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ALLOCATING CONSUMPTIVE WATER RIGHTS IN A
RIPARIAN JURISDICTION: DEFINING THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
INTERESTSt

Lynda L. Butler*
Histon·cally, water consumption in the eastern United States has been governed by the
common-law riparian doctrine. Fashioned to protect the domestic uses ofprivate individuals
in a largely agrarian society, the doctrine is not well suited to today's environment in which
the demands ofpublic users have grown enormously. Even in the East, where water has long
been abundant, the effects of increased consumption. pollution. and periodic drought have
brought the continued viability of the doctrine into question. Professor Butler examines the
legal standards which have developed under the riparian doctrine and identifies three principal areas in which the doctrine must be modified in order to satisfy present and future needs
ofprivate and public users in the eastern states: (I) traditional restrictions on the land which
may be benefitted by particular riparian rights, (2) the defining of "reasonable use" in terms
of low-density domestic consumption. and (3) na"ow restrictions on the transferability of
riparian rights. The Article recommends that reforms be instituted, particularly in recognition of the essential role that public users now play in meeting consumptive needs. While
changes are necessary, Professor Butler acknowledges that so long as the eastern states continue to enjoy relatively abundant water supplies legislatures will balk at instituting potentially costly overhauls ofthe common-law doctrine. Until the legislatures are willing to adopt
comprehensive reforms, the judiciary must assume responsibility for striking a more realistic
balance between the riparian rights of private individuals and the growing needs ofpublic
users. Reform will require the courts to be willing to interpret the riparian doctrine with more
flexibility, to modify "reasonable use" to encompass expandingpublic use, and to permit freer
transferabz1ity of consumptive n"ghts. At the same time. courts must remain cognizant ofthe
need to protect private users from unrestrained diversions by public entities. While this task
may seem both arduous and thankless for the courts, the issue ofwater distribution is ofsuch
basic importance that the challenge ought not to be refused.
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INTRODUCTION

In the water-rich East, 1 persistent water supply problems are a
relatively recent phenomenon.2 Until the 1970's, serious water supply
1. Because states in the eastern United States traditionally use a different system for allocating
consumptive water rights than states in the western United States, this Article primarily will discuss
states in the eastern portion of the country-that is, states lying in the humid region east of a line
cutting through an area between the 95th and tOOth meridians, or through the Dakotas, Nebraska,
Kansas, Oklahoma, and TexaS. See 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS§ 4.1, at 30 (1967).
Occasionally, however, courts in western states interpret and apply legal principles from the allocation system that developed in the East and some of these decisions also will be discussed. See infra
note 13.
2. In contrast, the arid West has faced many persistent water supply problems. One poten-
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problems rarely arose in the eastern United States unless a drought
occurred,3 and once the drought conditions subsided the problems
tially serious problem involves populous southern California. Because withdrawal from the Colorado River is expected to equal supply by 1985, the United States Supreme Court has ordered the
waters of the River apportioned among Arizona, Nevada, and California. Arizona v. California, 376
U.S. 340, 342 (1963). Southern California thus will have to search elsewhere fora water supply large
enough to meet the needs of its rapidly increasing population. For a discussion of southern California's water supply problems, see U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL
WATER SUMMARY 1983-HYDROLOGIC EVENTS AND IssUES 92 (Water-Supply Paper 2250, 1984).
The United States is not the only country facing serious water shortages. Conditions in other
parts of the world are so serious that the United Nations declared the 1980's to be the "water
decade." In a special meeting on November 10, 1980, the United Nations General Assembly designated 1981-1990 as the "International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade" and called
upon member states to commit themselves to the improvement of "standards and levels of service in
drinking water supply and sanitation." G.A. Res. 35/18, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 101
(1980). According to some estimates, three out of five people in developing countries do not have
access to safe drinking water, while three out of four have inadequate sanitation. See 18 U.N.
CHRoN. No. 1, at 29 (1981).
3. Since the mid-1970's, significant portions of the eastern United States have experienced several severe droughts. See generally Effects of the Drought on Small Business and Agriculture: Hearings Before the Select Committee on Small Business, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Water Resources

Problems Affecting the Northeast; The Drought. and Present and Future Water Supply Problems:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources ofthe Camm. on Public Works and Transportation, 91th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL
WATER SUMMARY 1983-HYDROLOGIC EVENTS AND IssUES (Water-Supply Paper 2250, 1984). Perhaps the most serious of the droughts occurred in 1983, when dry conditions persisted for months in
northeastern, mid-atlantic, southern, and mid-western states. Described by many as the worst
drought in fifty years, the 1983 water shortage caused an estimated seven billion dollars in damages
to the nation's crops. VA. WATER REsoURcES REsEARCH CENTER, 14 WATER NEws, No. 10, at 1
(Oct. 1983) [hereinafter cited as WATER NEws]; The Washington Post, Sept. 5, 1983, at At, col. 4.
In the mid-west, for instance, com production fell by 42% in Illinois, 42% in Indiana, and 49% in
Ohio as a result of the drought. STATISTICAL REPORTING SERVICE, CROP REPORTING BD., U.S.
DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, CROP PRODUCTION: 1983 SUMMARY, at B-16 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
STATISTICAL REPORTING SERVICE].
Similar losses occurred in the southern and mid-atlantic regions. In Virginia, for example, the
1983 drought affected 82 out of the state's 95 counties, causing an estimated $200 million in damages
to the state's crops. 14 WATER NEWS, supra, No. 10, at 1 (Oct. 1983). According to U.S.D.A.
figures for Virginia's agricultural industry, com production decreased by 73%, soybean production
by 44%, and tobacco production by 22%. STATISTICAL REPORTING SERVICE, supra, at B-16, ~17,
-27, -36. These decreases resulted in an estimated $13 million loss in sales to the state's potato and
commercial vegetable farmers, $30 million in com sales, $25 million in soybean sales, and $20 million in tobacco sales. 14 WATER NEws, supra, No.9, at 1 (Sept. 1983). By the end of the 1983
harvest season, the federal government had declared most of the affected counties disaster loan areas.
Declaration of Disaster Loan Area No. 3026, Amendment 1, 48 Fed. Reg. 55,796 (1983); Declaration of Disaster Loan Area No. 3026, Amendments 2-4, 49 Fed. Reg. 2,041-42 (1984); Declaration
of Disaster Loan Area No. 3026, Amendment 5, 49 Fed. Reg. 7,179 (1984).
Other southern and mid-atlantic states suffered similar agricultural losses. Tennessee officials,
for example, predicted that farmers of the state's major crops sustained $416 million in losses, while
in Arkansas losses were expected to exceed $500 million. Effects of the 1983 Drought on American

Agriculture: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural Production, Marketing, and Stabilization
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also disappeared.4 Except for the occasional dry spell, most users
could find sufficient water from nearby streams, lakes, or underground waters to satisfy their needs. Although droughts still are a
major cause of water supply problems in the East,5 other factors, such
as rapid population growth, extensive commercial development, and
pollution of available water supplies, are beginning to cause water
supply problems to arise even when drought conditions do not exist. 6
ofPrices of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture. Nutrition, and Forestry, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 63, 105
(1983) {statements of William H. Walker and Sen. Dale Bumpers).
The 1983 drought also had an adverse impact on farm-related industries. For instance, sales of
farm equipment decreased almost 50% in some areas of Virginia, while the state's livestock industries reported up to 12% decreases in productivity. 14 WATER NEWS, supra, No. 10, at 2 {Oct.
1983) (10% decrease in milk production by dairy cows, 2 to 12% decrease in eggs laid by chickens,
and a 2-month lag in the growth of steers). Because of the water shortage, experts predicted that the
costs of raising livestock could increase from 4 to 13%. Id. (poultry by 11-13%, hogs by 10-12%,
dairy cattle by 10-12%, and beef cattle by 4-7%).
Agricultural users were not the only ones detrimentally affected by the droughts. Many localities found themselves searching desperately for alternative sources of water after facing weeks of
dangerously low water supplies. In Virginia, for instance, a 1980 water shortage decreased groundwater tables by as much as four feet in some areas and caused water reservoir levels to fall significantly. M. HREzo, NORFOLK V. SUFFOLK: PROPOSED AGREEMENT LEAVES IMPORTANT IssUES
UNSE'ITLED 1 {Virginia Water Resources Research Center, Special Report No. 14, Nov. 1981).
Compare U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, WATER-DATA REPORT VA-81-1,
WATER REsOURCES DATA: VIRGINIA WATER YEAR 1981 (1982) {discussing effects of 1980
drought in Virginia) with 93 NAT'L CLIMATIC DATA CENTER, U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, CLIMA·
TOLOGICAL DATA: VIRGINIA, Nos. 7 to 9 {July-Sept. 1983) (discussing effects of 1983 drought,
when most areas of Virginia received less than half their normal rainfall). Drought conditions in
southeastern Virginia became so serious that the state's governor proclaimed a water resource emergency for the area. Gov. ofVa., Emergency Exec. Order No. 45(80) (Oct. 22, 1980). As late as midNovember of 1980, the city of Norfolk only had a 100-day water supply. STATE WATER STUDY
CoMM'N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL AssEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, S. Doc. No.
15, at 5 (1981). Due to the serious conditions, mandatory water use restrictions became the norm for
several months in southeastern localities. See, e.g., Chesapeake, Va., Ordinance No. 80-0-0188 {Aug.
19, 1980); Portsmouth, Va., Ordinance No. 1980-67 (Aug. 12, 1980). The area's two largest municipalities even adopted water rationing plans. Norfolk, Va., Ordinance No. 30,737 (Jul. 29, 1980);
Virginia Beach, Va., An Ordinance to Amend Section 37-ll{b) of the Code of the City of Virginia
Beach, Virginia (Oct. 13, 1980).
4. The recent droughts in the eastern United States have rekindled an interest in evaluating the
effectiveness of the common law allocation system, especially its effectiveness in providing for the
consumptive needs of the public. See, e.g., STATE WATER STUDY CoMM'N, REPORT TO THE GovERNOR AND GENERAL AssEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, S. Doc. No. 15 (1981); J. JONES, V. SIKORA, & J.
WOODWARD, STUDY OF TENNESSEE WATER REsOURCES LAW: LEGAL CoNSIDERATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE WATER MANAGEMENT UNDER CoNDmONS OF SHORTAGE (Tennessee Water Resources
Research Center, Research Report No. 97, Nov. 1983).
5. See supra note 3.
6. In Virginia, for example, the city of Virginia Beach has experienced a 52% increase in population within the last ten years and now bas about 5% of the state's population, U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
POPULATION-NUMBER OF INHABITANTS, U.S. SUMMARY 1-43, -177 (1982), yet the city does not
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As these factors increase the demand on the East's available
water resources, more and more eastern localities are experiencing
difficulty meeting the consumptive needs of their inhabitants. Though
it would be easy to attribute the localities' problems to the decreased
water supply, the common-law allocation system followed in many
eastern states is at least as responsible for the localities' ineffectiveness
in responding to water shortages. Because the common-law system
developed in an agrarian society, many of the legal principles governing allocation and use of water resources tend to protect low-density uses by private individuals and to impede commercial, industrial,
and municipal development. Thus, when a locality attempts to resolve its water supply problems, its efforts typically encounter strong
resistance among private users and those remaining "public users''
still fairly rich in water resources? who argue that the common law
restricts redistribution of water resources for public use.8
States have responded in several ways to the ineffectiveness of the
common law allocation system in meeting the consumptive needs of
the public. One approach taken by some states is to adopt comprehensive reforms that totally replace the common-law rules with a permit system covering all types of water resources. 9 Despite the
have a substantial source of fresh surface water within its boundaries. Similar increases in population, and thus in demand on surface waters, are occurring in other areas of the eastern United States.
See generally 1 U.S. WATER REsOURCES CoUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER REsoURCES, 1975-2000
(1978). By the year 2000 experts predict that water use nationwide will increase 27% over the 1975
level. Id. at 29. For a discussion of the effects of pollution and commercial development on the
East's available water resources see U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEPT. OF mE INTERIOR, NATIONAL WATER SUMMARY 1983-HYDROLOGIC EVENTS AND IssUES 80 (Water-Supply Paper 2250,
1984).
7. The phrase "public user'' shall refer to a municipality, county, or any other local political
unit or agent of any of the above who is conducting, or planning to conduct, a use of a watercourse
that is, or will be, primarily for the benefit of the public. The phrase "private user'' shall refer to a
party who is not a political unit or an agent of such a unit and who is conducting, or is planning to
conduct, a use that is not, or will not be, primarily for the benefit of the public.
8. A conflict involving a Virginia municipality, the Army Corps of Engineers, and several
private parties demonstrates the hostility that can exist. In the record of that case, litigants accused
each other of using "Pearl Harbor'' tactics. Memorandum of James B. Hunt, Jr., Governor of North
Carolina, in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 6-9, City of Virginia Beach v. Roanoke
River Basin Ass'n, Civil Action No. 84-11-N (B.D. Va. Feb. 2, 1984). That case, and two other
suits, involve a dispute over Virginia Beach's plan to build a pipeline from Lake Gaston to the
municipality in order to meet the increased demand for water brought about by its population
growth. For further discussion of the litigation see W. WALKER & P. BRIDGEMAN, ANATOMY OF A
WATER PROBLEM: VIRGINIA BEACH'S EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS TIME FOR A CHANGE (Virginia
Water Resources Research Center, Special Report No. 18, Aug. 1985).
9. Most comprehensive proposals are derived from the Model Water Code, drafted in 1972.
See F. MALONEY, R. AUSNESS, & J. MORRIS, MODEL WATER CoDE (1972). Florida has adopted a
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persuasive arguments in favor of this approach, 10 most states in the
eastern United States have not followed it, preferring instead to retain
the common law system and to modify it with less comprehensive
reforms. 11 The high cost of implementing the comprehensive reforms
appears to be one of the main reasons why the reforms have not been
comprehensive permit system based on that Code. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.011 to .619 (West
1974 & Supp. 1984). Together with Iowa, it shares the distinction of having the only really comprehensive water allocation systems. See IOWA CoDE ANN. §§ 455B.261 to .280 (Supp. 1984). The
Model Water Use Act was approved in 1958, but it has been adopted by only one state, Hawaii, and
even there in modified form. See HAWAll REv. STAT.§§ 177-1 to -35 (1976). A third comprehensive system was proposed by the National Water Commission in 1973. See NATIONAL WATER
CoMM'N, WATER POUCIES FOR THE FUTURE 280-94 (1973). See generally Maloney & Ausness, A
Modem Proposal for State Regulation of Consumptive Uses of Water, 22 HAsTINGs L.J. 523 (1971)
(discussing reform proposals).
10. Besides criticizing the common-law allocation system for its ineffectiveness in providing for
public consumptive needs, proponents of reform also point out that the common-law system improperly distinguishes between the different classifications of waters. This approach no longer can be
justified, reformists argue, because scientists now agree that all waters are part of one interrelated
hydrologic system. See infra note 20. See generally Trelease, New Water Legislation: Drafting for
Development, Efficient Allocation and Environmental Protection, 12 LAND & WATER L. REv. 385
(1977) (discussing arguments for reform). Because commentators have debated the desirability of
reform for years, this Article does not focus on that issue.
11. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 143-215.11 to -215.22 (1983). Some of the states preferring
the partial reform approach have retained the common-law system without significant amendments.
The primary source of law governing water use in Virginia, for example, is the common law.
Although some statutory changes have been made, most of the changes tend only to supplement the
common law and do not alter it in any significant respect. But see Ground Water Act, VA. CoDE
§§ 62.1-44.83 to -44.107 (1982). Enacted on an ad hoc basis without any serious attempt to integrate
them with one another, these amendments are scattered throughout the Virginia Code and delegate
various types of duties and responsibilities to eleven different state agencies. For a discussion of
these agencies see W. WALKER & W. Cox, BULLETIN 9: WATER REsOURCES LAWS 1N VIRGINIA
141-45 (Virginia Water Resources Research Center, 1968). Because the agencies tend to focus only
on a particular aspect of a water resource problem and generally have separate jurisdictional powers,
little coordination occurs between the various agencies. When this situation is combined with the
independent power that local political units have over the resources within their boundaries, a confusing and uncertain system for managing Virginia's water resources results.

In recent years some efforts have been made to coordinate control and governance of Virginia's
waters. The General Assembly, for instance, established the Virginia Water Resources Research
Center to collect and evaluate data about the state's water resources. VA. CODE§§ 23-135.7:8 to
-135.7:13 (1980). Also, in the past few years the General Assembly has passed important statutory
provisions dealing with the formulation of state water policy and the establishment of a planning
process. See, e.g., VA. CoDE §§ 62.1-11, -44.36 (1982). For a discussion of states which also retain
the common law without significant amendments, see, e.g., Aycock, Introduction to Water Use Law
in North Carolina, 46 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1967); Cohen, Water Law in Alabama-A Comparative Survey, 24 ALA. L. REv. 453 (1972); Cribbett, Water as a Species ofPrivate Property: The Illinois Jliew,
47 ILL. B.J. 449 (1959); Lauer, Water Law in Michigan, in WATER REsOURCES AND THE LAW 423
(1958); Weston & Gray, Legal Control of Consumptive Water Use in Pennsylvania Power Plants, 80
DICK. L. REv. 353 (1976); Note, The Riparian Rights Doctrine in South Carolina, 21 S.C.L. REv.
757 (1969); Note, Ohio Surface Water Rights, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 525 (1969); Note, Riparian Water
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adopted in more eastern states. 12 Until the problems created by the
common-law system outweigh the costs of implementing a new allocation system, most states having water-rich environments probably
Law-Lakeshore Developments, 1966 WIS. L. REv. 172, Comment, Water Rights in Tennessee, 27
TENN. L. REv. 557 (1960).
Other states preferring the partial reform approach have revised the common-law system substantially. But even in those states, important statutory exemptions usually continue application of
the common law to many users. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 151.140 (Bobbs-Merrill1980)
(exempting dcnestic and agricultural uses); N.J. STAT• .ANN. § 58:1A-7 (West 1982) (exempting
diversions under 100,000 gallons per day). For a discussion of water reforms in eastern states and of
the problems caused by the exemptions see Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Program for Reform, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 547 (1983).
12. Although it is easy to document the reluctance of many eastern states to adopt the comprehensive reforms, it is not as easy to explain their reluctance. Proponents of the reforms have advanced some persuasive arguments in support of their reforms. The unwillingness to adopt a
comprehensive solution may be due, at least in part, to the fact that a long-term water crisis has not
yet arisen in most eastern states. In its report WATER Poucms FOR THE FUTURE, the National
Water Commission acknowledges this point and even states that it "does not recommend the immediate adoption of permit statutes by all Eastern States." NATIONAL WATER CoMM'N, WATER POL·
ICIES FOR THE FuTuRE 280 (1973). As the Commission then explains, "[a]ny change in the law has
some costs; a fully developed permit system with extensive recordkeeping and provisions for allocation of water would have high costs relative to the value of much of the water being regulated." Id.
Political factors also may have contributed to the comprehensive reformists' lack of success in
many eastern states. In Virginia, for example, it would appear that a comprehensive water bill failed
to secure passage in part because it would place all regulatory power at the state level. Although the
bill would authorize the state regulatory agency to appoint local advisory boards, this power is
discretionary. The Virginia Water Law, H.B. 1420, 1981 Va. Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 62.1-211.11.
See generally Butler, Commentary on the Proceedings of the Water Rights Symposium, 24 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 767, 782-85 (1983) (discussing the role of the political process in allocation and
management of Virginia's water resources). To the extent that political factors explain the failures of
comprehensive proposals, those factors demonstrate that the proposals have not achieved a balance
between the competing concerns that is acceptable in many riparian jurisdictions.
Regardless of the reason or reasons for a state legislature's reluctance to adopt comprehensive
reforms, it is apparent that the policy formulation and planning processes for water resources tend to
slow down whenever the drought conditions subside and water becomes plentiful again in most areas
of a normally water-rich state. In Virginia, for example, the severity of the droughts in 1977 and
1980 precipitated an extensive state-wide evaluation process that culminated with the proposal of a
comprehensive water allocation system, The Virginia Water Law, H.B. 1420, 1981 Va. Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. See STATE WATER STUDY CoMM'N, REPORT TO THE GoVERNOR AND THE GENERAL
AssEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, S. Doc. No. 15, at 3-11 (1981) (describing the evaluation process). See
generally W. Cox, L. SHABMAN, S. BATIE, & J. LooNEY, VIRGINIA'S WATER REsoURCES: POUCY
AND MANAGEMENT IssuES (1981). Introduced in the state legislature after the drought conditions
had disappeared, the bill failed to pass the legislature. The Virginia Water Law, H.B. 1420, 1981 Va.
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (introduced Jan. 19, 1981, died in committee). Some contend that this
failure demonstrates the crisis-oriented approach of the evaluation process. See, e.g., STATE WATER
STUDY CoMM'N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND GENERAL AssEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, S. Doc.
No. 24, at 8 (1982) (statement by Louis L. Guy, Jr., P.E., that "[t]he end of the drought in Tidewater may turn out to be a curse instead of a blessing if it allows us to stick our heads back in the
sand"). In some areas, though, the need for water has become too great to wait for the next crisis.
See infra notes 169 & 170. For a description of more recent efforts to reform Virginia's water law see
16 WATER NEWS, supra note 3, No.7, at 5 (July 1985).
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will continue to use the common-law system, with some relatively minor modifications. These states generally lack sufficient incentive, in
the short run, to adopt a totally new system.
Given, then, that many states in the eastern portion of the country still adhere to common-law principles to a significant extent, it
becomes important to determine whether those principles can be updated and modified to permit better resolution of public water supply
problems. One of the critical aspects of the common law that needs to
be addressed in making this determination concerns its approach to
allocating consumptive rights in natural watercourses between public
and private parties. Those common-law principles governing allocation of rights in natural watercourses collectively are known as the
riparian doctrine. 13 Because the doctrine was developed in an era
13. The riparian doctrine primarily developed in states fairly rich in water resources-that is,
in states in the eastern portion of the United States. See supra note 1 (giving a more accurate division). Two variations of the riparian doctrine have developed: the natural flow theory and the
reasonable use theory. Under the former a riparian owner is "entitled to the natural flow of the
water of the running stream through or along his land, in its accustomed channel, undiminished in
quantity and unimpaired in quality." Dimmock v. City of New London, 157 Conn. 9, 245 A.2d 569,
572 (1968). This right is more limited than the right of a riparian under the "reasonable use" theory.
In a "reasonable use" jurisdiction, every riparian generally can conduct reasonable uses even though
they may affect the natural flow. 7 R. Cl.ARK, supra note 1, § 611 (1976). See generally 4 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 210-13 (1977); 2 H. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS§ 464 (1904). Since most riparian jurisdictions follow the "reasonable use" theory, the Article will focus on it.
Where water was scarce, the riparian doctrine proved inefficient and counterproductive. Because the riparian doctrine gives each riparian an equal right to make reasonable uses of a watercourse, see infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text, using such an approach in the arid West would
mean that most users would not have sufficient water to make a productive use. See 1 R. Cl.ARK,
supra note 1, § 4.1, at 30. The drier parts of the country thus developed an allocation system based
on the "first-in-time" principle. Known as the prior appropriation doctrine, this system basically
awards a superior right to use water to the party who first appropriates or exercises dominion over
the water for a beneficial use. The right continues as long as the beneficial use is exercised. See 2 H.
FARNHAM, supra, § 649. "Beneficial use" generally refers to the "use of such water as may be
necessary for some useful and beneficial purpose in connection with the land from which it is taken."
State v. McLean, 62 N.M. 264, 308 P.2d 983, 988 (1957). States following the prior appropriation
doctrine, either in its common law or statutory form, include Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 1 R. CLARK, supra note 1, § 4.1, at 31. See generally 4 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 213-15 (1977).
Some of the western states following the prior appropriation doctrine also apply the riparian
doctrine in certain circumstances. Under the California version, for example, the law of prior appropriation applies to acquisitions on public lands, while the riparian doctrine applies to ~~earns which
flow through private land and which have not been previously diverted. 1 S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS
IN THE WESTERN STATES§ 116, at 137 (3d ed. 1911). Other states following this approach include
Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. 1 R.
CLARK, supra note 1, § 4.1, at 31.
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when most users were private individuals, its principles traditionally
make certain assumptions about users that limit their ability to accommodate the public's consumptive needs without judicial
modification.
Perhaps the most serious limitation is that traditional riparian
principles generally prohibit diversions. To operate a public water
supply effectively, a local government often must divert water from a
watercourse and store it for future use by its inhabitants. When an
entire region is water-poor, the diversions may even require an interbasin transfer-that is, the diversion and transfer of water from a
watercourse located in one basin to the basin of the water-poor locality. Under traditional riparian principles, diversions and other consumptive uses 14 conducted for the public generally are not recognized
as legitimate consumptive uses.
In view of the common law's restrictive approach to defining
public consumptive rights, it is not surprising that some local governments still subject to the riparian doctrine have attempted to circumvent its constraints through their eminent domain powers. 15
Although this alternative is an appealing way to solve public water
problems, it has its weaknesses and limitations. Besides requiring
substantial financial resources, it also raises questions about whether a
locality should be forced to pay for consumptive use rights when a
private party would not have to pay in a similar situation. On a more
theoretical level, not all consumptive uses conducted by a locality
may qualify as a public use under a state's eminent domain law.l 6
Furthermore, even if acquiring public consumptive rights by eminent
domain is legally and financially feasible, that course of action does
not eliminate the need to reexamine traditional riparian principles.
Before a court can determine what private property rights a local government must acquire, it must understand how riparian principles define private and public interests.
14. Consumptive use has been defined as including those "uses or diversions which contemplate substantial reduction of supply," while nonconsumptive use refers to those "which are beneficial but do not result in planned diminution." 1 R. CLARK, supra note 1, § 55.2. Uses in the first
category would include irrigation, domestic uses, and the dumping of raw sewage, while the generation of electricity, navigation, and recreational uses would qualify as nonconsumptive. Id. See also
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:1A-3b, -3e (West 1982) (giving statutory definition for permit provision).
See generally 1. HIRSHLEIFER, J. DEHAVEN, & J. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY: EcONOMICS, TECH·
NOLOGY, AND PoucY 66 (1969) (discussing an economic view of consumptive and nonconsumptive
uses).
15. For examples of localities currently contemplating such action see infra notes 169-70.
16. See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
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This Article will examine traditional riparian principles to determine whether a more balanced accommodation between private and
public consumptive interests in watercourses 17 can be achieved by the
courts of a riparian jurisdiction. 18 The Article will begin by discussing the conventional legal principles, rationales, and assumptions still
used by courts in riparian jurisdictions to define private consumptive
rights in watercourses. Three aspects of these principles that are crucial to determining whether the public has consumptive rights will be
examined: limitations on the area that can benefit from a watercourse, limitations on the quantity of water that can be used, and limitations on the transferability of water rights.
After examining how these limitations define private consumptive rights, the Article will examine the nature of the public interest.
It will begin by evaluating the extent to which the legal principles
governing private rights also recognize public consumptive interests.
Then it will consider whether the common-law principles permit the
development of exceptions to accommodate the public interest. As in
the private rights section, the discussion in the public rights section
will focus on whether the judiciary can modernize the riparian doctrine to achieve a more effective balance between public and private
consumptive interests. 19 From the discussion it should become appar17. Although this Article will focus on natural watercourses, groundwater also can be an important water source. See generally infra note 20 (defining various water classifications). Also, as
traditionally defined, the phrase "watercourse" does not include lakes. But because the law governing use of lakes, known as the littoral rights doctrine, is very similar to the law governing use of
watercourses, much of the legal and policy analysis of the Article should apply to lakes as well. See
generally 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 28.56 (A. Casner ed. 1954); 6 R. POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY§ 709(2)(b)(iv) (1984).
18. Although many states in the eastern United States have modified the common law in some
respects, the legal and policy analysis conducted in the Article still should apply to most of those
states. Only a few states have adopted comprehensive reforms that totally displace the traditional
common-law pnnciples. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. For an application of some of the
ideas expressed in this Article to Virginia see Butler, Defining Public Consumptive Rights in Virginia's Rivers, Streams and Lakes: Is Legislative Reform Needed?, 11 VA. B.A.J., No. 1, at 14 (Winter 1985).
Whenever the phrase "riparian jurisdiction" is used in this Article, it will refer to those jurisdictions that apply traditional riparian principles in some meaningful manner, whether it be as the
primary source of law, as the source of law governing exempted users under a permit system, or as a
theory subordinate to the prior appropriation doctrine.
19. The Article will not consider whether other common-law concepts, principally the public
trust doctrine, provide independent bases for defining public consumptive rights. As a general matter, these other theories recognize that navigable waters are subject to certain rights and interests.
Because the other theories are not related to the riparian doctrine, determining whether they recognize public consumptive rights would involve a discussion of principles and policies distinct from
those of the riparian doctrine. See infra note 164.
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ent that the judiciary could make several helpful changes in the riparian doctrine to provide greater recognition of public consumptive
rights. But effective implementation will require an innovative judiciary willing to take an active role in developing a responsive water
allocation system.

II. PRIVATE CONSUMPTIVE RIGHTS
Under the common law each water resource is classified according to its place in the "hydrologic," or water circulation, cycle and
separate legal doctrines are developed for the major classifications.2o
Private consumptive rights in a natural watercourse, one of the main
classifications, are governed by the riparian doctrine, the basic tenet of
which is that a party owning land abutting a watercourse has the right
to make reasonable uses of the water in that watercourse for the benefit of his riparian land.21 Because these use rights arise as incidents to
ownership of land abutting a watercourse, they generally are considered to be vested property rights.22 As the holder of vested rights, a
riparian proprietor can seek protection of his rights at law or in equity
20. The main classifications under the common law generally are natural watercourses,
groundwater, and diffused surface water. Natural watercourses are defined as those waters "flowing
in a definite channel with a bed and banks or sides," 1 R. CLARK, supra note 1, § 52.1(B), at 308;
groundwater refers to "water found in the soil below the top of the zone of saturation, which may or
may not coincide with the •water table,' depending on nature of the soil or composition of the aquifer," id. §50, at 284; and finally, the phrase diffused surface water denotes water "which is diffused
over the surface of the ground, derived from the falling rains and melting snows, and continues to be
such until it reaches some well-defined channel . . . and • • . flow[s] with other waters • •• •" 3 H.
FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 878, at 2556 (citing Crawford v. Rambo, 44 Ohio St. 287, 7 N.E. 429
(1886)).
Scientists and legal commentators now agree that the law governing the main types of water
resources should be integrated because each type is part of one hydrologic cycle. See NATIONAL
WATER CoMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 233 (1973); Hines, A Decade ofExperience
Under the Iowa Water Permit System (Part One), 7 NAT. REsoURCES J. 499, 520-21 (1967).
Groundwater flow, for example, may add to the volume of a watercourse, while groundwater withdrawal may lower its water level. See Davis, Wells&: Streams: Relationship at Law, 37 Mo. L. REv.
189, 193-97 (1972). Dealing with each classification separately ignores this type of interrelationship
and often leads to inconsistencies.
21. The Massachusetts Supreme Court described the doctrine in the following manner:
. . . A proprietor may make any reasonable use of the water of the stream in connection with his riparian estate and for lawful purposes within the watershed, provided he
leaves the current diminished by no more than is reasonable, having regard for the like
right to enjoy the common property by other riparian owners.
Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87, 89 (1913); see also Bouris v.
Largent, 94 ill. App. 2d 251, 236 N.B.2d 15, 17 (1968); St. Lawrence Shores v. State, 60 Misc. 2d 74,
302 N.Y.S.2d 606, 608, 613 (1969); Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 130 S.E. 408,
410 (1925). See generally 2 H . FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 466.
22. Dunlop v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 212 N.C. 814, 195 S.E. 43, 45-46 (1938); Hite v.
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and cannot be deprived of them by the state without due process. 23
Nor do riparian rights have to be exercised to merit protection: a
riparian does not forfeit his rights because of nonuse and conversely
does not acquire a priority over other riparians just because he has
exercised his rights for a longer period of time. 24
The rights of a riparian owner are not absolute, for other riparian
proprietors25 along the same watercourse also have an "equal right"
to make reasonable uses of the watercourse.26 This "equal" right does
not entitle a riparian to conduct uses identical to those exercised by
another riparian.27 But it does mean that a riparian must be conTown of Luray, 175 Va. 218,8 S.E.2d 369,372 (1940); Mumpowerv. City ofBristol, 90 Va. 151, 17
S.E. 853, 854 (1893). For further discussion of the nature of riparian rights see infra note 26.
23. See Leitch v. Sanitary Dist., 369 ill. 469, 17 N.E.2d 34, 36 (1938); Grinels v. Daniel, 110
Va. 874, 67 S.E. 534, 536 (1910).
24. Harris v. Southeast Portland Lumber Co., 123 Or. 549, 262 P. 243, 245 (1927); Leonard v.
St. John, 101 Va. 752, 45 S.E. 474, 477 (1903). However, a riparian who does not exercise his rights
may lose them if another party meets the requirements for a prescriptive use. Harris, 262 P. at 245;
see also Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co. v. People's Ditch Co., 174 Cal. 441, 163 P. 497, 501 (1917).
25. The phrase "riparian proprietor" will be used in the same manner as in the REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTS, referring to "a person who is in possession of riparian land or who owns an
estate in it." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 844 (1977).
26. Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459,462 (1912); see also Elmore v.
Ingalls, 245 Ala. 481, 17 So. 2d 674, 675 (1944); Gehlen v. Knorr, 101 Iowa 700, 70 N.W. 757, 758
(1897). The rights of a riparian proprietor usually include: (1) the right of access to the watercourse
that flows through or by the riparian land, including a right of way to the line of navigability of a
navigable watercourse, Town of Islip v. Powell, 78 Misc. 2d 1007, 358 N.Y.S.2d 985, 992 (1974);
Thurston v. Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 140 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1965); Grinels v. Daniel, 110 Va. 874, 67
S.E. 534, 536 (1910); (2) the right to accretions, State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 126, 179 S.E.2d 371, 384
(1971); Steelman v. Field, 142 Va. 383, 128 S.E. 558, 559 (1925); (3) the right to dredge deposits of
sand or gravel that extend beyond low water mark, Bloom v. Water Resources Comm'n, 157 Conn.
528, 254 A.2d 884, 887 (1969); and (4) the right to construct a wharf, landing, or pier upon the bed,
extending out to the line of navigability where one exists, provided the structure does not impede
navigation, Causey v. Gray, 250 Md. 380,243 A.2d 575, 581 (1968); Peek v. City of Hampton, 115
Va. 855, 80 S.E. 593 (1914). See generally 1 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 62. Significantly, many
of these rights only can be exercised on the bed of the watercourse. Although a riparian proprietor
located on one bank of a nonnavigable watercourse usually owns to the middle of the stream bed,
see, e.g., Allot v. Wilmington Light & Power Co., 288 ill. 541, 123 N.E. 731, 734 (1919), title to
riparian land abutting a navigable watercourse generally does not extend beyond the low water
mark, see, e.g., Flanagan v. City of Philadelphia, 42 Pa. 219, 230 (1862). Riparian rights thus extend
to the soil of the beds even though the riparian proprietor does not own the bed. See generally 1 H.
FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 63.
Some riparian rights have been altered by statute. For example, under the common law the
right to build wharves and piers apparently includes the right to erect such a structure for commercial use. See Grinels v. Daniel, 110 Va. 874, 67 S.E. 534, 535 (1910). The Virginia General Assembly has modified that right by limiting the construction of wharves or other similar structures to
private wharves, piers, or landings used for noncommercial purposes. See VA. CoDE § 62.1-164
(1982).
27. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 850 comment d (1977). It perhaps would be
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scious of the common right of other riparians located above and below his property and must not unduly interfere with their riparian
rights in exercising his own.28 As a general matter, then, each riparian is entitled to receive and use the flow of a watercourse after reasonable use by riparians upstream from him but may not prevent
riparians downstream from him from exercising that same right.
Under the riparian doctrine, two key principles define and limit
consumptive interests in watercourses. The first is that a riparian proprietor can exercise his rights only for the benefit of riparian land.
The second is that a riparian's use must be reasonable. When these
two principles developed, most riparian users were private agrarians.
As a consequence, the principles reflect certain assumptions and legal
standards that have restricted uses by local governments and private
businesses. Perhaps the most restrictive aspects of the principles are
their bias toward low-density uses and their disapproving view of unrestrained transfers of use rights.
Although preservation of agrarian values remains a valid objective in many areas, it should not be the primary objective of a water
allocation system.29 To be effective, a water allocation system should
promote an efficient use of the allocated resource for a variety of purposes. 30 Granted, priorities of use must exist to help resolve conflicts,
but the system still should retain sufficient flexibility to permit the
more accurate to describe riparians' rights as being equal in the sense that each riparian is entitled to
"the same protection from interference with his use that the law gives to other riparian proprietors."
I d.
28. See Bouris v. Largent, 94 ill. App. 2d 251, 236 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1968); White v. Whitney
Mfg., 60 S.C. 254, 38 S.E. 456, 460 (1901); Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E.
459, 462 (1912). An upper riparian, for example, generally cannot divert the flow of a watercourse
away from a lower riparian, 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 496, and a lower riparian cannot
obstruct a watercourse so as to cause flooding of riparian land located above it, see id. § 546.
29. As one commentator explained:
A modem water law system must not only promote the welfare of water users, it must
accomplish the state's social and economic objectives, coordinate private activities with
state projects, protect the interests of the public in common uses and environmental values,
and integrate the activities of individual and corporate users into comprehensive state plans
for water development and management.
Trelease, supra note 10, at 388. Another commentator identified the primary objectives of a water
allocation system as including the promotion of an "optimal use of the resource" and "fairness."
Ausness, supra note 11, at 576.
30. For purposes of this Article, the term "efficiency'' will be used in a nontechnical manner to
describe an outcome or use that maximizes the benefits and minim;zes the costs associated with the
use or outcome. For a more extensive definition and discussion of efficiency see C. MEYERS & R.
POSNER, MARKET TRANSFERS oF WATER RIGHTS: TowARD AN IMPROVED
REsoURCES

2-4 (National Water Commission, Legal Study No.4, 1971).
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shifting of resources to new uses. 31 Furthermore, to be effective, a
water allocation system should distribute resources in an equitable
manner. 32 One way to promote an equitable distribution of water resources is to ensure that parties have the opportunity to become new
users. Another way is to ratify current expectations about allocation
and use of the allocated resource.
Parts II.A. and II.B. will consider whether it is possible to redefine the legal standards that have developed under the two key riparian principles in a manner that promotes these modem policy
objectives and achieves a better accommodation of public consumptive needs, without seriously undermining the private interests at
stake. Part II.C. then will consider the ability of the riparian doctrine
to respond to water supply problems by examining the extent to
which riparian rights can be redistributed.
A.

The Riparian Land Limitation: Restricting the Area
to be Benefitted

The riparian land limitation serves an important function under
the common law: it restricts the area that can benefit from use of a
watercourse and thus protects present users. If physical constraints
were not imposed on the area that could be benefitted by use of a
watercourse, a present user could not be reasonably assured that sufficient water would exist in the future. At least on a general level, then,
the riparian land limitation serves some valid policy objectives. Besides protecting the reliance interests of present users by providing
some security for their uses, the limitation also encourages certain
types of investments and uses of water resources.
Closer scrutiny, however, will demonstrate that the limitation, as
traditionally interpreted, fails to achieve many of the policy objectives
of an effective allocation system. Because of the restrictive approach
taken by the courts under the riparian doctrine, the standards and
31. See infra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
32. As used in this Article, the terms "equity" and "equitable distribution" will refer to
whether a use, outcome, or distribution is fair or acceptable to interested parties, as well as to society
in general. Factors relevant to deciding whether an outcome is equitable would include the final
distribution achieved by the outcome, the process used to choose the outcome, the extent to which
the outcome gives equal access to water resources, and the extent to which the outcome ratifies
reasonable expectations. Cj. Ausness, supra note 11, at 576 (describing fairness as meaning "equal
access to the resource, freedom from arbitrary treatment, and assurances that reasonable expectations will not be frustrated by a regulatory agency"). For a more extensive discussion of the meaning
of equitable distribution as applied to natural resources see J. HIRSHLEIFER, J. DEHAVEN, & J.
MILLIMAN, supra note 14, at 76-77.
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interpretations that have developed under the riparian land requirement often hinder development by many private users, rather than
promote it, and pose major obstacles to public users poor in water
resources. Four principal tests for identifying riparian land have been
developed by the courts.33 First, to be riparian land, a tract must
have physical contact with a watercourse. Second, a tract must be
located within the watershed of a watercourse to be considered riparian to that watercourse. Third, the riparian owner must have acquired title to the entire tract that he is claiming as riparian land in
one transaction. Finally, the tract must be unitary in a physical sense.
Each test will be examined now to determine whether a court could
improve the test's effectiveness without seriously impairing the private
interests at stake.
1.

The Physical Contact Test

The most obvious test for identifying riparian land is that a tract
must have physical contact with a watercourse to be riparian.34 Without this initial standard for identifying riparian land, several theoretical and practical problems would arise. If a tract of land could
qualify as riparian land without being in physical contact with a watercourse, then a key premise of the riparian doctrine would be violated: that riparian rights arise as incidences of ownership of la11d
adjoining a watercourse. Although other rational standards for defining consumptive rights exist,35 the physical contact standard appears
to reflect the land settlement pattern of early Americans, who preferred to purchase waterfront property rather than land not abutting a
watercourse.36 By preserving use of a watercourse for parties with
33. Although there are some variations as to how these restrictions are interpreted, most riparian jurisdictions appear to have accepted the general concepts behind them.
34. See 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 463a; see also Thompson v. Enz, 379 Mich. 667, 154
N.W.2d 473, 478 (1967).
35. In the arid West, for example, the prior appropriation doctrine generally provides a more
effective way of defining consumptive interests. See supra note 13.
36. Admittedly it is difficult to determine which came first in America: the preference for
waterfront property or the riparian doctrine. That the doctrine existed in seventeenth century England suggests that it affected, instead of reflected, the settlement patterns of colonists. Though this
argument is appealing, it ignores the early settlers' preoccupation with survival, which on more than
one occasion caused them to act first and seek legal ratification of their conduct later. See, e.g., 10
W. HENING, VIRGINIA'S STATUTES AT LARGE, ch. 11, at 38 ("[W]hereas great numbers of people
have settled in the country upon the western waters . . . for which they have been hitherto prevented from suing out patents or obtaining legal titles by the king . . •"); see also id. at 39
("[W]hereas several families . . • have settled themselves in villages or townships, under some agreement between the inhabitants of laying off the same into town lots . .. [t]hat six hundred and forty
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waterfront property, the standard protects the premium paid by those
parties for the location of their land.37
Moreover, if the physical contact test were not used, the owner of
land considered to be riparian to a watercourse, but not contiguous to
it, would not have any access to the watercourse. The landowner thus
could not use the watercourse to benefit his land unless he purchased
access rights or unless the courts decided to recognize such rights as
riparian rights. Because of this problem, owners of nonwaterfront
property would not be reasonable in expecting to acquire use rights in
a nearby watercourse as an incident to their ownership of the property. The physical contact standard thus ratifies general expectations
about the extent of private ownership interests in waterfront and
nonwaterfront property.
Interpreting the standard too literally, though, can lead to an unnecessarily restrictive approach to riparian rights. If, for example, the
courts construe the riparian doctrine to allow the transfer of riparian
acres of land •.. shall be reserved for . . . [their] use . . . until a true representation of their case
can be made to the general assembly . • . .").
The settlers, for example, would have preferred waterfront property because such property provided access to ships carrying supplies and to the abundant supply of food and water found in many
American rivers and streams. See 1 P. BRUCE, EcoNOMIC HisTORY OF VIRGINIA IN TilE SEVENTEENTII CENTURY 104-16 (1907). Additionally, besides being easier to defend than many inland
properties, waterfront land tended to be more fertile than soil farther away from a watercourse.
Tobacco, for instance could be grown quite profitably on many lowlands in Virginia. See id. at 7778. Early colonists contemplating settling inland property also would have been discouraged by the
tedious and difficult process of clearing the land. See id. at 257-58.
37. The premium paid by settlers for waterfront property would not have been reflected in the
actual value paid for the land. During the 1700's and 1800's, the purchase price of land generally
was set at a constant rate for a specified number of acres. Under the land grant system of early
colonial Virginia, for example, a party could acquire the right to claim 50 acres of waste and unappropriated land by immigrating to the colony at his own expense or paying for the transportation of
another to the colony. Instructions to Sir George Yeardley (1618), reprinted in 2 VA. MAGAZINE OF
HISTORY & BIOGRAPHY 154, 164-65 (1894-1895). By the early 1700's this land grant system was
replaced by another system that permitted a party to purchase directly the right to a specified
number of acres. Under the later system, a party who paid a set fee would receive a certificate, called
a treasury warrant, entitling the party to take up and patent 50 acres of waste and unappropriated
land. Before he could obtain a patent, though, the party would have to present his warrant to the
surveyor of the particular county where he wanted to take up land, have the surveyor survey the
appropriate land, and comply with a few other procedural requirements. 1 EXEC. J. OF THE CouNCIL OF CoLONIAL VA. 457 (1699). For a discussion of both systems see F. HARRISON, VIRGINIA
LAND GRANTS 42-51 (1925); VA. STATE ARCHIVES, VIRGINIA LAND OFFICE INVENTORY vii-xii
(1981). Thus, to obtain a patent for waterfront land, a party would have to acquire a warrant before
any other party and then successfully settle the land as required by the patenting process. The
premium paid for waterfront property then would include the time and capital required to obtain a
patent for the maximum amount of waterfront property that could be acquired as quickly as
possible.
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rights, as they generally do with property rights, then a literal application of the physical contact test can create serious conflicts with the
transferability principle. 38 Whereas the transferability principle
would permit alienation of riparian rights to the owner of land not
contiguous to the watercourse, a literal interpretation of the physical
contact standard would not allow the purchaser to exercise the rights
for the benefit of his land. To avoid these problems, the contact standard, as well as the other tests for riparian land, should be interpreted
in light of its key policies and functions. As will be shown, this more
policy-oriented approach could help to minimize conflicts within the
doctrine and to accommodate the public interest. 39

2.

The Watershed Test

A second test for riparian land, the watershed test, defines the
maximum amount of land that can qualify as riparian land. Under
this standard land must be within the watershed of a natural watercourse to be riparian to that watercourse.40 If, for example, a landowner's tract of land abuts a watercourse, but extends beyond its
watershed, that p-art of the tract outside of the watershed cannot qualify as riparian land, in spite of the physical contact.41 As one court
explained, the watershed limitation ensures that any water withdrawn, but not fully used, by one riparian will remain within the watershed and thus be able to return to the watercourse for use by other
riparians in the watershed.42
From a scientific perspective, the watershed test seems an appropriate way to define the maximum area that can benefit from use of a
watercourse. The rationale used to explain the limitation suggests
that a watershed is the natural drainage area of a stream or river.
38. See infra Part II.C.
39. See infra Part II.C.2.
40. Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87, 88 (1913); Sayles v. City
of Mitchell, 60 S.D. 592, 245 N.W.390, 391 (1932). See generally 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13,
§ 463a. Without further restriction, the physical contact standard could include huge tracts of land
within the category of riparian land. As long as the tract "touched" the watercourse at some point,
the entire tract arguably could qualify as riparian land. Apparently recognizing this problem, the
courts have added several other qualifications to the definition of riparian land.
41. Bathgate v. Irvine, 126 Cal. 135, 58 P. 442, 444-45 (1899); Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn,
129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508, 511 (1921).
42. Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978, 980 (1907); see also 2 H.
FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 463(a), at 1571. Although California is a prior appropriation jurisdic·
tion, California courts apply riparian principles when dealing with streams which flow through pri·
vate land and have not yet been diverted. See supra note 13.
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Because this definition includes all that land that contributes to the
replenishment of the watercourse, it generally appears to take into
account the hydrologic cycle.43 Furthermore, the definition seems to
be consistent with the view currently held by many scientists and legal
scholars that the legal system should resolve environmental problems
arising in a watershed by considering the watershed as one complex,
interrelated ecosystem.44
Fairness concerns also support the continued use of the watershed standard to define the maximum area that could be benefitted by
a watercourse. At least in a water-rich environment, present users
still seem to be reasonable in expecting the maximum area to be limited to the region replenishing the watercourse. As one court explained, the fact that land feeds a watercourse creates an expectation
that if the land otherwise qualifies as riparian land it is "entitled, so to
speak, to the use of its waters."45 Where water is less plentiful,
though, those expectations must be tempered by the needs of waterpoor areas. Then fairness would seem to require some sharing of the
available water resources. Working out such an arrangement, however, would not necessarily require rejecting the watershed test as a
standard for detennining who initially has riparian rights. Rather, it
would require focusing on the flexibility of the riparian doctrine and
evaluating the extent to which riparian rights are or should be transferable. As will be seen momentarily, the results of this evaluation
will have a significant impact on a locality's ability to satisfy the consumptive needs of its inhabitants.
Whether the watershed test promotes an efficient use of water
resources is a more troublesome question. To the extent that the test
is interpreted as limiting the maximum area and thus the number of
potential users, it protects the reliance interests of users and rewards
present investments. Confusion arises, however, because the watershed test is a difficult standard to apply. Where a watercourse is a
major river, the natural drainage area could encompass a vast amount
43. See generally K. GREGORY & D. WALLING, DRAINAGE BASIN FORM AND PROCESS: A
GEOMORPHOLOGICAL APPROACH 96-105 (1973).
44. Perhaps the best examples of this view are the various reports and studies of the Chesapeake Bay conducted under the direction of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. See, e.g.,
U.S. ENVT.L. PROTECTION AGENCY, CHEsAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1983) (recommending specific approaches for improving the Bay's water quality); U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (1983) (presenting a framework for maintaining the Bay's ecological integrity). See generally NATIONAL WATER
COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FuTuRE 19-37 (1973).
45. Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978, 980 (1907).
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of land. The drainage basin of the Tennessee River, for example, includes about 40,000 square miles of land spanning seven different
states.46 Furthermore, detennining the drainage area of a particular
watercourse involves questions of fact better resolved by experts in
geology and hydrology.
Some of the inefficiencies of the watershed test become very apparent when the test is applied to the situation where two streams
merge. According to a leading California case involving that situation, Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller,41 the watersheds of the two
streams must be dealt with separately. This means that land solely
within the watershed of one stream would not be riparian to the other
stream, even though the land may be part of a tract that otherwise
falls within the watershed of the first stream.48 In Anaheim Union
Water Co., plaintiffs sought to enjoin the proprietors of riparian land
located above plaintiffs' land from diverting water from a river and
conducting it to land located within the drainage area of a tributary of
the river. Defendants had argued that the watershed of the river
should be defined broadly to include the river's "[entire] valley from
its sources to its mouth."49 Under this approach, land within that
general area would be riparian to the river even though it did not
directly feed the river. In rejecting defendants' argument, the court
explained that their broad interpretation of watershed was inconsistent with the purposes of the watershed test, which were to ensure
that unused water would return to the particular watercourse being
used and to restrict riparian rights to land "entitled" to use the
watercourse. 50
The implications of the California approach are significant, for it
requires a riparian to place his land precisely within its appropriate
watershed. Under this approach, land solely within the watershed of
a tributary cannot be within the watershed of the main stream. Only
that portion of the tract within the watershed of each stream can be
considered riparian to that stream, and a riparian landowner must use
the waters of each stream accordingly, even though such conduct may
inconvenience the landowner. Where the riparian is a sprawling lo46. G. Scorr, STUDIES OF THE POLLUTION OF THE TENNESSEE RivER SYSTEM 1 (1970).
47. 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978 (1907).
48. Id. at 980. The few cases addressing this issue appear to have taken a similar approach.
See Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533, 548 (1938); Town of Gordonsville
v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508, 512 (1921).
49. Anaheim, 88 P. at 980.
50. Id.
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cality, that inconvenience could include a significant duplication of
financial, administrative, and physical resources.
Similar problems arise when the California approach is applied
together with some of the other tests for riparian land. If, for instance, a tract of land borders the main stream and not the tributary,
yet extends into the watershed of the tributary, that portion of the
land within the tributary's watershed would not be riparian to the
tributary and therefore could not be benefitted by it.5 1 Few landowners possess the expertise necessary to make such a precise allocation of
resources. And, at an even more fundamental level, few landowners
would anticipate that such a precise and artificial division of resources
would be required of them. More likely, they would expect to be able
to use one, if not both, watercourses to benefit their entire tract.
Because a restrictive definition of watershed does not ratify the
expectations of riparians and requires an expertise not possessed by
many of them, it is not surprising that riparian landowners often are
confused and uncertain about the nature and extent of their rights.
The more uncertain they are about their rights, the less likely they
will be to rely on those rights and productively use their resources. 52
A legal rule that fails to ratify reasonable expectations of property
owners also tends to increase the costs of dealing with the property
and under certain circumstances encourages noncompliance. In such
a situation, a property owner either will realize the confusion surrounding his rights and investigate the situation or will fail to realize
the discrepancy between the law and his expectations and proceed as
he believes the situation should be. Whereas the first option is costly
in terms of the owner's time and money, the second is costly in terms
of his misused property rights.
A more productive result perhaps could be achieved by adopting
the broader view of watershed advanced in Anaheim Union Water Co.
or by defining the maximum area that could benefit from a watercourse with another standard. The first alternative would seem to
eliminate some of the confusion and conflicts caused by the more restrictive approach without undermining the basic functions of the watershed test.53 Implementing it, however, would require gathering
51. See, e.g., Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533, 547-49 (1938).
52. See Trelease. supra note 10, at 404; see also DeVany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara, & Scott, A

Proper System for Market Allocation ofthe Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineer·
ing Study, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1499, 1506 (1969).
53. A broader interpretation, however, would probably lead to some inconsistencies with the
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data about various watercourses54 and developing guidelines for distinguishing between major and minor drainage basins, tasks not well
suited to the case-by-case approach of the common law.
If the second alternative were pursued and a narrower standard
than the watershed test were adopted, the new standard would not
maximize the area that could be benefitted by a watercourse as well as
the watershed test. Fewer people would have the opportunity of initially using the watercourse and, to the extent that redistribution
would not be possible, fewer people also would have the opportunity
of eventually using the watercourse. Nor would a narrower standard
define the maximum area in a manner that accurately reflected the
hydrologic cycle. Because the standard would exclude land that was
within the natural drainage area of a watercourse, it would prevent
land that contributed to the replenishment of the watercourse from
qualifying as riparian land.
If, on the other hand, the new standard were more expansive,
permitting land outside the watershed of a watercourse to be riparian,
it would better ratify the expectations of water-poor areas and definitely would increase the area of land that could be benefitted by use.
The broader standard, however, would not necessarily promote other
desired policies, such as protection of present users' reliance interests
and preservation of the environment. As mentioned earlier, the watershed limitation apparently developed because the courts perceived
a need to protect present users. Adopting a broader standard thus
would require some fundamental changes in the philosophy of the riparian land restriction.
Furthermore, ecologists and marine scientists generally agree
that diverting a watercourse to areas outside of its watershed would
have detrimental consequences on the watershed's environment.55
other tests for riparian land. It, for example, would appear to permit land within the watershed area
to be riparian even though it is not in physical contact with the watercourse.
54. This data-gathering process already has begun in most states, which have established water
research centers as mandated by Congress. See 42 U.S.C. § 7811 (1983) (repealing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1961a (West 1974)). The centers are formed for the purpose of collecting information about the
relevant state's water resources and problems. See, e.g., VA. CoDE§§ 23-135.7:8 to -135.7:13 (Supp.
1982).
55. Although all diversions have adverse environmental impacts, diversions to areas outside
the watershed can have especially serious consequences. A large-scale diversion occurring in California illustrates some of these consequences. In Inyo County, California, a diversion from Mono
Lake, one of the state's most beautiful lakes, has diminished the lake's surface area by one-third and
has increased its salinity level significantly, causing serious damage to the lake's fisheries. The
shrimp hatch in 1981, for example, was down by 95%. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct.,
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Admittedly, these consequences also would result from diversions
within the watershed, though probably to a lesser degree.56 Thus, if
the primary policy objective of a water allocation system is environmental preservation, the courts should restrict use of a watercourse to
a narrow area of land near the watercourse. Even in a water-rich
environment, such an approach seems undesirable and unrealistic, for
it would prohibit numerous parties from benefitting from the
watercourse.
Assuming, then, that some adverse.environmental impact will be
tolerated, the watershed test would appear to be the preferable judicial standard for defining the maximum amount of land that can be
riparian. Unlike an agency administering a water permit system, a
court applying the riparian doctrine cannot actively supervise and
manage the state's water resources. 57 But through the watershed test,
a court can maintain some control over use of watercourses and thus
can provide some protection for the reliance interests of present
users. 58 Rather than adopting a broader standard and upsetting those
reliance interests, the courts could accommodate at least some of the
needs of water-poor areas by permitting appropriate transfers of use
rights within a watershed.5 9 Nor would a narrower standard seem as
desirable since it would increase the number of areas poor in water
resources.
If the watershed test were retained, some problems of application
still would exist. Most private riparians, for instance, continue to lack
the expertise required to apply the standard. Scientists and appropri33 Cal. 3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 348, 352, 658 P.2d 709, 711, 715, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413
(1983). See generally Hagan & Roberts, Ecological Impacts of Water Storage and Diversion Projects,
in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT 543 (C. Goldman ed. 1971). For a
general discussion of the environmental effects of water projects see NATIONAL WATER CoMM'N,
WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 19-37 (1973).
56. At least with diversions within a watershed, it is more likely that a smaller ecological area
will be affected by the diversions. For example, the number of miles of conduit pipes probably would
be smaller. In its report WATER POLICIES FOR mE FUTURE, the National Water Commission
generally agreed with this observation, stating: "There is no difference in kind between interbasin
transfers and any other water development project, so far as social, environmental, or economic
values are concerned. But there is a difference in degree where the interbasin transfer is a large-scale
project . • . ." NATIONAL WATER CoMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 319 (1973).
57. A court, however, may be able to impose planning responsibilities on the state government
by invoking the public trust doctrine. See United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water
Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
58. To the degree that redistribution of use rights is allowed, the protection given the reliance
interests of present users diminishes.
59. For further discussion of the transferability issue see infra Part

n.c.
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ate government officials, however, have succeeded in developing more
sophisticated tools and guidelines for determining the watershed of a
stream or river. Through more precise topographical maps, they usually can determine the watershed of a watercourse with specificity. 60
Given this progress, then, the watershed limitation appears to be the
preferable standard for courts in riparian jurisdictions. More than the
other alternatives, it permits the courts to achieve a better balance
between the expectations set by traditional riparian principles and
more modern concerns like environmental preservation, equitable redistribution, and efficient use of today's resources. Absent a shift in
the fundamental philosophies of the riparian doctrine, the watershed
limitation should be retained.

3.

The Single Transaction Test

A third qualification to the definition of riparian land, known as
the single or same transaction test, provides that land not abutting the
60. Courts, legislatures, and commentators alike have been vague in their definition of watershed. See Maxwell Land-Grant Co. v. Dawson, 7 N.M. 133, 34 P. 191, 193 (1893) (a watershed is
"that district of country that drains into a river or stream"), rev'd on other grounds, 151 U.S. 586
(1894); IND. ConE ANN. § 13-2-1-4(6) (Burns 1981) (A watershed is "an area from which water
drains to a common point. The watershed of an entire watercourse shall be measured to its mouth
and the watershed of any part of a watercourse shall be measured to the farthest downstream point
in question."); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 151.100(8) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982) (a watershed includes "all of the area from which all drainage passes a given point downstream"); Farnham, The
Pennissib/e Extent ofRiparian Land, 7 LAND & WATER L. RE.v. 31, 34 (1972) (the watershed of a
lake or stream is "the drainage area contributing to the water found in a particular lake or stream").
Even the United States Environmental Protection Agency defines a watershed simply as "[t]he land
area that drains into a stream." U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CoMMON ENVIRONMENTAL
TERMS 16 (1977).
The Soil Conservation Service bas formulated a more precise definition of a watershed area to
use under the Federal Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1001-09 (1985).
It provides in pertinent part:
A watershed area comprises all land and water within the confines of a drainage divide
or a land and water problem area. A watershed area may comprise the land and water of
two or more minor drainageways that are separate tributaries to a stream, artificial waterway, lake, or other tidal area. Areas from which water is brought into it by diversion may
be excluded from the watershed if these sources of water have no significant effect on the
fiood prevention and water management problems of the watershed area. The watershed
area must necessarily include all direct tributary drainageways and lands from which, after
project installation, water and sediment could adversely affect any proposed structural
measure such as an irrigation or drainage canal, fioodway, or fioodwater-retarding structure included in the plan.
SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, NATIONAL WATERSHEDS MANuAL,
tit. 390, ch. V, § 500.11(a) (1981).
For a more detailed discussion of the meanings of watershed and drainage basin see K. GREGORY & D. WALLING, supra note 43, at 96-105.
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watercourse must have been acquired in the same transaction as the
portion touching the watercourse to qualify as riparian. 61 The practical effect of this single transaction requirement is to limit riparian
land to the smallest area held by a party under a chain of title including the land adjoining the watercourse. 62
Restricting the definition of riparian land to land acquired in the
same transaction means that some land within the watershed of a watercourse will not qualify as riparian and that therefore the area to
which riparian rights attach will not be maximized. The courts in
many riparian jurisdictions apparently preferred a less efficient alternative to one that would maximize the size of the area that could be
benefitted-the watershed-because of certain equitable concerns. By
restricting the definition of riparian land to land acquired in a single
transaction, the courts prevented financially secure riparian landowners from enlarging their tracts of riparian land and expanding their
rights by purchasing land contiguous to their original tract but not
contiguous to the watercourse. 63 Thus, the courts have used the single transaction test to achieve a more equitable distribution of use
rights.
In addition to discouraging riparians from monopolizing consumptive rights, the single transaction test also helps to preserve the
priority status of riparians, which are set in part by physical location
along a watercourse. If, for example, a riparian owns two noncontiguous tracts of waterfront property, the single transaction test would
prevent the riparian from purchasing a thin strip of land to connect
the two tracts and then claiming the right to use water taken from the
watercourse on the upper tract for the benefit of the lower tract without regard for riparians between the two tracts. Since all the land had
61. See Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781, 790-91 (1903); Watkins Land
Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86 S.W. 733, 735 (1905). See generally 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13,
§ 463(a), at 1571-72. In some jurisdictions the courts apply a "unity of title" test, instead of the
single transaction or "chain of title" test. Under the unity of title standard, land not abutting a
watercourse may still qualify as riparian if it is held under common ownership with land contiguous
to it and to the watercourse. For a discussion of both approaches see Levi & Schneeberger, The
Chain and Unity of Title Theories for Delineating Riparian Land: Economic Analysis as an Alternative to Case Precedent, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 439 (1972). Because the unity of title test closely
resembles the unitary tract test, the policies and values furthered by the unity of title test will be
analyzed in the discussion of the unitary tract test. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533, 547 (1938) (amount
of land held in chain of title was 10,402 acres, which was only about half of the original grant).
63. See 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 463(a), at 1572 & n.4. In contrast to the single
transaction test, the unity of title standard would permit a riparian to enlarge his riparian tract by
purchasing adjoining lots. See Levi & Schneeberger, supra note 61, at 442.
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not been acquired in the same transaction, the riparian could not
claim that his holdings formed one tract of riparian land entitling him
to use the watercourse before other riparians located below the upper
tract. In exercising his riparian rights for the lower tract, the riparian
still would be subject to the reasonable use rights of riparians located
above the lower tract.64
Although both functions should remain important objectives
under the riparian doctrine, they could be furthered even if the single
transaction test were abandoned or modified. The first objective, equitable distribution of use rights, still would require some limitations
on the ability of a riparian to enlarge his riparian tract. That objective, however, could arguably be achieved in a less restrictive manner. 65 If, for example, a riparian were allowed to extend his riparian
estate by subsequent purchase directly back to the outer boundary of
the watershed, he still should not be able, in most situations, to increase his estate so substantially that he could monopolize riparian
rights for the area. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated momentarily, a fourth, more sensible refinement to the definition of riparian
land limits the extent to which a riparian can change the size of his
riparian estate without having to account to other riparians.66 The
second objective, preservation of priorities based on physical location,
also would require some limitations to ensure that a riparian could
not improve his priority by purchasing tracts located upstream to his
original tract. But, once again, a fourth test for riparian land provides
appropriate limitations and effectively preserves priorities.
That the single transaction test duplicates functions served by
another standard is not, by itself, sufficient reason to reject the test.
When, however, the adverse policy implications of the single transaction standard are considered, the argument for abandonment becomes
stronger. One adverse consequence of the single transaction test is
that it refuses to recognize the reasonable growth needs of riparians.
Where the riparian is a locality, this can have serious consequences.
64. Riparians generally have the right to receive the flow of a watercourse after reasonable use
by upstream riparians. See generally 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 461.
65. It is ironic that a rule designed in part to prevent monopolization of rights may result in an
inefficient use of resources.
66. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text. Furthermore, other laws now prevent parties from monopolizing property rights in land and other resources. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1958) (finding practice of granting or leasing land with condition
that products from that land be shipped on grantor's railroad illegal). See generally 2 P. AREEDA &
D. TuRNER, ANrrrRUsr LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANrrrRUsr PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPUCA•
TION § 409f (1978) (finding monopolization of divisible resources to be a barrier to entry).
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If, for example, a locality situated next to a watercourse has annexed
adjoining areas, the single transaction test would prevent it from exercising its riparian rights for the benefit of annexed areas. 67
Equally as significant, the single transaction test impedes the development of land. Even if there presently existed a riparian who
owned a large tract of land extending from the watercourse to the end
of the watershed, once that riparian decided to subdivide his tract and
sell off parts of it, the single transaction test would prevent the tract
from being considered a riparian tract. 68 Because the reasonableness
of a riparian's use rights are measured in part by the size of his tract, 69
this consequence could be serious. Moreover, the chances that such a
large tract of land would remain intact indefinitely are slim. The single transaction test thus has become a test of chance. As long as a
riparian tract happened to extend to the end of the watershed, the
owner could exercise his riparian rights for the benefit of the entire
area. When, however, he decided to subdivide the tract, his riparian
rights no longer could benefit the entire area.
The above analysis suggests that the single transaction standard
no longer serves a useful purpose and should be abandoned. This
course of action, however, should not occur without recognition of
the need to protect the interests of small private users. These interests
are especially strong when a neighboring riparian is a growing municipality or a developing industrial user. Without the single transaction
test, the small private user legitimately could fear that such a neighbor would expand its riparian holdings at the small user's expense.
As the following discussion demonstrates, a fourth test for riparian land should allay some of these fears. It basically serves the same
functions as the single transaction test without being as inflexible as
the single transaction standard. But even the fourth test would not
protect the small private user against the likelihood that a riparian
locality would increase its population as well as its geographic limits.
As will be explained, protecting the small private user from this possi67. The unity of title test for riparian land also would appear to prevent a riparian locality
from exercising its rights for the benefit of the annexed areas. Because those areas usually consist of
lots owned by private parties, the annexed areas would not be held under common ownership with
the riparian tract. For a discussion of how the fourth test, the unitary tract standard, would deal
with the annexed areas, see infra note 74.
68. The physical contact standard also would affect the riparian status of subdivided parts not
contiguous to the watercourse.

69. See generally infra Part ll.C.
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bility can only occur through the reasonable use requirement, which
imposes quantitative limits on use rights.

4.

The Unitary Tract Test
A fourth qualification to the riparian land requirement, the uni-

tary tract test, restricts riparian status to tracts that are unitary in a

physical sense, as defined by reasonable community standards and location in the watershed.70 Like the single transaction test, the unitary
tract restriction helps to define the priority status of riparians. Under
this restriction, for example, the riparian owning the two noncontiguous tracts of riparian land described above could not claim that the
lower tract should receive the same priority as the upper tract, even
though the two are connected by a thin strip, because his holdings
would not form a physically continuous and uniform tract of land.71
70. See Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738, 744 (1966); Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921). The REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS bas
adopted a similar requirement in its definition of riparian land. To qualify as riparian land, a tract of
land must be "a continuous tract or plot ofland in one possession, no part of which is separated from
the rest by intervening land in another possession." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 843 comment c (1979); see also 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 463(a) (defining riparian land as "all that
parcel which is regarded as one tract").
71. Such a claim was advanced by a riparian in Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542,
106 S.E. 508 (1921). That case involved a conflict between the town of Gordonsville, which owned a
one-acre lot abutting a nonnavigable stream, and an individual riparian landowner, who had separately purchased two tracts of land, located above and below the town's lot and connected by a strip
of land. The land above the town's lot was approximately 25 feet in width and abutted the stream.
The town sought an injunction to prevent the individual landowner from withdrawing water from
the stream at a point located on her upper property and pumping it to her dwelling on the lower
section.
In considering the status of the defendant's land, the court concluded that although the lower
property was riparian to the stream, it could at best be regarded as lower riparian land in relation to
the town lot. As explained by the court, the lower section was not within the watershed of the upper
section and therefore could not be considered to be riparian to that part of the stream abutted by the
upper property. Zinn, 106 S.E. at 512. Thus, the court focused on physical location within the
watershed in defining riparian status.
Because the state supreme court in Zinn provided only a vague description of this fourth limitation, the court's language is susceptible to several interpretations. Under the strictest interpretation,
the decision could be construed as limiting riparian status to land lying directly behind that area
bordering the stream. This interpretation, however, could limit severely the amount of land considered to be riparian and seems to require that water return to a watercourse at a precise point behind
the area of contact. It also ignores an important fact of Zinn: the two tracts of land owned by the
defendant were not regarded in the community as a unitary tract of land. Thus, a broader interpretation of the Zinn limitation would be that riparian land includes only that portion of a riparian
proprietor's land that is considered to be unitary under reasonable community standards, as reflected
in local custom and understandings. Under certain circumstances, like those in Zinn, a unitary tract
would encompass only that land lying directly behind the area abutting the stream because only that
land would form a cohesive tract.
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Similarly, when the owner of a waterfront lot subsequently purchases
the lot directly above his, he may not be able to claim that the two lots
form a unitary tract, for they may not meet community standards for
a unitary tract of land. 72 As long as those standards focus solely on
whether a tract is held under common ownership or possession, the
party could treat the two lots as one riparian tract. 73 But if the community standards for a unitary tract require consideration of additional factors, such as the placement of lot boundary lines on a
locality's plat, then the two lots would not form one riparian tract.
Unlike the single transaction test, the unitary tract standard has
sufficient flexibility to permit changes in the results achieved by the
standard. For instance, if in the last situation community perceptions
about the two adjoining lots eventually changed and the lots later
were recognized as one tract, 74 they then would meet the unitary tract
standard. Under the rigid single transaction test, the two lots never
could be considered as one tract of riparian land.
This notion of a unitary tract defined by community standards
and physical cohesiveness is not foreign to property law. It appears in
72. Other riparians, however, may have difficulty establishing injury, which generally is required in riparian jurisdictions. See infra note 198. If, however, the cost of gaining access to the
watercourse is prohibitive for one of the lots and the riparian decides to divert water from the other
lot to the lot with the poor access, then the lower riparian may be able to convince a court that its
rights are injured.
73. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 843 comment c (1977). Under this approach the unitary tract test almost becomes synonymous with the unity of title test. See supra note
61.
74. The flexibility of the unitary tract test arguably could help a riparian locality that has
annexed adjoining areas. If community perceptions about the boundaries of the locality's riparian
tract change to include the annexed area, the tract then may meet the unitary tract test. But unless
the test were changed for public users, the locality could not include lots held in fee by private
parties within its unitary tract. A lot separately owned by a private party generally would be regarded as a unitary tract. Evidence of community perceptions about the boundaries of unitary tracts
could be found in the appropriate locality's plat, tax map, or other documents setting forth the
subdivision oflots in the locality. See generally 6 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIFS ON THE MODERN
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY§§ 3034-3036, 3040 (1962) (explaining how a landowner can change his
boundaries).
Perhaps because the unitary tract test is based on the somewhat vague notion of community
perceptions, some courts prefer instead to apply a unity of title or single ownership standard. Under
this standard several tracts within a watershed could qualify as riparian if they are contiguous to
each other, if at least one abuts the watercourse, and if all of them are held under common ownership. See Ausness, Water Use Permits in a Riparian State: Problems and Proposals, 66 KY. L.J. 191,
202 (1977). The single ownership test thus permits a riparian to enlarge his riparian tract by
purchasing contiguous lots. See generally Levi & Schneeberger, supra note 61, at 442. Although the
single ownership and unitary tract tests are very similar, some differences exist. For example,
whereas the unitary tract test would involve inquiring into reasonable community perceptions, the
single ownership test could be applied simply by examining the deeds of the appropriate party.
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several different areas of real property where flexibility is needed to
ensure fair results and to protect third party interests. The law of
adverse possession, for instance, uses the concept to help define when
an adverse possessor of a portion of a tract of land can acquire title to
the entire tract of land. 75 By requiring that the entire tract qualify as
a unitary tract under reasonable community standards before an adverse possessor can acquire title to it, the law of adverse possession is
better able to respond to particular circumstances and thus produce
just results. Additionally, this requirement ensures that third parties
are not unreasonably burdened. If the unitary tract requirement were
not imposed, a landowner would have to review the deeds of his
neighbors periodically to ensure that a conveyance had not included
his land within the boundaries of neighboring land.76
Despite its advantages, the unitary tract standard presents serious obstacles to localities attempting to satisfy their public's consumptive needs. Even where a locality abuts a watercourse, that
locality would have difficulty arguing that it formed one large unitary
tract that could be benefitted by the watercourse. A riparian challenging a use by the locality simply would respond that at the very
least the unitary tract test requires common or single ownership. A
locality generally could not meet this standard because it consists of
numerous unitary tracts owned by private parties.77 Furthermore,
modifying the unitary tract test for the public user could pose a serious challenge to the interests of private riparians. If the locality's argument is accepted, it would appear to permit the public user to
expand its riparian holdings, increase its quantitative use rights, and
improve its priority status by annexing adjoining areas.
75. Under the concept of constructive adverse possession, a party in actual adverse possession
of a part of a unitary tract of land can acquire title to the whole if he meets the requirement of
adverse possession for the part and if he enters under color of title. See, eg., Murphy v. Doyle, 37
Minn. 113, 33 N.W. 220 (1887); Mullis v. Winchester, 237 S.C. 487, 118 S.E.2d 61 (1961). See
generally 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 15.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 5 G. THOMPSON, supra
note 74, § 2545 (1979).
76. If the unitary tract standard did not exist, an adverse possessor conceivably could enter
onto a part of one tract and acquire title to the entire tract, as well as a neighboring tract, through
the concept of constructive adverse possession. To establish his claim to the neighboring tract,
though, the adverse possessor generally would have to establish color of title to the neighboring tract
by producing a written instrument, like a deed, that included that tract. See 3 AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY§ 15.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952). Thus, if the unitary tract standard were not imposed, a
landowner would need to review the deeds for neighboring land to discover and prevent possible
constructive adverse possession claims.
77. Cf. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 843 comment c (1977) (riparian land only in·
eludes tract held "in one possession,).
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But if the meaning of the unitary tract test is not changed for the
public user, then the test effectively precludes meaningful uses by a
riparian locality. The only way to give the public riparian rights comparable to the private riparian's is to define the unitary tract of a riparian locality as including all land that adjoins the locality's waterfront
property, that forms a physically cohesive area, and that is held under
"common jurisdiction" with the waterfront parcel. Whether this approach would infringe impermissibly on the rights of private riparians
depends on the meaning of the reasonable use requirement, for most
of their concerns raise issues that are at the heart of that requirement.
Protecting the reliance interests of private users thus could occur
through the reasonable use requirement.
Like the physical contact and watershed tests, the unitary tract
test still effectively serves several important functions. 78 But, to avoid
unnecessarily restrictive results, all three tests must be interpreted in
light of those functions to ensure that the tests can respond to modem
water supply problems. If, for instance, a court is willing to permit
transfers of riparian rights, then the court should not interpret the
physical contact standard literally to require all benefitted land, even
the land to which the rights are transferred, to be in physical contact
with a watercourse.79 A functional or policy-oriented approach to
those tests also would ensure that the watershed test is the key stan78. In its report WATER Poucms FOR THE F'uruR.E, the National Water Commission recommends that "[r]iparian restrictions on who may use water at what locations should be abolished."
NATIONAL WATER CoMM'N, WATER POUCIES FOR THE FUTURE 281 (1973). Although this recommendation may be advisable when a state is willing to substitute the riparian doctrine with a
comprehensive permit system, the three riparian land tests identified above should be retained, with
the suggested modifications, where a state is not willing to do so. Indeed, if interpreted as suggested,
the restrictions may even help to further another recommendation of the Commission: that states in
the East at least "proceed on a basin-by-basin basis," id. at 280.
79. See infra Part II.C.2. Applying the watershed limitation and the physical contact standard
together also demonstrates some of the problems that can arise if a literal approach is taken. Once
the maximum area is defined by the watershed test, the physical contact standard becomes as much a
test of happenstance as a test of reasonable expectations. If a landowner happened to own a tract of
land stretching from the watercourse to the end of the watershed, the entire tract would qualify as
riparian land. But, if the landowner later sold that part of his tract beginning one mile from the
watercourse and extending to the end of the watershed, the conveyed land literally would not meet
the physical contact test and thus would not seem to be riparian land. A literal interpretation of the
physical contact standard would limit the utility of the watershed test. Once development occurred
and a portion of the tract lost physical contact with the watercourse, that portion would cease to be
riparian land, regardless of whether the watershed test was met. A more functional or policy-oriented approach would focus on whether the policies served by the physical contact test would be
undermined by allowing the land to retain its riparian status.
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dard and that artificial interpretations do not prevent the maximum
possible area from being benefitted.
Unlike the other tests, the single transaction standard fails to
serve an independent function that justifies its retention. Courts abandoning the standard, though, need to adopt some restrictions to protect present users. While the unitary tract test would provide
protection against significant geographic development, the reasonable
use test should be used to protect against unreasonable increases in
quantitative use.
Abandoning the single transaction standard, however, will not
reverse the adverse consequences it already has caused. Subdivided
tracts of riparian land should not reacquire the riparian rights that
once could be exercised for the entire tract. But if this suggestion is
combined with a rule permitting transferability of riparian rights,
then some of the consequences can be reversed through the marketplace. Before such a possibility can be discussed further, the standard
used to define the quantitative use rights of riparians must be examined. That standard is the reasonable use requirement.
B.

The Reasonable Use Requirement: Balancing Use Rights
Through Quantitative Limits

The second key principle, that a use must be reasonable, also
plays a major role under the riparian doctrine: it defines the quantitative use rights of each riparian and thus, provides a standard for
resolving conflicts among users. Although the importance of this
function cannot be denied, the reasonable use requirement has developed in two major ways that hinder resolution of modem water supply problems.
First, courts in riparian jurisdictions have taken a narrow perspective in defining quantitative use rights. This perspective apparently resulted because early in the development of the riparian
doctrine courts began to assume that riparians were, and would continue to be, private agrarians who supplied all their consumptive
needs. Though this assumption no longer is valid, many modem
courts appear reluctant to reject it and broaden their scope of inquiry.
As a result, private users involved in large-scale business operations
and public users attempting to meet the demands of their public have
had difficulty establishing their uses as reasonable.80
80. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
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Second, the flexibility and uncertainty of the reasonable use standard create problems for public and large private users attempting to
plan for future use. Like reasonableness standards adopted in other
areas of the law, the reasonable use requirement is imprecise and varies according to the facts and circumstances of a particular situation.
Because of this imprecision, and flexibility, users have had difficulty
predicting whether a use will be protected in the future. Each of these
problems will now be discussed to determine whether they can be partially or wholly resolved by modifying and updating the reasonable
use requirement.
I.

Changing the Judiciary,s Perspective to the Reasonable
Use Limitation

The courts have identified a range of factors to be considered in
determining whether a use is reasonable. They include: the normal
conditions of the stream (such as its nature and size), the purpose of
the use, the compatibility of the use with other uses, the status of the
user as an upper or lower riparian, rainfall and other weather conditions, the quantity of water used in relation to the size of the stream,
and local custom. 81 Although the importance of a use is not determinative, 82 some uses tend to have a higher priority than others under
the riparian doctrine. For example, domestic uses, such as using
water for drinking, bathing, and cooking,83 usually receive the highest
priority when a conflict arises. Under certain circumstances this pri81. See Kyser v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 151 Misc. 226, 271 N.Y.S. 182, 186 (1934) (discussing
extent of use, capacity of stream, downstream uses, effect of use on others); Davis v. Town of Harrisonburg, 116 Va. 864, 83 S.E. 401, 403 (1914) (focusing on purpose of use); Arminius Chemical
Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459, 462-63 (1912) (discussing normal conditions and purity, but
rejecting importance of use as a factor). See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 8SOA
(1977); 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 466.
82. See, e.g., Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142, 147-48 (1900); Wheatley v.
Chrisman, 24 Pa. 298, 302 (1855); Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459, 463
(1912).
83. At common law, domestic uses typically include using a watercourse for drinking, bathing,
cooking, and watering livestock. See, e.g., Cowell v. Armstrong, 210 Cal. App. 218, 290 P. 1036,
1038 (1930) (domestic uses were those made to fulfill the "necessities of life on riparian land such as
household use, drinking, watering domestic animals"); Filbert v. Deckert, 22 Pa. Super. 362, 368
(1903) (domestic uses are not restricted to family enjoyment, but rather include all uses by a riparian
to satisfy natural wants such as drinking, washing, cooking and helping to preserve life and health).
Comprehensive permit systems generally have defined domestic uses in a similar manner. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.019(6) (West 1974) (domestic uses include any "use of water for the individual personal household purposes of drinking, bathing, cooking, or sanitation"); KY. REv. STAT.
§ 151.100(9) (Supp. 1982) (domestic uses include any "use of water for ordinary household purposes,
and drinking water for poultry, livestock, and domestic animals").
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ority even may permit an upstream riparian to exhaust the water in a
watercourse, without leaving any water for downstream riparians.84
The judicial preference for domestic uses suggests that a riparian
locality meeting the domestic needs of its inhabitants would have priority over most other uses. In applying the reasonable use standard,
however, the courts have taken a narrow perspective, defining the
standard primarily in the context of an individual private agrarian.85
The cases establishing the priorities between different types of uses
demonstrate the courts' tendency to assume that a riparian is a private agrarian. 86 Traditionally the courts have distinguished between
"natural" and "artificial" uses, giving a preference to those uses falling within the first category. 87 Natural uses, the preferred category,
are those uses that satisfy the "natural" wants of a riparian and include watering livestock and supplying the domestic needs of the riparian and his family. 88 Artificial uses, on the other hand, are uses that
are not needed to sustain life and generally include uses by business
84. See Evans v. Merriweather, 4 ill. (3 Scam.) 492, 496 (1842); Spence v. McDonough, 77
Iowa 460, 42 N.W. 371, 371 (1889); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Graham Land & Improvement Co., 10
Va. L. Reg. 983, 984 (Cir. Ct. 1904). See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF TORTS§ 850A
comment c (1977) (explaining effect of preference under natural flow and reasonable use theories).
Statutory planning and policy provisions enacted in many states generally reaffirm the common law
preference for domestic uses, especially human consumptive uses. See, e.g., IND. CoDE ANN.§ 13-21-3(1) (Burns 1981) ("use of water for domestic purposes shall have priority and be superior to any
and all other uses"); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 151.140 (Bobbs-Merril11980) ("nothing herein shall
interfere with the use of water for agricultural and domestic purposes"); VA. CoDE§ 62.1-44.36(2)
(1982) ("preference shall be given to human consumption purposes over all other uses"). In many of
these states, though, the preferences only affect the rights of permittees and do not bind courts
applying riparian principles to exempted users. See, e.g., MD. NAT. REs. CoDE ANN. § 8-802(b)
(1983).
85. See, e.g., Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1941) (concluding
that supplying "the inhabitants of a municipality with water for domestic purposes is not a riparian
right" and that municipality therefore could not divert for domestic uses). But see City of Canton v.
Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600, 603 (1902) (concluding that "if the upper proprietors have
grown so large or become so numerous as to consume most or all of the water, the lower proprietors
have no cause of complaint, because it is only what they should have reasonably expected in the
growth and development of the country").
86. Further evidence of the judiciary's narrow perspective is provided by the cases addressing
the lawfulness of diversions by local governments, which will be discussed later. See infra notes 17383 and accompanying text. See generally Ziegler, Acquisition and Protection of Water Supplies by
Municipalities, 51 MicH. L. REv. 349 (1959).
87. See, e.g., Evans v. Merriweather, 4 ill. (3 Scam.) 492, 495 (1842). See generally REsTATE·
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 850A comment c (1977); 7 R. CLARK, supra note 1, § 614.2, at 77
(1976).
88. Evans v. Merriweather, 4 ill. (3 Scam.) 492, 495 (1842). Today courts generally refer to
these uses as domestic uses. See, e.g., Cowell v. Armstrong, 210 Cal. App. 218, 290 P. 1036, 1038
(1930).
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and industrial riparians.89 Because municipalities are corporate bodies, the courts traditionally have reasoned that they cannot have any
natural wants and that they therefore should not be entitled to the
preference given to natural users.90
The courts' traditional approach to evaluating the reasonableness
of public uses is archaic. Although the courts' narrow perspective
may have been responsive to the needs ofriparians in the 1800's when
many of them were private individuals, it does not accurately reflect
modem water use patterns. The courts' approach to public domestic
uses, for instance, ignores the fact that today local governments conduct most significant domestic uses. 91 Despite this change in roles,
many courts continue to evaluate the reasonableness of these uses
from their traditionally narrow perspective. To modernize their approach to the reasonable use standard, the courts either should redefine the standard to protect public, as well as private, domestic users
or should distinguish between the two types of users and develop separate standards and priorities for each.92 Because of important differ89. Evans v. Merriweather, 4 ill. (3 Scam.) 492, 495 (1842).
90. See, e.g., Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130, 146 (1854). See also 7 R. CLARK, supra note 1,
§ 614.2, at 80-81 (1976) (discussing the traditional belief that corporations do not have "natural"
bodies and therefore cannot have natural wants). Many courts use a similar type of reasoning to
evaluate the reasonableness of business uses. As corporate entities, business users are not conducting
uses that are needed to sustain life and therefore are not entitled to a preference for their uses. See,
e.g., Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142, 147-48 (1900); Weiss v. Oregon Iron &
Steel, 13 Or. 496, 11 P. 255, 257 (1886) (rejecting argument that use should be found reasonable
because business was a "laudable enterprise"). Some courts also point out that any approach giving
a private business use a preference because of its importance to the public or to the economy would
constitute a taking for public use without just compensation of the rights of other private riparians
injured by the use. Drake v. Lady Ensley Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 102 Ala. 501, 14 So. 749, 751
(1894); Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459, 463 (1912); Day v. Louisville
Coal & Coke Co., 60 W. Va. 27, 53 S.E. 776, 777 (1906). The few courts that take a more liberal
approach to defining what constitutes a reasonable business or industrial use usually emphasize the
productiveness of the use or its importance to the public in upholding the use as reasonable. Pugh v.
Wheeler, 19 N.C. 50, 54 (1836); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453,456-57
(1886).
Whatever the reason for denying a preference to business users, the consequence in most traditional riparian jurisdictions is that business users must exercise their rights so as not to destroy or
materially diminish the flow for lower riparians and cannot, under any circumstances, consume all
the water in a stream to the exclusion oflower riparians. See Evans v. Merriweather, 4 ill. (3 Scam.)
492,495-96 (1842); see also 2 J. MINOR, INSTITUTES OF COMMON AND STATIJTB LAW 28 (4th ed.
1892).
91. According to an assessment done by the U.S. Water Resources Council, public water supply systems met the needs of 179 million people in 1975 (83% of the population), while the other 37
million either used their own domestic systems or did not have a piped water supply system. See 1
U.S. WATER REsoURCES CoUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES: 1975-2000, at 32 (1978).
92. Furthermore, although the common law preference for domestic uses over business uses
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ences between the two, the second alternative is preferable. 93
Regardless of the specific action taken to modernize the reasonable use requirement, it is clear that a court willing to broaden its
perspective of the reasonable use requirement, once again, should recognize the need to adopt limitations to protect the private interests at
stake. For instance, although a change in perspective is needed to
protect public domestic uses, local governments admittedly conduct
domestic uses on a much larger scale than individual riparians. Because of this fact, it is highly likely that a substantial change in perspective would cause serious infringement of private interests. The
severity and unreasonableness of the infringement would depend, to
an extent, on the particular situation. Where public users are conducting domestic uses for the benefit of numerous private riparians,
the infringement may not be as serious as it would first appear. Because the locality is supplying riparian inhabitants, the public uses
should not duplicate significantly the uses conducted by private riparians. At least in these situations, it would seem inaccurate to evaluate
the reasonableness of the locality's domestic uses from the perspective
of a single private riparian. That standard of comparison fails to recognize the change in water use patterns. Rather, what the courts
should be comparing is the domestic use of the locality with the domestic use of the appropriate number of private riparians who would
have had to conduct the use if the locality had not done so.
The problem of infringement is more difficult to resolve where a
locality or private business is a nonriparian attempting to purchase
use rights from a riparian proprietor or where the locality or private
business is a riparian planning to exercise its riparian rights for the
still seems justifiable, the courts need to develop a more meaningful standard for evaluating business
uses. One possible standard, already used in a few jurisdictions, is to evaluate the reasonableness of a
business use by comparing it to other "like" uses. As one court using this approach explained, "the
use by any particular person must be the same as the neighboring proprietor in like circumstances.''
Dunlap v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 212 N.C. 814, 195 S.E. 43, 45 (1938). As the court further
elaborated, "[t]he use of one farmer shall be judged by the use of another farmer, one manufacturer
by the customs and use of another manufacturer." Id. Adoption of a "like use" standard for private
uses would allow courts to develop more consistent standards of comparison and to protect profitable business uses without having to rely on their economic importance to the public. Even under a
like use standard, though, some comparison of different uses would be necessary, and if the competing use is domestic the business use generally should be subordinate to the domestic use. See infra
notes 95-112 and accompanying text for further discussion of priorities of use. Whether riparian
rights are transferable becomes an important issue when a riparian wants to pursue a productive
business use without worrying about diminishing the flow. For a discussion of this issue see infra
Part II.C.
93. For further discussion of these differences see infra Part III.A.
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benefit of nonriparian land. What is clear is that a populous locality
or large business should not be able to purchase use rights for a small
tract of riparian land and then exercise those rights for the benefit of
all its inhabitants or corporate property. Permitting such a redistribution of resources in a riparian jurisdiction would raise serious fairness
concerns. Any further treatment of the issue must wait until the concepts of transferability and diversion have been discussed. 94

2.

Clarifying Quantitative Rights

Besides limiting the consumptive rights of public domestic and
private business users, the reasonable use requirement also hinders
long-range planning efforts. Because the reasonableness of a use varies according to surrounding facts and circumstances, users generally
cannot predict whether a use will be protected in the future. Changed
conditions may cause a once permissible use to become unreasonable.
Furthermore, under common law principles, a riparian who has been
exercising a riparian right for a long time does not obtain any priority
over rights subsequently exercised. Riparian rights in undeveloped
riparian lands are not extinguished by nonuse and, once exercised,
generally are entitled to the same legal protection as established
uses. 95
While the supply of water remains abundant, the flexibility of the
reasonable use limitation should not pose serious problems for riparians. Because most users would have sufficient water, few conflicts
would arise. Aware of the abundance of water, users would be more
willing to accept the risk of proceeding with a use even though its
continued permissibility might be difficult to predict. As water becomes less plentiful, though, the flexibility of the reasonable use limi94. See infra Parts II.C. and III.A.
95. Leonard v. St. John, 101 Va. 752, 45 S.E. 474, 477 (1903). But see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A(h) (1977) (listing priority of use as one factor to consider in determining
reasonableness of use). In the few cases where a limited supply has made it impossible for an old and
a new user to co-exist, most courts have protected the prior user. See, e.g., Rowland v. Ramelli, 25
Cal. 3d 339, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 362, 599 P .2d 656, 668-69 (1979) (when there is an interest in
promoting clarity and certainty of rights, unexercised rights may lose their priority); Harp v. Iowa
Falls Elec. Co., 1961owa 317, 191 N.W. 520, 525 (1923) (power company enjoined from interfering
with use of prior riparian user).
In contrast to the riparian doctrine, the prior appropriation doctrine uses an "all or nothing"
approach to dispute resolution. Junior appropriators know that their rights always will be subservient to those of a senior appropriator, regardless of the circumstances. 1 S. WIEL, supra note 13,
§ 1014. Although this approach is clearer, it is not always more efficient. See infra note 96.
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tation could produce serious inefficiencies. 96 The more uncertain a
water allocation system is, the more it discourages reliance on property rights and investment in productive activities. Also, because of
the system's flexibility, riparian users often would have to resort to
the courts to clarify their rights. 97
Some flexibility admittedly is needed and desired.98 Physical
conditions affecting use of watercourses can vary at any time, often
without sufficient warning to permit planning. Flexibility at least is
needed to allow the legal rules to respond to changes in physical conditions. Indeed, a rule defining and taking into account such changes
probably would be unworkable, if not impossible to formulate. The
flexibility of the reasonable use requirement thus permits the courts to
respond to factual variations in a manner that they consider fair. 99
Nevertheless, several steps should be taken by the courts to clarify the quantitative rights of riparians. Perhaps the most significant
96. According to one commentator, the flexibility of the riparian doctrine forces "[i]nvestors in
multimillion dollar enterprises and international agencies underwriting large projects now [to] seek
from the law the security once supplied by a seemingly inexhaustible stock of water.'' Trelease,
supra note 10, at 386; accord REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 850A comment k (1977). This
approach to defining rights and resolving conflicts, however, has some advantages. By reviewing
uses as cases arise, the courts are not forced to define rights based on circumstances existing years
ago, but rather can respond to changed circumstances. Also, the courts can protect new uses that
are reasonable and efficient. In contrast, the prior appropriation doctrine requires courts to fix rights
in time, regardless of changed circumstances. Senior appropriators have little incentive to develop
more efficient uses because they rarely are threatened by a denial of water. Furthermore, because
nonuse eventually may lead to forfeiture of their rights, see 1 S. WIEL, supra note 13, at 609, senior
appropriators will continue to use the same amount of water they always have used even if they do
not need that amount. Thus, although the prior appropriation doctrine instills security among senior users, it can lead to inefficient results in the long run. See generally Trelease, Alternatives to
Appropriation Law, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POLICY 282 (1976).
97. As one commentator explained, "where riparian owners share in the use of water based on
the relative social value of their particular use, allocations are made on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis
which ignores the need for certainty, an essential prerequisite for major capital investment.'' White,
Legal Restraints and Responses to the Allocation and Distribution of Water, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POLICY 341, 350 (1976).
Because the reasonable use standard requires established uses to adjust to often unpredictable
changes in circumstances, many commentators, legislators, and public interest groups have advocated adoption of a more certain system for defining use rights and resolving conflicts. See supra
notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 96.
99. Such flexibility exists in other areas of property law as well. Under the law of easements,
for example, the owner of the dominant estate is permitted to increase his use of the servient estate so
long as the increase is "reasonable.'' Zubli v. Community Mainstreaming Associates, 423 N.Y.S.2d
982, 102 Misc. 2d 320, 330 (1979); Waskey v. Lewis, 224 Va. 206, 294 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1982);
Rippetoe v. O'Dell, 276 S.E.2d 793, 796 (W.Va. 1981). Whether an increase is reasonable depends
on whether a development of the dominant tenement could reasonably be expected. See generally 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 8.66 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
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step that could be taken would be to clarify the system of priorities or
preferences used in evaluating the reasonableness of conflicting uses.
As explained earlier, the outdated assumptions and general preferences of that system no longer provide an adequate basis for resolving
conflicts between users. A clearer, more specific set of priorities
would contribute to a more effective water allocation system by reducing the number of variables that a user would have to consider in
weighing his options. Under a clearer system, users facing a water
shortage would be better able to predict where they stood in relation
to other users and thus could take appropriate action. 100
To improve the common law's priority system, the courts must
clearly identify the factors that are important to resolving conflicts
among users. To encourage and protect productive uses, these factors
should include the duration of a use, its priority in time, and the
amount of a user's investment. 101 Courts in riparian jurisdictions
100. In contrast, most water shortage provisions presently applicable in riparian and permit
jurisdictions fail to provide a clear set of priorities and usually only apply when governing bodies
determine that an emergency exists. See, e.g., VA. CoDE§ 15.1-37.3:4 (1981). Furthermore, the
provisions define water shortage in vague terms, typically providing that a shortage exists when it is
necessary to protect the public health or safety or to protect the public interest in lands or waters.
See, e.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 12-5-31(1) (1985). For a commentator's definition of water shortage see
Trelease, supra note 10, at 408.09. Users frequently are not given any indication of how their needs
may be curtailed. Only general legislative guidelines exist for determining priorities of users during a
water shortage. See, e.g., VA. CoDE § 62.1-44.36(2) (1982).
In developing a clearer, more detailed priority system, though, a court should avoid adopting a
rigid, inflexible list of priorities. As Professor Trelease admonished, these types of lists "too often
reflect the economic and social thought of the moment • . . and are soon outmoded by time and
change." Trelease, supra note 10, at 400. Furthermore, they "prevent the intelligent weighing of
alternative and relative values." Id.
101. To minimize the degree to which clarifications made in the priority system would infringe
on private interests, the courts might want to develop a more detailed priority system that would
apply to private users only when the water in a watercourse falls below a predetermined level. As
long as the water supply of the watercourse remained above the specified minimum level, normal
riparian principles could apply. Under this suggested approach, the courts would be able to retain,
in modified form, the main advantage of the reasonable use requirement: its ability to respond to
variations in physical conditions. Now, however, the flexibility of that requirement would be limited
to situations where it would not seriously handicap parties attempting to respond to water shortages.
The significance of this suggestion depends in part on the standing requirements adopted by a
court under the riparian doctrine. If a court requires a riparian to establish actual harm before
recovering for an unlawful use, then the suggestion is not that significant. When water is plentiful,
most riparians should not be injured. If, however, the court permits a riparian to establish potential
injury to recover, then the suggestion could have important ramifications. Even though sufficient
water may exist to meet present needs, a riparian still may be able to establish injury to future uses.
For further discussion of the actual injury requirement see infra note 198.
Although the courts could implement the suggestion fairly easily by using the minimum flow
level of a stream as one factor affecting the reasonableness of a use and as triggering the use of the
more specific priorities, the legislative branch probably could develop this alternative more effec-
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presently are reluctant to consider these factors. They need to recognize that giving the factors some weight encourages the user to rely on
his property rights and thus, increases his incentive to develop his
property interests. Protection of reliance interests is especially important to public users, who generally expend a significant amount of
capital to operate a public water supply system. A priority rule, however, should not be based solely on length of-use or :first..;in-time status,
for these factors tend to ratify the status quo and produce inefficient
results. Prior users would not have any incentive to change or improve their uses because they generally would be protected over new
uses, even if the new uses were more efficient. 102 Furthermore,
although a rule based on the amount of investment might encourage a
user to increase his investment to maintain his priority, it would not
encourage him to consider whether the new investment would lead to
a more efficient use.
If riparian rights are freely transferable, then the efficiency
problems caused by a rule based on duration of use, first-in-time status, or the amount of an investment could be partially resolved
through the marketplace. A party who believed he could make a
more productive use of riparian rights could purchase them from the
present user. This solution, however, would not help that party after
he purchased the riparian rights of a less efficient user, at least not
where he was subject to a first-in-time or duration of use rule. Even
though his use may be the most productive in the area, it still would
be subsequent in time to and, under a first-in-time or duration rule,
therefore subordinate to many neighboring uses. Furthermore, the
ability of a jurisdiction to encourage more efficient uses depends on
the transferability of use rights, a characteristic not fully recognized
in all riparian jurisdictions.to3
Because of these problems, a riparian jurisdiction should not give
first-in-time status or duration of use controlling, or even substantial,
weight, but rather should consider them as part of a list of factors
tively. Unlike the courts, it would not have to wait for a controversy to arise before it could define
scarcity in a particular watercourse or set priorities. Most comprehensive reforms require minimum
flows to be set by the appropriate regulatory body and set forth priorities in case of shortage. See,
e.g., F. MALONEY, R. AUSNESS, & J. MORRIS, MODEL WATER CoDE§§ 1.07(4), 2.09 (1972).
102. See supra note 13. Since riparian jurisdictions tend to be water-rich, the impact of this
built·in inefficiency would not be as severe as in the arid West. Most users in riparian jurisdictions
normally would be able to get sufficient water, so conflicts between prior and subsequent users would
not arise as often.
103. For a discussion of this issue see infra Part II.C.
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affecting priority. 104 Only when accompanied by other significant factors, like the domestic nature of a use, should those factors favorably
affect the priority status of the user. 105 Although the amount of investment also should not be controlling, courts concerned about the
high costs of developing public water supplies might want to give a
preference to public users because of their high capital outlays. Given
the judicial preference for domestic uses, these objectives also could
be accomplished by recognizing that most public uses sustain the natural wants of a locality's inhabitants and therefore, are domestic uses.
Besides recognizing the above factors, the courts also should consider the water distribution patterns and needs of a particular area.
Because most states have an uneven distribution of water resources
and population, the priority rules should vary somewhat according to
the hydrologic and demographic facts of particular regions. 106 Such
regional variation would allow courts to respond to differences in
needs and types of uses without having to choose between a system
favoring developed urban areas and one favoring rural, sparsely populated areas. 107
At the very least, though, riparian law should protect the prior
user indirectly through its burden of proof, much as the United States
Supreme Court did in a 1982 decision involving allocation of consumptive rights among states. In Colorado v. New Mexico, 108 the
104. According to the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, only a few courts in riparian jurisdictions have specifically mentioned priority in time as a factor affecting the reasonableness of a use.
But when a situation arises where a new use threatens a prior use, the courts tend to protect the prior
use. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 850A comment k (1977). Because of this tendency, the
Restatement concludes that priority in time is "an important factor'' in determining the reasonableness of a use. I d.
105. Alternatively, a court could develop a preference for being first in time that would apply
only to a defined category of uses, like those benefitting the public health and welfare or requiring
high capital outlay.
106. For example, although Virginia possesses an abundance of water, it is unevenly distributed throughout the state. Areas of the state experiencing the greatest growth in population and
economic development physically lack sufficient water resources to meet the increased demand.
Tidewater Virginia, for instance, has 60% of the state's population, but only 29% of the state's land.
C. Cox, VIRGINIA'S MOST IMPORTANT WATER-RELATED PROBLEMS 8 (Virginia Water Resources
Research Center, Special Report No. 13, Aug. 1981). See generally W. Cox, L. SHABMAN, S. BATIE, & J. LooNEY, supra note 12 (discussing Virginia's current water supply problems).
107. Most comprehensive reforms proposed in eastern states reject a regional approach to regulating water use rights and instead use a centralized administrative system. See, e.g., The Virginia
Water Law, H.B. 1420, 1981 Va. Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
108. 459 U.S. 176 (1982), dismissed on reh'g, 104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984). In Colorado v. New
Mexico, Colorado sought an equitable apportionment of the Vermejo River, which begins in Colorado and flows into New Mexico. Before the request only farm and industrial users in New Mexico
had been using the river's waters. A Special Master, appointed by the Supreme Court, initially

1985]

CONSUMPTIVE WATER RIGHTS

135

Court required a state seeking an apportionment of interstate waters
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the benefits of its
proposed use of the waters substantially outweighed the harm that
might result. 109 Recognizing that this burden was higher than the
preponderance standard ordinarily used in a civil case, the Court explained that the higher burden reflected its view that the party proposing a use should bear the risks of an erroneous decision. In the
words of the Court, "[t]he harm that may result from disrupting established uses is typically certain and immediate, whereas the potential benefits from a proposed diversion may be speculative and
remote. " 11° Further, as the Court explained on remand, the clear and
convincing standard "accommodates society's competing interests in
recommended that Colorado be permitted to divert a specified quantity of water. After considering
New Mexico's exceptions to the Master's findings, the Supreme Court concluded, in its first decision
in the controversy, that the Master did not properly consider all relevant factors and that additional
findings needed to be made to reach an equitable apportionment of the river's waters. 459 U.S. at
189-90. On remand the Master made some additional findings, but reaffirmed his original recom·
mendation. In considering New Mexico's second set of exceptions, the Court held that Colorado did
not establish by clear and convincing evidence that its proposed diversion should be allowed. Colorado v. New Mexico, 104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984).
One of the issues considered by the Court concerned the significance of the fact that approximately three-fourths of the river's flow originated in Colorado. In rejecting the argument that this
fact automatically entitled Colorado to a portion of the river's waters, the Court explained that
rights under the prior appropriation doctrine are based on appropriation and actual use, and not on
land ownership as under the riparian doctrine. 459 U.S. at 179 n.4. In a prior appropriation state,
then, equitable apportionment of water rights should depend on the benefits and harms of competing
uses, or, in the words of the Court, on "whether the benefits to the state seeking the diversion
substantially outweigh the harm to existing uses in another state." /d. at 190. This conclusion
provides a strong disincentive to riparian jurisdictions thinking of switching to prior appropriation
principles. By doing so, they may be jeopardizing their chance for equitable apportionment of inter·
state waters. In distinguishing between the prior appropriation and riparian doctrines, the Court
suggests that the fact that a portion of a river lies in one state could be significant in apportioning
waters among riparian jurisdictions. /d. at 190.
The doctrine of equitable apportionment was first applied by the Supreme Court in a contro·
versy over the Arkansas River. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1906). In that dispute the
Court announced that it
must consider the effect of what has been done upon the conditions in the respective states
and so adjust the dispute upon the basis of equality of rights as to secure as far as possible
to Colorado the benefits of irrigation without depriving Kansas of the like beneficial effects
of a flowing stream.
/d. at 100. This weighing of the potential benefits and harms has continued through the recent
dispute over the Vermejo River. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982), dismissed on reh'g,
104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984). For a discussion of the doctrine of equitable apportionment see Trelease,
Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to People, States, and Nation, 1963 SUP. CT.
REv. 158, 169-72 (1963).
109. 459 U .S. at 187-88.
110. /d. at 187.
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increasing the stability of property rights and in putting resources to
their most efficient uses." 11 •
Similar reasoning could be used to allocate the burden of proof
among users of intrastate waters. As with new uses of interstate waters, a party pursuing a new use of waters within one state should bear
the burden of establishing the reasonableness of its use. Because the
benefits of established uses are known, while the benefits of the proposed use are speculative, a new user should not be able to upset established users without clearly demonstrating the reasonableness of
the proposed use. 112
111. Colorado v. New Mexico, 104 S. Ct. 2433, 2438 (1984).
112. Establishing an unlawful diversion does not entitle a complaining riparian to relief, for
other requirements exist as well. See Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va 542, 106 S.E. 508, 515
(1921). To be entitled to relief for unlawful diversion, a plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance
of evidence, that defendant's actions prevented the watercourse from flowing in a natural course
upon plaintiff's land, Heninger v. McGinnis, 131 Va 70, 108 S.E. 671, 676 (1921), and that plaintiff
suffered injury because of defendant's conduct, see infra note 198.
The type of cause of action brought when a riparian is unlawfully diverting a watercourse depends to an extent on the context in which the issue arises. Compare Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v.
Graham Land & Improvement Co., 10 Va L. Reg. 983 (Cir. Ct. 1904) (issue arose as part of condemnation proceedings brought by a railroad pursuant to its statutory authority) with Latta v. Catawba Elec. Co., 146 N.C. 285, 59 S.E. 1028 (1907) (suit brought to construe a deed and determine
who had riparian rights). Normally, the appropriate cause of action would be a private nuisance.
See, e.g., Cook v. Town of Mebane, 191 N.C. 1, 131 S.E. 407 (1926); see also 2 H. FARNHAM, supra
note 13, § 474, at 1606-07 (suggesting that a bill to quiet enjoyment of a watercourse may be filed)
and § 505, at 1662 (stating that in some jurisdictions the proper cause of action would be trespass on
the case}.
As defined by one jurisdiction, a nuisance involves interference "with some right incident to the
ownership or possession of real property" and may be established by substantial impairment of the
owner's "comfort, convenience and enjoyment of the property, causing a material disturbance or
annoyance in use of the realty." National Energy Corp. v. O'Quinn, 223 Va 83, 286 S.E.2d 181, 182
(1982); see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977) (private nuisance "is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land"). Because a
nuisance action involves injury to property rights, a plaintiff bringing a diversion suit must have
riparian rights that are being injured by the diversion to maintain the action. In a riparian jurisdiction this generally means that the plaintiff must own riparian land downstream from the point of
diversion. Jurisdiction over watercourses, especially nonnavigable ones, does not provide a locality
with a sufficient basis for bringing a nuisance suit for unlawful diversion. Although jurisdiction may
give the locality the power to regulate the watercourse and resolve disputes concerning it, jurisdiction does not give the locality riparian rights in the watercourse.
Determining when a cause of action accrues is not an easy task. The running of the statute of
limitations for unlawful diversion depends on how a jurisdiction defines injury. For a discussion of
the injury requirement see infra note 198. The running of the statute also may be affected by
whether the diversion constitutes a continuing nuisance. According to one jurisdiction, a nuisance is
permanent and not continuous "when the original act • . . is at once productive of all the damage
which can ever result from it, and at once destroys the estate for all practical purposes." Norfolk &
W. Ry. Co. v. Allen, 118 Va 428, 87 S.E. 558, 560 (1915). If defendant's diversion activities constitute a continuing nuisance, an aggrieved riparian can bring a cause of action for injury even though
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If such an approach to the burden of proof is adopted, it will
increase the stability of prior users. It will not, however, guarantee
that water resources are shifted to more efficient uses. Whether that
occurs depends primarily on the degree to which riparian rights are
transferable. The issue of transferability will be discussed now.
C.

The Severability Rule: Defining a Redistribution Principle for
Consumptive Rights

As with other areas of property law, an effective water allocation
system must permit transferability of water rights. Without the
power to transfer, the holder of a water right would not be able to sell
out to a more efficient user. 113 Allowing unrestrained transfers of riparian rights to any party and for the benefit of land located anywhere, though, would create some serious problems. 114 Unlike the
allocation of interests in other types of resources, the allocation of
consumptive rights in water resources raises certain interests and policy concerns that either cannot be adequately protected in the marketplace or are better resolved by the judicial or legislative branches of
the govemment.11s
The dependency of the public health and welfare on water remore than the time prescribed in the statute of limitations may have passed since the wrongful
conduct originally occurred.
Defenses typically raised in suits for unlawful diversion include laches, see Town of Purcellville
v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700 (1942), acquiescence, see Risien v. Brown, 73 Tex. 135, 10 S.W.
661 (1889), and acquisition of the right to divert by prescription, see infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text. For a discussion of situations where diversions may be permitted as exceptions to the
normal rules see infra Part III.B.
113. As Richard Posner explains, "[i]n order to facilitate the reallocation of resources from
less to more valuable uses, property rights should, in principle, be freely transferable." R. POSNER,
EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 3.11, at 56 (2d ed. 1977). Where resources are freely transferable,
"we can be reasonably confident that the shift involves a net increase in efficiency. The transaction
would not have occurred if both parties had not expected it to make them better off." Id. § 1.2, at
11; see also C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 15-17.
114. Some of the problems can be attributed to the fact that riparian rights, as presently defined, do not include the value of the return flow generated by a particular use. Because of this
omission, not all transfers of riparian rights would lead to a more efficient outcome. See infra notes
157-60 and accompanying text.
115. Professor Trelease described the need for regulation of marketplace transfers of water
rights in slightly different terms. According to Trelease, "the market cannot be relied upon to always produce optimum results" in part because of "the physical properties of water, its transient
nature, and the interdependence of its use in common by a number of users" and in part because of
"acknowledged imperfections in the market for water and water rights." Trelease, Policies for Water
Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulation, 5 NAT. REsoURCES J. 1, 39 (1965)
(footnotes omitted). When the market cannot be relied on, Trelease advocates public intervention
and regulation. For further discussion of situations where be perceives a need for regulation of the
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sources, for instance, requires adoption of transferability rules that
facilitate and protect uses by local governments, sometimes to the detriment of productive private users. If unrestrained transfers of riparian rights were permitted, the marketplace would not adequately
accommodate the public's consumptive needs. In contrast with private riparians, political factors affect the ability of public users to acquire use rights. Limitations on a local government's ability to raise
revenues, for instance, impose external restraints on its financial resources.116 Also, the condemnation and purchasing powers of localities may vary, depending on size and other factors. 117 Thus, whereas
a highly developed urban locality may have sufficient financial resources and political powers to acquire use rights, an undeveloped
rural locality may lack the necessary resources or powers. Because
the marketplace does not adequately consider these political restraints, and because redistribution raises difficult policy choices, judicial or legislative intervention is needed to protect the public interest.
Restraints on transferability would help to ensure that one policy or
interest group is not favored to the detriment of other important concerns and thus that an equitable distribution is achieved. 118
To date, most courts addressing the question of transferability of
riparian rights have considered it primarily in the context of nonconsumptive uses, such as constructing a pier or filling in lowland. The
majority agrees that riparian rights may be severed from riparian land
and separately conveyed. 119 Although the language used by some of
market see id. at 38-42. Also, for a discussion of some of the policy concerns better resolved by the
legislature or judiciary see infra notes 163, 185.
116. In Virginia, for example, the power to raise revenues is limited to taxation. VA. CoDE
§ 15.1-841 (1981).
117. Compare, e.g., VA. CoDE§ 15.1-335 (1981) (allowing cities and counties of a certain size
to acquire waterworks systems) with id. §§ 15.1-504 to -581 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (describing general
powers and duties of counties) and id. §§ 15.1-837 to -915.1 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (describing general
powers of cities and towns)and id. §§ 15.1-916 to -945 (1981) (describing other forms of government
for municipalities of less than 50,000). For a discussion of other political factors affecting management and use of water resources see Butler, supra note 12, at 782-85. Although it may be more
efficient to allow the locality with the lower transaction costs to acquire what water rights it can,
such an approach would not necessarily lead to an equitable distribution of water rights among
political subdivisions.
118. But cf. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOR'IS § 856 comment b (1977) (generally arguing
that riparian rights should be freely transferable).
119. Mianus Realty v. Greenway, 151 Conn. 128, 193 A.2d 713, 715 (1963); Harbor Island v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 286 Md. 303, 407 A.2d 738, 746-47 (1979). See generally 1 R. CLARK,
supra note 1, § 53.4; 3 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, §§ 724, 725; 1A G. THoMPSON, supra note 74,
§ 262 (1980). The courts, however, do not agree on what, if any, limitations should be imposed on
the severability principle. Compare, e.g., Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92, 77 S.E. 535, 537 (1913)
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the courts in announcing this "severability rule" suggests that they
would take a similar approach to consumptive rights, 120 their analysis
provides an inadequate basis for extending the severability principle to
consumptive rights. In considering whether nonconsumptive rights
should be severable and transferable, the courts almost uniformly focus on the nature of riparian rights to determine whether a transfer
would be consistent with the type of property right involved. While
this approach may be adequate for nonconsumptive uses, it precludes,
or at least discourages, consideration of policy concerns important to
the consumptive use situation. The following examination of one
court's treatment of the transferability issue in the context of a nonconsumptive use illustrates the court's theoretical perspective and introduces some of the problems that the approach causes for
consumptive interests.121
1.

The Severability Rule and Nonconsumptive Interests

In Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, the Virginia Supreme Court
unequivocally declared that "riparian rights may be severed from the
land to which they were once appurtenant'' and separately conveyed.122 The case involved a dispute between the owner of a parcel
(riparian rights may not be severed for use beyond the riparian land to which they are incident) with
Pyle v. Gilbert, 245 Ga. 403, 265 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1980) (right to make reasonable use of water on
nonriparian land could be acquired by grant from riparian owner).
120. See, e.g., Harbor Island Marina v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 286 Md. 303, 407 A.2d 738,
746-47 (1979); Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 140 S.E.2d 678, 680-81 (1965).
121. Because the public user raises different policy concerns than the private user, the discussion in Part II.C. will focus primarily on the private user.
122. 205 Va. 909, 140 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1965). The court in Thurston also clarified that the
principle of severability applied regardless of whether the watercourse was tidal or nontidal. Thurston, 140 S.E.2d at 681.
A 1973 decision by the Virginia Supreme Court suggests that the severability principle announced in Thurston is not absolute. That decision, Marine Resources Comm'n v. Forbes, 214 Va.
109, 197 S.E.2d 195 (1973), involved a dispute between the state and several parties, who, the state
argued, were filling in state-owned subaqueous beds without authorization or a superior claim of
right. In response, those parties argued that section 62.1-3 of the Virginia Code, VA. CoDE § 62.1-3
(1968) (present version at VA. CoDE § 62.1-3 (1982)), created a right to fill subaqueous beds in
"riparian owners" and that this right had been severed by the owner of the highland, as permitted by
Virginia law, and transferred to them. In rejecting the parties' arguments, the court observed that
"Virginia law recognized two types of riparian owners," those with rights appurtenant to the highland and those with rights severed from the highland. Marine Resources, 197 S.E.2d at 199. In the
instant situation, the relevant law, VA. CoDE§ 62.1-3 (1968), "conferred the new right to fill only
upon the owner of highland with riparian rights appurtenant thereto" and thus did not permit severance of the statutory right. Marine Resources, 197 S.E.2d at 199. As the court explained, this conclusion followed from statutory language authorizing "the doing of such acts as are necessary for
.•• fills by riparian owners opposite their property . . . ." VA. CoDE§ 62.1-3 (1968), quoted and
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of riverfront property and a city which claimed ownership of all the
riparian rights once appurtenant to that parcel. The deed conveyed to
the landowner's predecessor-in-title had "expressly reserve[d) and except[ed] from this conveyance all the riparian rights appurtaining or
in anywise belonging to the said property." 123 After the city acquired
these reserved rights, it began to fill in along the shore for the purpose
of constructing a highway. Suing to enjoin the fill-in operation, plaintiff argued that the riparian rights were easements appurtenant to the
riverfront land that only could be enjoyed by the owner of that land
and that therefore could not be severed from the dominant estate. 124
In rejecting plaintiff's argument, the court observed that prior
law had recognized that a riparian right is not just " 'a mere easement
to pass over the water or a privilege to use the surface, but [is] propconstrued in Marine Resources, 197 S.E.2d at 198. If the legislature had intended to confer the right
to fill upon all riparian owners, then, the court reasoned, it would not have used the phrase "opposite
their property."
Because Marine Resources involved a statutorily created riparian right which was defined in a
manner indicating that severance was not permissible, the decision arguably should have limited
precedential effect on Thurston. Even assuming that this is the correct interpretation of Marine
Resources, that decision, nevertheless, indicates that under certain circumstances riparian rights are
not severable, but rather must be held by the owner of the highland. The court in Marine Resources,
however, does not define what those circumstances or rights are, beyond stating that the statutory
right under review is one example.
One commentator has concluded that Marine Resources Comm'n v. Forbes is "inconsistent"
with Thurston and "substantially reduces the value of severed riparian rights." M. Livingston, Current Law Governing Rights and Interests in Land Abutting Virginia Waters 44 (Aug. 15, 1982)
(unpublished manuscript available at DePaul University College of Law, to be included in a forthcoming book by M. Livingston and L. Butler). She explains:
Under the Forbes rationale, for example, it is questionable whether the owner of severed
riparian rights still may build a wharf on submerged lands. Although the common law
recognized the right to wbarf, the statute cited in Forbes also lists 'the placement of private
piers for noncommercial purposes' as one of the statutorily permitted uses of subaqueous
beds. It apparently limits the right to build a noncommercial pier to owners of riparian
lands and to structures placed 'in the waters opposite such riparian lands.' Using the
Forbes reasoning, a court might well find that the General Assembly intended to restrict
the common law right of wharfage to only highland owners of riparian rights.
Id. at 44-45 (footnotes omitted). The commentator also concluded that the no-severability rule of
Marine Resources Comm'n v. Forbes probably should not violate the due process or takings clauses.
In her view as long as the rule "does not reduce the aggregate value of the property below an
acceptable level, it is irrelevant that one segment of the bundle of rights is virtually destroyed." Id.
at 47-48.
123. Thurston, 140 S.E.2d at 679-80. Courts will presume that a grant of riparian land includes riparian rights, unless a contrary intent is clear from the face of the deed. See, e.g., Mayor of
Paterson v. E. Jersey Water Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 49, 70 A . 472, 479 (1905); Interstate Motels Inc. v.
Biers, 213 Va. 498, 193 S.E.2d 658, 662 (1973). See generally 3 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 723.
124. Thurston, 140 S.E.2d at 680.
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erty in the soil under the water.' , 125 As a valuable property interest
in the soil, a riparian right could be the subject of a suit for damages
or an injunction and could be condemned for public use. 126 Similarly,
the right could be severed from the land to which it attaches and conveyed apart from that land.
With the exception of these few principles, the court in Thurston
v. City ofPortsmouth did not attempt to explain the nature of riparian
rights. Most courts have been equally as vague, perhaps because of
the problems that would arise if traditional property concepts were
used. 127 Although riparian rights resemble several different types of
property interests, none of the traditional classifications fit them precisely. Classifying riparian rights as easements appurtenant, for instance, would mean that the rights only could benefit the dominant
estate, or the tract of riparian land, and generally could not be severed.128 Also, even if the court concluded that riparian rights were
easements appurtenant until severed from the dominant estate, at
which point they became easements in gross, other problems then
arise. As easements in gross, they would be subject to the same limits
on transferability as other easements in gross. Although the law governing alienation of easements in gross is not clearly developed, they
are, as a general matter, not freely transferable. 129 By concluding that
125. Id. (quoting Peek v. City of Hampton, 115 Va. 855, 80 S.E. 593, 594 (1914)); see also
Thurston, 140 S.E.2d at 680 (quoting prior law as recognizing that riparian rights, "•are in no sense
easements, but are qualified property rights incident to the ownership' " of riparian land).
126. Thurston, 140 S.E.2d at 680.
127. See, e.g., Harbor Island Marina v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 286 Md. 303, 407 A.2d 738,
746-47 (1979); Cole v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co., 106 Pa. Super. 436, 162 A. 712, 714 (1932).
128. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OP PROPERTY§ 8.73 (A. Casner ed. 1952); R. MlNOR &
J. WURTS, THE LAW OP REAL PROPERTY§ 87 (1910).
129. Although there is no clear majority position, most courts do not permit transfers of easements in gross unless they are commercial in nature or purpose. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY §§ 8.75-8.80 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 2 G. THOMPSON, supra note 74, § 325, at 89-92
{1980). This distinction between commercial and personal easements in gross may provide a basis
for distinguishing between public and private users and for permitting severability for public users
when it would not be permitted for private users.
An easement in gross technically is a right to use another's land for purposes personal to the
holder of the right and arises independently of his ownership of land. See generally 2 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.9 (A. Casner ed. 1952); R. MINOR & J. WURTS, supra note 128, § 86. The
concept of easements in gross therefore is inconsistent with the basic nature of riparian rights, which
initially arise as incidents of ownership of riparian land.
Similar theoretical problems also would arise if riparian rights were classified as profits. A
profit a prendre generally involves taking a product from the land of another. See generally R.
MINoR & J. WURTS, supra note 128, § 66; 1 G. THOMPSON, supra note 74, § 139 (1980). Although
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riparian rights are not "mere easements," the Virginia Supreme Court
avoided these problems.
The task of defining the nature of riparian rights is important, 130
for the characteristics of a property right can affect the way a controversy involving that right is resolved. The courts, however, appear to
have focused on that task almost to the exclusion of the policies at
stake and have used their conclusions about the nature of riparian
rights to make some broad statements about the transferability of riparian rights. In Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, for example, the
court used unequivocal language to announce the severability principle, suggesting that it would apply the principle to all types of riparian
rights, regardless of whether they involve consumptive or nonconsumptive uses. 131 Those two categories of uses, however, raise different practical and policy considerations. For instance, the holder of a
nonconsumptive right, like the right to fill-in involved in Thurston or
the right to build a wharf or pier, must, by definition, exercise the
dght in the same general area of the riparian tract as his transferor.
Because the principal change is in the identity of the user, a transfer of
this right does not involve a high risk that the use will be expanded or
altered. With a consumptive right, though, the potential for divergence from the present use and for interference with other uses is
much greater. A transferee of the right to use water from a watercourse may change the type of use made, increase the amount of
water consumed, or use the water to benefit land in a different location.132 Because of these differences between consumptive and nonconsumptive uses, resolution of the transferability issue should focus,
to an extent, on the type of use involved and on the policies and interests that would be benefitted or infringed by the transfer. A discusa few riparian rights conceivably could fall within this category, most riparian rights do not involve
removing products from the land.
Classifying riparian rights as licenses also would not solve the theoretical problems since
licenses technically are not interests in land. See generally R. MINOR & J. WURTS, supra note 128,
§ 122. But see 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.110 (A. Casner ed. 1952) (A license is an
interest in land which includes the privilege of use of the land in which it is an interest.). Furthermore, they generally are not assignable. R. MINoR & J. WURTS, supra note 128, § 125. See also 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 8.122 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
130. Because of the problems in classifying riparian rights as one of the traditional property
interests, some commentators have suggested that riparian rights really are sui generis. See, e.g., 1A
G. THOMPSON, supra note 74, § 264 (1980).
131. Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 140 S.E.2d 678, 680-82 (1965).
132. Accord M. Livingston, supra note 122, at n.121.
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sion of the policy implications of transferring consumptive rights
follows.

2.

Transfe"ing Consumptive Rights

The policies and interests affected by the transfer of consumptive
rights vary according to the specific circumstances and can be identified by considering four key situations. They include: (a) a Thurstontype situation, where consumptive rights are transferred to a nonriparian for use in conjunction with the transferor,s riparian land; (b) a
riparian tract subdivision situation, where lots formed by subdividing
a tract of riparian land are sold to third parties who would like to
exercise the consumptive rights that had attached to the tract for the
benefit of their lots; (c) an intrabasin transfer situation, involving the
transfer of consumptive rights to parties p]anning to exercise the
rights for the benefit of land never part of the transferor's riparian
land, but within the same watershed or basin; 133 and (d) an interbasin
transfer situation, involving the transfer of consumptive rights to parties p]anning to exercise the rights for the benefit of land outside the
watershed or basin of the watercourse to be used. Each situation
raises different economic, equitable, and environmental concerns.
a.

The Thurston-Type Situation

The first situation, which is perhaps the easiest to deal with
under the severability principle, involves a riparian who wants to sell
a consumptive right to a nonriparian to be exercised in conjunction
with the seller,s riparian land. Such a situation may arise, for instance, when the owner of the riparian land lacks the resources or the
skills needed to exercise the riparian rights properly and productively.
Or the riparian landowner may have decided to develop a recreational
or boating facility next to the water to be used by those who are willing to purchase a membership interest that includes the appropriate
consumptive and nonconsumptive rights. 134
133. As defined, the intrabasin transfer example should include situations where a riparian
locality annexes adjoining areas.
134. Such uses might include the right to use the water for recreational uses, the right of access
to the watercourse, and the right to use a pier, wharf, or dock. Although commentators generally
agree that recreational uses can be consumptive or nonconsumptive, most classify recreational uses
as nonconsumptive. See, e.g., 1 R. CLARK, supra note 1, § 55.2, at 381. For a discussion of Virginia's approach to partial severance of riparian rights, seeM. Livingston, supra note 122, at 37-41.
A riparian landowner attempting to develop a recreational or boating facility may face other
legal problems besides those raised by the riparian doctrine. A developer planning to build "dock-
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Applying the transferability rule to this type of situation does not
seem troublesome, as long as the class of users is not unreasonably
increased, since the riparian rights still will be exercised in conjunction with the original riparian land. Although some increase in the
amount of water consumed probably will occur, other riparians
should have reasonably foreseen that the entire tract eventually would
be benefitted by the exercise of riparian rights and the identity of the
developer should not matter. Riparians do not acquire superior rights
of use just because another riparian fails to exercise his rights.t3s Furthermore, if the increase in the class of users or "beneficiaries" really
is unreasonable, then the courts should be able to protect the other
riparians through the reasonable use requirement. 136 Normally,
though, the benefits derived from permitting the transfer and making
an efficient use of the tract of land should outweigh the harm to other
riparians caused by the change in identity of those directly
benefitted. 137

b.

The Riparian Tract Subdivision Situation
A more difficult question, however, is posed where a riparian

ominiums" in Norfolk, Virginia, for example. discovered that his plans could be interfering with
public rights in the watercourse and submerged bed. Because he planned to sell boatslips to private
parties and because the boat slips would rest upon the publicly owned river bed, any interest sold
would be subject to the state's right to use the river bottom. The developer, thus, could not guarimtee that those buying an interest in the "dockominium" would be acquiring a valuable, exclusive
property right. Newport News-Hampton Daily Press, July 4, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
A riparian landowner. attempting to develop waterfront property also must comply with federal
requirements governing navigable waters. For example. construction of wharves, piers, and other
similar structures must not impede navigation, and any project which will modify harbor lines or the
affected watercourse must be recommended by the Army Corps of Engineers and approved by the
Secretary of the Army. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403
(1982).
135. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
136. Some courts already have demonstrated a willingness to use the reasonable use requirement to control development. In Pierce v. Riley, 35 Mich. App. 122, 192 N .W.2d 366 (1971), affd,
51 Mich. App. 504, 215 N.W.2d 759 (1974), affd, 81 Mich. App. 39, 264 N.W.2d 110 (1978) (per
curiam), for example, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that a proposed use was unreasonable because it would have increased the number of persons having access to a small lake by 66%. In
that case several owners of lakefront property sought to prevent other owners of lakefront property
from granting rights of way for access to the lake to nonriparians. See Pierce, 192 N.W.2d at 367.
As relief the court ordered the defendants to fill a channel which they had built to provide access to
the lake. Pierce v. Riley, 51 Mich. App. 504, 215 N.W.2d 759 (1974), affd, 81 Mich. App. 39, 264
N.W.2d 110 (1978) (per curiam).
Like owners of land abutting a watercourse, owners of lakefront property are governed by the
reasonable use requirement. See supra note 17.
137. Cf. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 856 comment b (1977) (justifying grants of
riparian rights, even to nonriparians).
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landowner subdivides his tract of riparian land and sells lots to third
parties. When a party purchases a lot not contiguous to the watercourse, the question arises whether the purchaser also acquires riparian rights for the benefit of the lot. If riparian rights generally can be
severed from riparian land and transferred, then the policy of property law favoring alienation138 suggests that any restriction on transferability should be construed narrowly and thus that land within the
watershed of a river or stream should retain its riparian status even
though severed from the original tract of riparian land.
The few cases addressing the issue appear to have disagreed with
this analysis. In perhaps the leading case on the matter, Anaheim
Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 139 the California Supreme Court held that:
[i]f the owner of a tract abutting on a stream conveys to another a part of
the land not contiguous to the stream, he thereby cuts off the part so
conveyed from all participation in the use of the stream and from riparian rights therein, unless the conveyance declares the contrary. 140

Then, to emphasize the permanency of the loss of status, the court
added: "[l]and thus conveyed and severed from the stream can never
regain the riparian right," not even if it later is "reconveyed to the
person who owns the part abutting on the stream, so that the two
tracts are again held in one ownership."141
It is unclear why the court qualified its holding with the phrase
"unless the conveyance declares the contrary." One possibility is that
the court added the phrase because it viewed the severability issue
138. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 26.1 (A. Casner eel. 1952); supra note 113.
139. 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978 (1907).
140. Anaheim, 88 P. at 980. Although the California court did not explain its approach, it did
cite several other sources which provide some insights into the court's reasoning. One cite is to a
section of a water rights treatise dealing with riparian land. Id. (citing 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note
13, § 463a). In the treatise section, the author suggests that nonriparian tracts of land cannot attain
riparian status merely by being purchased by the owner of contiguous, riparian land. 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 463a, at 1572. As the author explains, this position seems to have been
prompted by a fear that land corporations would purchase tracts of land stretching miles away from
the stream. I d. The treatise section thus supports taking a restrictive approach to riparian status in
the subdivision situation.
Another source cited by the court in Anaheim is an earlier California decision, Boehmer v. Big
Rock Creek Irrigation Dist., 117 Cal. 19, 48 P. 908 (1897). See Anaheim, 88 P. at 980. Like the
treatise author, the court in that case concludes that land severed and separately conveyed from the
part contiguous to the water never can regain riparian status, not even if it later is held by the owner
of the waterfront part. It feared that if a contrary position were adopted riparian rights held because
of ownership of a tract abutting a stream "would extend to all lands [the owner] • • • might subsequently acquire, no matter • • • how distant from the stream, provided he owned all the land between the stream and the land so purchased." Boehmer, 48 P. at 910.
141. Anaheim, 88 P. at 980.
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posed by the subdivision situation more as a question of conveyancing
and intent than as a matter of transferability. Support for this view
can be found in the court's subsequent description of the noncontiguous subdivided part as land "obtained . . . by a conveyance which
severed" it from the riparian tract. 142 If the court intended this interpretation, then Anaheim would not impose a restraint on alienation,
except to the extent that it dealt with alienation of riparian rights in a
manner inconsistent with the normal preference for transferability of
property rights.
Another possibility is that the court failed to realize the full impact of its qualifying language and that it generally intended to restrict alienation of riparian rights. The court's subsequent statement
about the permanency of the loss of status, as well as its continued use
of phrases like "not contiguous to" or "not abutting" to describe the
subdivided part, supports this second interpretation. 143 Also, on several occasions, the court restated its conclusion about the status of
noncontiguous parts without adding the qualifying language. 144
Accepting the first interpretation and construing Anaheim as permitting severability 145 would cause a conflict to develop within the
142. Id. at 981.
143. ld. at 980-81.
144. Id.
145. Only a few courts have considered the severability issue in the context of the subdivided
riparian tract situation. They apparently have agreed with Anaheim and prohibited severability.
See, e.g. , Yearsley v. Carter, 149 Wash. 285, 270 P. 804, 805 (1928). In a few other decisions,
though, the courts have permitted riparian rights to attach to land purchased by a riparian when
that land is contiguous to his riparian land. See, e.g., Jones v. Conn, 39 Or. 30, 64 P. 855, 858
(1901). Although these cases involve slightly different situations, they suggest that the courts deciding them would permit severability in the subdivision situation. Accord REsTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 843 comment c (1977) (riparian tract of land defined as a continuous tract held by one
possessor, without regard to area or size of tract, or manner of acquisition).
The approach taken by some jurisdictions on this issue is confusing and contradictory. One
decision in Virginia, for example, appears to approve of the California rule, quoting and discussing
the Anaheim decision. See Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508,512-13 (1921).
Several other authorities, however, suggest that Virginia has rejected, implicitly at least, the position
reken by the California court. In Marine Resources Comm'n v. Forbes, 214 Va. 109, 197 S.E.2d 195
(1973), for example, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that "when a property interest severed by
an antecedent owner from the fee is acquired by a subsequent owner of the limited fee, the two
property interests merge to revive the fee simple absolute." Marine Resources, 197 S.E.2d at 199.
Although Marine Resources Comm'n involved a dispute over the transfer of a statutorily created
riparian right, its application of the revival or merger doctrine suggests that it is rejecting at least
part of the California rule. Furthermore, those Virginia cases that have recognized the severability
and transferability of riparian rights have tended to state the principle broadly and without qualification. In Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 140 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1965), for instance, the
Virginia Supreme Court declared that "[i]t has long been assumed . • . that riparian rights may be
severed ••.," Thurston, 140 S.E.2d at 680, while in an earlier case, Hite v. Town of Luray, 175 Va.
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riparian doctrine. Whereas the single transaction restriction adopted
as part of the definition of riparian land suggests that riparian rights
can benefit land not contiguous to a watercourse only where that land
was acquired in the same transaction as land abutting the watercourse, the severability principle suggests that riparian rights should
be freely transferable. Similarly, while the physical contact and unitary tract standards indicate that only those unitary lots contiguous to
the watercourse can retain their status as riparian land after being
subdivided, the severability principle supports allowing noncontiguous lots to be benefitted by the watercourse where appropriate riparian rights are transferred along with the lots.
Accepting the above interpretation and resolving the conflicts in
favor of the riparian land tests would mean that the riparian doctrine
would pose a significant obstacle to development. Although the riparian doctrine initially may have served as a method for preserving and
protecting low-density uses, other more appropriate methods for controlling development now exist. Instead of promoting certain types of
uses, the riparian doctrine should be concerned with allocating water
rights as efficiently and equitably as possible. 146 As a general matter,
an efficient and equitable distribution system would require transferability of riparian rights.t47
Furthermore, at least where a transfer would not result in new
uses substantially different from the old, either in type or degree, upholding the transfer would not appear to create a serious conflict with
the riparian land tests. 148 As in the first situation, the land to be
218, 8 S.E.2d 369 (1940), the court described the principle as "a well settled doctrine.. applying to
water rights in general, Hite, 8 S.E.2d at 371. Finally, at least one Virginia statute suggests that
riparian rights can be exercised for the benefit of nooriparian land where that land once was part of
an individual tract of riparian land. That statutory provision defines riparian land as including "real
property under common ownership and which is not separated from riparian land by land of any
other ownership . . • not withstanding that such real property is divided into tracts and parcels
which may not bound upon the watercourse!• VA. CoDE§ 62.1-104(5) (1982). Although the effect
of this provision is limited by its own language, which specifically refers to subdivided land still held
under common ownership, and by the fact that it is contained in an act dealing only with impoundment of surface waters, it appears to be one of the few statutory provisions in the Virginia Code
addressing the effect of subdividing land on the land•s riparian status. See generally 2A STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION § 47.07 (C. Sands ed. 1973) (a term defined in one statute is not
generally extended to other code sections).
146. For a discussion of the goals of a water allocation system and of the proper role of public
regulation see Trelease, supra note 115, at 1-6, 37-47.
147. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text. For further discussion of how to minimize the conftict between the riparian land tests and the severability principle see infra notes 161,
184-95 and accompanying text.
148. If the courts permit the transfer of riparian rights to subdivided parts not contiguous to
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benefitted in the second hypothetical situation is the original tract of
land. Thus, to the extent that expectations are set by the boundaries
of the tract and by the nature of the old use, the transfers should not
undermine the policies of the riparian land tests.
But where a significant change in use would result from severance in the subdivision situation, as would normally occur when the
transferee is a locality, then other riparians would appear to have a
legitimate interest in preventing the transfers. Their expectations
about use of the watercourse would have been set by the fact that the
riparian owner's land initially was not subdivided. Furthermore, a
significant increase in use would reduce severely the return flow available to lower riparians and thus could create a situation where injuries
to third parties outweighed the benefits received by those involved in
the transaction. If such a situation arose, permitting the severance
and transfer of riparian rights would create an inefficient result:
although the new use might be worth more to the parties to the transfer than the old one, the aggregate benefit to society of the new use
would be less than that of the old use.t49
Some degree of transferability, though, is needed to avoid locking
the riparian owner into his present use. If the holder of a property
right cannot transfer the right, he may not be able to shift his res~urce
the watercourse, then the question arises whether the purchaser of the noncontiguous part has a
right of access to the watercourse. Where a conveyance does not expressly provide for access rights,
a court may choose to imply a right of way. But even if a court decides such a right cannot arise by
implication, the problem can be resolved through the marketplace. In this type of jurisdiction, a
potential purchaser would know that the market price did not reflect the value of access rights and
thus could bargain for the rights as part of the conveyance.

149. In his work EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Posner describes such a situation by hypothesizing that A, B, and D are farmers along a watercourse and that A, who is upstream to the others, is
contemplating transferring his use right to X, a municipality. He assumes further that A's right is
worth $100 to him, that X is willing to pay $125 for it and plans to use the water to supply its
inhabitants, and that the value of return flow is not considered to be a property right. Although A
probably would sell his right to X under these facts, the transfer would not necessarily produce a
more efficient result. Because municipalities consume a much larger percentage of the diverted
water than individual users and return the excess to a different point on the stream or to a different
stream, downstream users, like 1J and D, probably would be adversely affected by the transfer. They,
for example, would suffer ifX returned excess water downstream from B, where only D could use it,
and if A's return flow was worth $50 to B, while X's return flow was only worth $10 to D. Under
these circumstances, it would be inefficient to allow A to sell his right to X: the value of A's and B's
current uses ($150) would be greater than that of ..rs and D's proposed uses ($135). To encourage
the efficient result, Posner suggests that the value of return flow generated by a use be part of the
property rights of the user. Then each right holder would consider the value of return flow generated by its use in deciding whether to shift the resources to a new use. R. PoSNER, supra note 113,
§ 3.11, at 56-51.
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to more productive uses. 150 An absolute ban on severability in the
subdivision example admittedly would not lock in the riparian owner
completely since he still would have the option of selling his riparian
land. The ban, however, would deprive him of options available to
other riparians. For instance, another riparian who was planning to
sever and transfer only his riparian rights to be used for a portion of
his riparian land would appear to be able to do so under the California rule, even though the portion to be benefitted was not contiguous
to the watercourse. By limiting the transfer to riparian rights and
choosing not to sell his ownership interest in the noncontiguous portion of land, the riparian should be able to circumvent the ruling in
Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller.
One possible way to allow development of riparian land without
unfairly burdening other riparians would be to permit riparian rights
to attach to subdivided parts of the original tract only where the subdivision was considered to be a reasonable development of the land. 151
Granted, evaluating the reasonableness of development plans might
be difficult, especially where the "developer" is a local government or
the new user is a large private business. 152 At some point in time,
protection of the reasonable expectations of present users would require denying the right to sever and transfer riparian rights to the
purchasers of subdivided parts. Where the riparian developer is a locality, this denial can have serious consequences since the locality
otherwise may have been able to justify using the watercourse for the
benefit of residents purchasing the subdivided lots. 153
150. Property rights must be transferable if they are to be put to their most efficient uses. As
Posner explains, if a farm is being managed by a bad farmer (A) whose future earnings from the land
have a present value of $1,000 and if a better farmer {B) anticipated that his earnings on that parcel
would have a present value of $1,500, it would be efficient forB to purchase A's interests for $250
more thanA's expected present value. Then A would receive $250 more thanA's expected value and
B still would make a $250 profit. Value maximization, in Posner's words, thus "requires a mechanism by which the farmer [A] can be induced to transfer rights in the property to someone who can
work it more productively; a transferable property right is such a mechanism." /d. § 3.1, at 28-29.
See generally id. §§ 3.1, 3.11.
151. An unreasonable development may exist, for example, where a use drastically reduces the
flow for lower riparians or where the increase in use for the lot being developed is high in proportion
to the actual size of the lot.
152. It would be unusual for a new user in the subdivision tract situation to be a local govern·
ment. If a locality was attempting to acquire use rights, it probably would buy land contiguous to
the watercourse and not a noncontiguous subdivided part. The only circumstances under which a
locality may, as a practical matter, be purchasing a subdivided part would be where the locality
owned the part of the subdivided tract still in physical contact with the watercourse and was trying
to reacquire some of the parts that were subdivided.
153. Part III will discuss other options available to the locality.
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At least where a development is reasonable, severance and transfer of riparian rights to the subdivided parts should be allowed. Once
again, other areas of property law provide protection for the interests
of private riparians by helping to control development and ensure that
compatible uses are conducted in the same general area. Furthermore, this type of approach to balancing the interests in development
with the interests in preserving the status quo appears throughout
property law. Under the law of easements, for instance, the benefit of
an easement appurtenant generally can attach, upon subdivision of
the dominant estate, to each subdivided part. 154 As the Restatement
of Property explains, the subdivision of dominant estates is a "common" occurrence which the parties are presumed to have contemplated, absent an intent to the contrary. 155 As will be demonstrated in
more detail later, adopting a similar standard for subdivision of riparian land could be accomplished easily through the reasonable use
requirement. 156
This solution, however, still does not eliminate the inefficient outcome that can occur when a reasonable development produces a significant increase in use and reduces the return :flow available to other
riparians. Because the value of the return :flow generated by a particular use is not considered part of the property rights of the user, he will
not consider that value in evaluating his use options. 157 In discussing
this problem in a slightly different context, Posner recommends that
the transferee be deemed "the owner of any new return flow that the
transfer creates." 158 Posner offered this suggestion while examining
transfers of appropriation rights, which are another type of water
right defined under the common law of many western states. Appropriation rights admittedly differ from riparian rights in several material respects. Besides having more precise quantitative limits,
appropriation rights also are subject to a clearer priority system based
on the first-in-time rule. As a general matter, a party who appropriates water to his use before another prevails in a dispute. 159 Because
154. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Perry, 309 Mass. 100, 34 N.B.2d 489, 491 (1941); Bang v. Forman,
244 Mich. 571, 222 N.W. 96, 97 (1928); see also REsTATEMENT OP PROPERTY § 488 comments b, c
(1944). Where an excessive use results because of changes in the dominant estate, the remedy usually is an injunction and not forfeiture of the easement, unless the unauthorized use cannot be severed and effectively prohibited. Crimmins v. Gould, 149 Cal. App. 2d 383, 308 P .2d 786, 791 (1957).
155. REsTATEMENT OP PROPERTY § 488 comment b (1944).
156. See infra notes 184-95 and accompanying text.
157. R. POSNER, supra note 113, § 3.11, at 57; see supra note 149.
158. R. POSNER, supra note 113, § 3.11, at 57.
159. For a discussion of the prior appropriation doctrine see supra note 13.
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the concept of appropriation rights developed in areas poor in water
resources, it is not surprising that these rights are clearer and more
inflexible than riparian rights. If clearer standards for defining use
rights and for resolving conflicts among users had not developed, the
already serious consequences that water shortages have in those arid
areas would have achieved even greater magnitude.160
Despite the differences between appropriation and riparian
rights, Posner's suggestion should be extended to riparian rights. The
concern being addressed by his recommendation is not the need for
precise standards or clear priorities, but rather the need for efficient
use of a resource, generally, and for recognizing the full impact of a
use, more specifically. As with appropriation rights, the exercise of
riparian rights generates a return flow which can be measured.
Although the uncertainty of riparian rights may make this task more
difficult, interested parties have, in the past, been able to make projections about the impact of present and future uses and thus should be
able to estimate return flow. Also, although the uncertainty may
cause the value of the return flow to depreciate or appreciate over
time, this type of fluctuation is a risk which owners of property rights
generally assume. As with appropriation uses, recognizing the value
of the return flow generated by a riparian use will not guarantee that
the flow will remain steady or last forever. But failing to take such
action could result in the same inefficient outcome that Posner describes in the context of appropriation rights.

c.

The Intrabasin Transfer Situation

A third situation presents a more serious conflict under the riparian doctrine. It arises when a party who already owns a tract of land
within the watershed of a watercourse decides to purchase riparian
rights from the owner of riparian land located in another part of the
watershed. If the purchaser plans to exercise the rights for the benefit
of the land that he owns and that land is waterfront property, then the
transfer would conflict with the single transaction test. Where the
purchaser's land is not waterfront property, a conflict with the physical contact standard also would arise. The problem in the first variation is not that significant, given the shortcomings of the single
transaction standard. The conflict arising under the second variation,
however, poses a more serious obstacle to the severability principle.
160. See generally supra notes 2 & 13.
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In contrast to the first two hypothetical situations, the land to be
benefitted in the intrabasin transfer situation is not part of the tract
owned by the riparian-transferor and, indeed, would not even qualify
as riparian land where the purchaser did not own waterfront property. The party seeking the transfer therefore could not argue, as was
advanced in the first two hypothetical situations, that the transfer
would not contravene the reasonable expectations of other riparians.
Neighboring riparians could not anticipate that the transferor's riparian rights would be exercised for land located elsewhere in the
watershed.
Despite this seemingly insurmountable difference, a consistent interpretation of both the riparian land requirement and the severability
principle still can be achieved in the intrabasin transfer situation. The
key to accomplishing this is recognizing that the two serve different
functions under the riparian doctrine. The riparian land requirement
helps the courts to identify those parties who have riparian rights to
exercise or possibly sell. Once the parties holding those rights are
identified, the severability principle then defines how and to what extent the rights can be sf'vered and transferred. As in other areas of
property law, the legal principles governing alienation of riparian
rights should be construed broadly. By permitting riparian rights to
be transferred for the benefit of land throughout the watershed, the
courts would be encouraging riparian landowners to sell their use
rights to benefit other land in the watershed.
Taking a functional approach to interpreting the riparian land
tests and the severability principle will not resolve the matter entirely,
for the reasonable use standard still needs to be redefined somewhat to
reflect the new uses. Because the third situation involves two tracts of
land, it is unclear which tract should be used to set priorities between
users and define the quantitative limits of the transferee's uses. To
protect the expectations and equities of other riparians, courts permitting a transfer in the third situation should observe two related
principles.
The first principle is that no purchaser of riparian rights should
acquire any greater interest than his transferor. If, for example, the
transferee's lot is a ten-acre farm, while the transferor's is only a oneacre farm, a court should not permit the transferee to exercise the
purchased rights to satisfy all the needs of his ten-acre tract. The
court should limit the amount that the transferee can use to the
amount that his transferor would have been able to use. To permit
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otherwise in a traditional riparian jurisdiction would seriously undermine the reasonable use requirement.
Although applying this first principle may prove to be difficult,
the courts should not, as a practical matter, have to apply it that
often. Once parties learn about the principle, they should adjust to it
voluntarily through the marketplace. For example, in the above situation an informed purchaser only would be willing to pay for rights
that could be used for the one-acre tract, instead of his ten-acre tract.
Reversing the size of the lots provides an even better illustration of
how the parties would adjust to the first principle through the marketplace. If the transferee's lot consisted only of one acre, while the
transferor's lot had ten acres, then the transferee would not want to
purchase all of the transferor's use rights. Because the transferee only
would need sufficient use rights to meet the needs of his one-acre
tract, paying for anything more would be an unwise business decision.
The second principle is that the reasonableness of a transferee's
use generally should be measured in light of the expectations of riparians owning land near the parties to the transfer. For example, if the
transferee owns nonwaterfront property located above, but not adjacent to, the transferor's riparian land, the transferee should not be
able to purchase the transferor's riparian rights and then claim that he
is upstream to, and therefore has certain priorities of use over those
neighboring riparians located between the two tracts. Allowing this
claim would undermine the reasonable expectations of the intervening
riparians. They generally could not have anticipated that the owner
of nonriparian land located above them in the watershed one day
would acquire riparian rights. 161 Although this result also could be
achieved under the first limitation, the second principle would function more as an equitable safety valve than as an incentive to properly
value the purchased rights.
If courts use these two principles to define the rights of transferees in the third situation, then intrabasin transfers may not be as appealing an alternative for public users and large private users as they
would first appear. Depending on the nature and extent of the available transferors' rights, a locality may have to buy up the rights of
numerous riparians to be able to supply its public's consumptive
needs. At least to the small private user, this prospect should not
161. If, on the other hand, the transferee owns nonwaterfront property below the transferor's
waterfront property, then the expectations of riparians in the area between the two tracts would be
to receive the flow of the watercourse after reasonable use by the transferor.
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seem that troubling; what the two principles really are forcing public
users to do is to pay for the use rights that they need. But to the
public user, that prospect may be unacceptable, at least when compared to several other options available under the common law. As
will be shown, these other options may not require the public user to
give value for public consumptive rights.

d.

The Interbasin Transfer Situation

Perhaps the most troublesome situation arises where a private
riparian severs and transfers his riparian rights to a party who intends
to use the rights for the benefit of nonriparian land located outside the
watershed. Unlike the first three situations, this hypothetical situation introduces a new factor, an interbasin transfer, which supports
completely banning the transfer of severed riparian rights. 162 Admittedly, the same functional approach used with the intrabasin transfer
could be applied to this last situation. That is, those favoring the
transfer could argue that permitting transfers to nonwatershed land
would not undermine the watershed requirement because that requirement still would be used to determine who had riparian rights to
transfer. This argument ignores the other functions served by the watershed test, especially the important balancing function served by it.
As explained earlier, the watershed standard represents a compromise
between often conflicting equitable, environmental, and efficiency concerns. If the standard were not used, then some of those important
concerns would be seriously undermined.
Abandoning the watershed test would have an especially severe
impact on the expectancy interests of users in the transferor's watershed. Because the benefitted land is not in the same watershed as the
watercourse, the unused portion could not return to the watercourse
for use by other riparians without construction of an elaborate return
system. Assuming return flow is recognized as a property right, as
suggested above, the transferee would be willing to construct such a
return system only where the value of the return flow in the transferor's watershed exceeded the construction costs. That such a situation would arise is highly unlikely, given the high costs of building
water supply structures. In most interbasin transfers, then, the trans162. Though their reasons often are unclear, many courts agree that severability and transfer
should not be allowed when land outside the watershed would be benefitted. See, e.g., Harvey Realty
Co. v. Borough of Wallingford, 111 Conn. 352, 150 A. 60, 63 {1930); Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va.
92, 77 S.E. 535, 537 (1913).
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fer would decrease the amount of the return flow to other users in the
transferor's watershed. Although this result would be more efficient
when the value of the water in its new uses is greater than the value of
the old uses, it would seriously infringe on the interests of other riparians along the diverted watercourse, not only in their exercise of present uses, but also in their development of new uses. Until water
resources in the eastern United States become scarce, the riparian
doctrine can afford to strike a better balance between efficiency and
equity. The watershed test provides such a balance.
In conclusion, although case law establishes the general proposition that riparian rights are severable and transferable, the various
policies at stake suggest that this proposition should not be uniformly
applied to all transfers of riparian rights. The different policy concerns raised by consumptive and nonconsumptive uses, for example,
indicate that a distinction should be made between those two categories of rights. Nonconsumptive uses generally are exercised in conjunction with the riparian land even after severance. Because the
nature of the expected use does not change significantly in most cases,
few restrictions on the transfer of nonconsumptive uses are necessary.
Consumptive uses, however, are not as closely tied to the land,
and the likelihood of a significant change in use is greater. Therefore,
whether riparian principles should permit severance and transferability of consumptive rights should depend on the circumstances surrounding the change in use. Where, for instance, a private riparian
wants to transfer a consumptive right to a nonriparian to be used for
the benefit of the seller's land, it seems both efficient and equitable to
permit the transfer, so long as the change in use is one that the riparian transferor could have made. Although allowing transferability in
the subdivision example also is desirable under certain circumstances,
equitable and efficiency concerns necessitate imposing restrictions on
such transfers. A requirement that the subdivision be a reasonably
foreseeable development, for instance, might be necessary to avoid imposing an unfair burden on other riparians. Also, to prevent an inefficient outcome, the property rights of a user should be redefined to
include return flow.
The last two situations pose the most serious conflicts under the
riparian doctrine. Unlike the first two situations, which involve land
that once could qualify as riparian land, the third and fourth may
involve land that never could be riparian. Although this distinction
suggests that transfers should be banned in the last two situations to

156

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:95

avoid a conflict with the riparian land restriction, focusing on the separate functions of the riparian land restriction and the severability
principle helps to minimize the conflict between them. If intrabasin
transfers are permitted, equitable and efficiency concerns once again
would require imposing some restrictions. Besides limiting the transferee's reasonable use rights to those held by the transferor, a court
also should evaluate the reasonableness of the transferee's uses by
considering the expectations of riparians in the vicinity. Although
these limitations also could be imposed on interbasin transfers to minimize some of the concerns held by riparians, they would not remove
the economic and environmental concerns raised by the fact that the
transfers would be to land outside the watershed. The courts, at least,
might have difficulty reaching a more acceptable compromise between
the competing concerns. 163
The above conclusions reflect legal and policy considerations that
generally should apply regardless of whether the user is a private
party or a public entity. Because some of the considerations, though,
change sufficiently when a public user is involved, further analysis of
the public use situation is needed. Part III will focus on the nature of
public consumptive rights in natural watercourses, examining the extent to which the riparian doctrine recognizes such rights, either directly or indirectly.
III.

PUBLIC CONSUMPTIVE RIGHTS

As explained in Part II, many of the common-law riparian principles are based on an assumption that the user is a private agrarian.
Although this assumption may have been based in fact when the riparian doctrine first developed, it no longer reflects water use patterns
and seriously limits the water options of localities attempting to sat163. If a basin in a riparian jurisdiction becomes water-poor, some sort oflegal action would be
needed to provide for that area's public consumptive needs. Because of the importance of the policy
concerns at stake and because of the need for a carefully developed management plan, the state
legislature probably would be a more appropriate problem-solver than the courts. See Butler, supra
note 12, at 777-80. It, more so than the courts, could enact a comprehensive regulatory system that
promoted efficient and equitable transfers of water use rights to private parties for use outside the
watershed. Under a comprehensive system, a regulatory body not only could review proposed transfers to evaluate their economic and equitable implications for users in the watershed, but also could
assess their environmental impact. Regulatory oversight thus could minimize some of the problems
that would result if the transfers were allowed under the common law. At least in the area of
interstate waters, though, the judiciary has demonstrated, through its application of the equitable
apportionment doctrine, that it can take an active role in managing use of water resources. See supra
note 108.

1985]

CONSUMPTIVE WATER RIGHTS

157

isfy their inhabitants' needs. Unlike many private users, local governments usually must divert water from a watercourse to fulfill their
public's needs. Effective operation of a public sewage system, for instance, requires using large quantities of water for waste treatment,
while the public's drinking needs generally cannot be met responsibly
without storing water for future use.
Whether a local government can divert or othenvise use a watercourse to satisfy the public's consumptive needs depends, to an extent,
on a court's willingness to modify traditional riparian principles and
their underlying assumptions. 164 Because the policy considerations
raised by public consumptive uses differ, sometimes significantly,
from those relating to private consumptive uses, courts in riparian
jurisdictions may be reluctant to alter riparian principles to accommodate the public interest, through direct or indirect means. 165 Part
III.A. will examine the nature of public consumptive rights under the
riparian doctrine to determine whether the doctrine can provide
greater recognition of public rights without seriously impairing existing interests. Part III.B. will consider the extent to which the doc164. It also may depend on the navigability of the watercourse. See generally 1A G. THOMPIf a watercouse is nonnavigable, then the public interest in the watercourse is governed primarily by the riparian doctrine. But if
the watercourse is navigable, then other common-law doctrines provide possible bases for defining
and interpreting the public interest in the watercourse. Significantly, because these theories do not
depend on riparian ownership, they could apply in nonriparian jurisdictions as well. Perhaps the
most important of these other common law concepts is the public trust doctrine, which is founded on
the principle that certain natural resources are held by the state or its delegates in trust for its people.
For a discussion of the doctrine by a leading authority see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REv. 471 (1970). Although other theories also exist, they are not as developed nor as accepted as the public trust doctrine. See, e.g., Old
Dominion Iron & Nail Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 116 Va. 166, 81 S.E. 108 (1914), appeal
dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction, 242 U.S. 623 (1916) (where state court appears to be developing a
"public waters" theory and recognizing certain public interests in those waters).
165. If altering the legal principles would seriously undermine key aspects of the riparian doctrine, then courts normally should avoid acting on "personal policy preferences," as the Supreme
Court recently admonished, and instead follow established legal principles. See Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2793 (1984). Because the controversy in
Chevron involved interpretation of the Clean Air Act,§ 172(b)(6), 42 U.S. C.§ 7502(b)(6) (1983), See
104 S.Ct. at 2785, the Court's admonishment would not apply directly to a court examining riparian
principles. But that court still should be careful not to change riparian principles radically because
of personal policy preferences. Otherwise holders of riparian property rights affected by the change
might challenge the judicial action as a violation of the takings or due process clauses of federal and
state constitutions. See, e.g.;U.S. CoNST. amends. V, XIV; VA. CoNST. art. I,§§ 6, 11. If property
is taken for public purposes without just compensation, contrary to the constitution, then a final
judgment of a court upholding the taking would be a violation of due process. Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,235 (1891);see Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164
U.S. 403, 417 (1896). See generally Ausness, supra note 74, at 240-56.
SON, supra note 74, § 258 (1980) (discussing meaning of navigability).
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trine permits public users to justify diversions and other consumptive
uses through exceptions to traditional doctrine.
A.

Recognizing Public Consumptive Rights Under
the Riparian Doctrine

Although the efficiency and environmental concerns raised by
public uses differ in some respects from those raised by private uses,
the most significant policy differences between the two types of uses
appear to involve equitable concems. 166 Because public uses often occur on a much larger scale than private uses, public uses tend to cause
more intense conflicts between users and to provoke stronger feelings
of injustice. Water-rich localities, many of which are low-density rural areas, understandably fear that water-poor areas will rob them of
important development opportunities by attempting to divert some of
their abundant water resources. The anger and sense of injustice felt
by the water-rich jurisdictions is intensified by a belief held by many
of them that they own the waters within their boundaries, or at least
have a right to use those resources for the benefit of their inhabitants.167 Although this belief is not legally justified, 168 it does seem to
166. Although public users tend to operate on a larger scale than private users, both types of
users face similar efficiency concerns. Like the private user, for example, the public user can cause
inefficient uses because of the common law's failure to recognize return flow as a property interest.
See supra notes 149, 157-58 and accompanying text.
Public and private users also face similar environmental concerns, though the magnitude of the
concern often is greater for the public user. For instance, regardless of the identity of the user, it is
clear that the prospect of interbasin transfer raises serious environmental concerns. Because a large
quantity of water would be transferred to an area deficient in water resources, an impoundment
structure probably would need to be built to hold and store the diverted water. Besides changing the
ecology of the area where construction occurs, the impoundment plans would necessitate flooding
land near the destination site and thus would alter or destroy wildlife habitats. Serious environmental concerns also would arise in the area of origin. Substantial withdrawals, for instance, could affect
the salinity of remaining water resources, as well as the types of wildlife that frequent the area. See
generally NATIONAL WATER CoMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FuTuRE 19-37 (1973); Hagan &
Roberts, supra note 55; Robie, Some Reflections on Environmental Considerations in Water Rights
Administration, 2 EcoLOGY L.Q. 695, 710-21 (1972).
Assuming water-poor users do not resort to self-help plans, prohibiting interbasin transfers for
both public and private users would eliminate or minimize many of these concerns. To the extent
that public users seek interbasin transfers more frequently than private users, though, the differences
between the environmental concerns associated with each type of use become more significant.
167. See 13 WATER NEws, supra note 3, No. 11, at 8 (Nov. 1982). A party who actually uses
water from a watercourse develops a similar, and perhaps more justified belief, that the water in the
watercourse generally becomes "his water." See Trelease, supra note 10, at 414.
168. Although the question of ownership of flowing water has been debated for years, most
property law scholars today agree that no one owns flowing water while it is in its natural state. See,
e.g., 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.55 (A. Casner ed. 1954). This position does not mean,
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reflect a legitimate concern: a fair distribution of resources would
seem to require giving a water-rich jurisdiction some priority over
other jurisdictions in using resources within its boundaries.
Water-poor localities, on the other hand, face the problem of
supplying the sometimes urgent water needs of their populace. If the
common law is interpreted as prohibiting diversions of watercourses
for public use, it will limit seriously the options of water-poor localities. When such a prohibition exists in a state generally rich in water
resources, it understandably leads to frustration and resentment.
Water-poor jurisdictions are forced to bargain with those parties willing to sell surplus water, often on unfavorable terms, or attempt to
solve their water supply problems on their own. Because these selfhelp schemes typically involve the diversion and transfer of water,
challenges from private riparians and water-rich localities affected by
the plan are likely to result. 16 9 As will be explained, unless a court is
willing to alter riparian principles for the public user, the challenges
probably will succeed.11o
Finally, the prospect of a change in the common law rules governing consumptive use by public users raises an important fairness
though, that no one has an interest in those waters. A riparian proprietor, for instance, has the right
to use the waters and to control use by other riparians and third parties. The state also has an
interest as sovereign that justifies its regulation of the waters. See id. § 28.59.
169. An example of such a situation exists in southeastern Virginia, where two of the state's
largest municipalities are faced with impending water shortages. The city of Newport News has
consulted with experts as to its alternatives, and the most recent plan proposed the drilling of additional wells to help delay the inevitable need for long-term expansion. Newport News-Hampton
Daily Press, Aug. 19, 1984, at Bl, col. 1. Additionally, an Army Corps of Engineers study released
in May, 1984, suggested that the city construct a 49 mile pipeline to a spot above Richmond on the
James River, at an estimated cost of $81 million, and divert water to meet its needs. See U.S. ARMY
CoRPS OF ENGINEERS, WATER SUPPLY STUDY: HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA 273-75 (1984). The
city of Richmond, however, has already declared that, in the absence of any clear state water plan, it
will contest the diversion plan in court to protect its rights to the James River. Newport NewsHampton Daily Press, Aug. 23, 1984, at 13, col. 4. For a discussion of the city of Virginia Beach's
attempts to resolve its water supply problems, see infra note 170.
170. A diversion plan may escape challenge, though, ifit includes acquisition of all appropriate
rights and interests by sale or condemnation. See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text. In
Virginia, for example, the city of Virginia Beach has proposed a plan to divert water from a lake
located almost ninety miles from the city. Since 1923, Virginia Beach has been supplied with water
by the city of Norfolk, but because the contract with Norfolk only requires that Virginia Beach be
supplied with water after the needs of Norfolk residents are met Virginia Beach decided to look for
more stable long-term sources. Under the proposal the City plans to contract with the Corps of
Engineers for permanent use of storage space at Buggs Island Reservoir and to reimburse Vepco for
the value of power generation lost on account of the diversion. Amended Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment at 4-5, 10-16, City of Virginia Beach v. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n, Civil Action No. 8411-N (B.D. Va. Jan. 31, 1984). The plan also calls for the acquisition, by purchase or condemnation,
of rights of way from property owners along the 90 mile diversion route.
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concern among private users. A significant departure from prior law
would, at the very least, impair their expectancy interests and may
even deprive them of valuable property rights without due process or
just compensation. Putting aside these potential due process and takings problems, 171 it is nevertheless evident that a legal system allowing
serious deprivations would have difficulty being accepted. Those private riparians deprived of their rights and interests naturally would
resent and oppose the change. Furthermore, other property owners
would have reason to fear that the judicial action would be extended
to other types of resources. A court that is willing to redefine riparian
rights more restrictively to accommodate public uses may be just as
willing to take similar actions with respect to other valuable
resources. 172
Whether traditional riparian principles can be modified so as to
accommodate the public interest and achieve an acceptable balance
between these competing policy concerns depends in part on the principles and rationales at stake and in part on the type of diversion situation under review. Under traditional principles a riparian generally
cannot divert the flow of a watercourse, sometimes not even to his
own riparian land. 173 This "no-diversion" rule applies equally to public and private users. A city or town does not acquire greater rights
just because of its status as a governmental entity. 174 Nor does it acquire consumptive rights because of the location of water resources
within its boundaries. Although jurisdiction over water resources
may provide sufficient justification for regulating those resources, it
does not confer riparian rights upon a locality.
171. For a discussion of the takings and due process issues raised by a comprehensive revision
of a state's water allocation system see NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE
FuroRE 281-83 (1973); Ausness, supra note 74, at 240-56. See also supra note 163.
172. Nor would such a system be efficient. Without assurances that their rights would be
protected, property owners would be reluctant to invest in long-range activities requiring high capital outlays, even though the activities otherwise would be efficient. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
173. A riparian cannot divert water from a watercourse for use on his land if the diversion
materially diminishes the watercourse. But where the riparian diverts a reasonable quantity of water
for use on his riparian land and returns the watercourse to its original channel before it leaves his
land, then the diversion should be allowed. See Stein v. Burden, 29 Ala. 127, 133 (1856); Cook v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 107 Va. 32, 57 S.E. 564, 565 (1907). Diversions beyond riparian land generally are prohibited. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Gold, 88 Va. 551, 14 S.E. 329 (1892). See generally 2 H.
FARNHAM, supra note 13, §§ 496, 497.
174. See Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1941); Town of
Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508, 515 (1921). See generally 7 R. CLARK, supra note
1, § 620.1 (1976).
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To a public user the no-diversion rule means that the public user
cannot use a watercourse to satisfy public consumptive needs without
fear of legal repercussions by neighboring riparians. Although the uncertainty of this situation may seem inefficient and unfair, not all public diverters deserve the same degree of protection from the courts. If,
for example, the public user is justifying the diversion on the basis of
its own use rights, then the courts' approach should depend on the
nature of those rights. A diverter that has attempted to purchase sufficient use rights to justify the diversion should be treated differently
than one that has not paid sufficient value. At least with respect to
the nonpaying diverter, the countervailing concerns of water-rich localities and private users may justify a result unfavorable to the diverter. If, however, the diverter is supporting its diversion by
attacking the rights of the complaining riparian, then the approach of
the courts should vary according to the nature of the complaining
riparian's interests. A diverter that is injuring neighboring riparians
should be treated differently than one that is not causing harm.
Part III.A.l. will examine the various approaches taken by the
courts to the no-diversion rule to determine whether those approaches
permit consideration of relevant policy concerns. Part III.A.2. will
consider specific diversion situations to determine whether recognizing public consumptive rights in those situations would seriously impair existing interests.
1.

The No-Diversion Rule and Public Consumptive Rights

Three principal approaches have been used by the courts to define the no-diversion rule. The first, referred to as the per se unreasonable approach, is alluded to by several courts when they describe
diversions to nonriparian land as "extraordinary" and "unreasonable."175 Because these descriptions are worded broadly and appear in
the same discussion as the courts' conclusion that diversions to nonriparian land are unlawful, the courts could be interpreted as declaring
all such diversions to be per se unreasonable. 176 This approach thus
175. See Harvey Realty Co. v. Borough ofWallingford, 111 Conn. 352, 150 A. 60, 63 (1930);
Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700,703 (1942); Roberts v. Martin, 72 W.Va.
92, 77 S.E. 535, 536-57 (1913). But see Pyle v. Gilbert, 245 Ga. 403, 265 S.E.2d 584 (1980) (striking
down per se approach and permitting reasonable uses on nonriparian land); Town of Gordonsville v.
Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921) (failing to use language suggesting the per se approach as
Potts did). Because diversions to nonriparian land are the principal type of diversion that public
users conduct, the discussion will focus on them.
176. Another possible interpretation of some of the language suggesting the per se approach is
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treats the no-diversion rule as a procedural rule of law, at least where
the diversions are to nonriparian land. Any diversion to nonriparian
land automatically is considered to be unreasonable and therefore injurious to the rights of some downstream riparian.t77
Most courts are reluctant to follow the first approach, apparently
because it requires them to declare diversions to nonriparian land to
be unreasonable without looking at the surrounding facts and circumstances.178 Under the per se approach, a court would have to declare
a diversion to nonriparian land to be unreasonable, regardless of its
actual consequences. The diversion, for example, would be unreasonable even though it represented the diverter's reasonable share of a
watercourse and even though it did not infringe on the reasonable use
rights of neighboring riparians. The first approach, therefore, does
not permit a court to consider the efficiencies or equities of a particular diversion situation. Nor does it permit a court to determine
whether key principles and policies of the riparian doctrine would be
undermined if the diversion were allowed to continue.
A second approach treats diversions by local governments for the
purpose of creating a public water supply as unreasonable uses. 179
that the courts merely are restating the requirement that a riparian must establish actual injury to
recover. See Abrams, Interbasin Transftr in a Riparian Jurisdiction, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 591,
601 (1983). For a discussion of the injury requirement see infra note 198.
177. The effect of this approach appears to be to shift the burden of proof between the parties.
As a general matter, to be entitled to relief for unlawful diversion, a plaintiff must establish, by a
preponderance of evidence, that defendant's actions prevented the watercourse from flowing in a
natural course upon plaintifrs land, see supra note 112, and that plaintiff suffered injury because of
defendant's conduct, see infra note 198. In addition, as the proponent of the evidence, the plaintiff
has the duty of producing sufficient evidence to send the issue to the jury. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT CoMMON LAW§ 2487(a) (J. Chadbourn ed. 1981). But in certain situations, if the
proponent produces evidence that, when coupled with a rule oflaw, will persuade a jury of reasonable men to rule in his favor, the burden will shift to the opponent to produce evidence sufficient to
counter that offered by the proponent, or risk losing by default.
Under the per se approach then, a party seeking relief for an unlawful diversion only has to
prove the unlawfulness of the diversion-by establishing that it is to nonriparian land-in order to
prevail in the suit. As one court adopting the per se approach explained, even if the plaintiff could
not establish actual damage, he still could recover nominal damages at law for an unlawful diversion
or receive injunctive relief in equity. See Roberts v. Martin, 72 W . Va. 92, 77 S.E. 535, 536 (1913).
Therefore, the per se approach has the effect of relieving the plaintiff of the usual need to show some
injury.
178. See, e.g., Gillis v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161,31 A. 18, 19 (1892). As the Supreme Court ofNew
Hampshire explained, a cause of action should not exist unless there is an unauthorized and unreasonable diversion.
179. See, e.g., Lonsdale Co. v. City of Woonsocket, 25 R.I. 428, 56 A. 448, 451 (1903); Town
of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700, 703 (1942). According to the Virginia Supreme
Court in Town ofPurcellville v. Potts, the fact that the wrongdoer was a municipality, "clothed under
the Constitution and statutes of the State with the power of acquiring the plaintiffs' riparian rights by
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The courts using this rationale apparently assume that diversions by
local governments are unanticipated by most riparians, who acquired
their land with the expectation that they could exercise their rights in
low-density areas. 180 Besides having many of the same problems as
the per se approach, this rationale also seems indefensible on broader
policy grounds. Although the courts' reasoning may have reflected
the expectations of riparians in the 1800's, most riparians today could
not reasonably expect land near watercourses to remain unsettled and
undeveloped. Furthermore, the assumption of low-density conflicts
with the pro-development stance taken in other areas of property law.
For example, in evaluating whether the grantee of an express easement increased his use impermissibly, the courts generally presume
that the parties to the conveyance anticipated reasonable development
of the benefitted estate. 181 Although a different approach to public
uses may be justifiable on the grounds that development in these other
areas tends to involve private parties and thus tends to occur on a
much smaller scale, the second rationale still has one major weakness:
it fails to account for public consumptive rights in water resources in
any significant respect. If the riparian doctrine is to remain the primary source of law governing consumptive use of watercourses in
many jurisdictions, then it should recognize and attempt to accommodate the public interest.
The third approach, followed in the majority of jurisdictions,
views diversions to nonriparian land solely as a function of the riparian land requirement; that is, the fact that a party is diverting to
nonriparian land only establishes a violation of the riparian land restriction and nothing more. 1B2 Under the third approach, then, a riparian complaining about a diversion still would have to establish the
other elements of his burden of proof, principally that he has sustained injury, to recover. 183
eminent domain," made the wrongdoer's conduct "all the more inexcusable." Purcellville, 19 S.E.2d
at 703.
180. See Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1941); Salem Flouring
Mills Co. v. Lord, 42 Or. 82, 69 P. 1033, 1039 (1902). As several courts have pointed out in response, though, the cities merely are drawing water for their domestic needs, which is a preferred
use. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600, 603 (1902).
181. The law of easements, for instance, allows the holder of the dominant estate to increase
his use of the servient estate so long as the increase is reasonable and does not overly burden the
servient estate. See supra note 99.
182. See Williams v. Wadsworth, 51 Conn. 277,304-05 (1883); Town of Gordonsville v. Zion,
129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921); Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92, 77 S.E. 535, 537 (1913).
183. See supra note 112; see also infra note 198.
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Despite its more restrictive definition of the no-diversion rule, the
third approach also could present serious obstacles to localities attempting to create public water supplies, especially if it is interpreted
literally. Most diversions for public use would require the transfer of
water to nonriparian land, often to areas in another part of the watershed and sometimes to areas outside of it. Courts examining the validity of these transfers understandably may wonder how they could
uphold the diversions under the riparian doctrine and still be doctrinally consistent. As long as the riparian land restriction remains an
essential part of the doctrine, the courts must prohibit substantial violations of the restriction. Permitting public use diversions to nonriparian land certainly would seem to violate that restriction.
Although this reasoning is appealing, it fails to consider the argument advanced in the severability section that the riparian land restriction should be interpreted from a functional perspective to
achieve greater consistency with other aspects of the riparian doctrine. Under a functional interpretation, the riparian land tests would
serve primarily to identify the parties who have riparian rights to exercise or sell, while the concepts of severability, alienation, and diversion then would govern redistribution of those rights. Additionally,
the above reasoning ignores the main distinction between the first two
approaches and the third explanation of the no-diversion rule.
Whereas the first two approaches force a court to conclude automatically that all public use diversions to nonriparian land are unreasonable, regardless of their actual impact on other users or on other
aspects of the riparian doctrine, the third approach permits consideration of these types of factors. Under the third approach, a court could
evaluate the policy implications of particular diversion situations and,
where appropriate, permit diversions to nonriparian land. Such an
evaluation will be conducted now.
2.

The Policy Implications of Specific Public Uses

As observed in the severability section, the policy implications of
a public consumptive use will vary according to the situation. If, for
example, a public user is diverting water to land outside the watershed, then a court should use the riparian land rationale to ban the
diversion. Just as in the severability situation involving transfers of
riparian rights to a party intending to use the rights for land outside
the watershed, permitting the diversion would seriously undermine
the policies furthered by the watershed test. Besides leading to envi-
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ronmental problems, allowing the diversion also would raise significant equitable concerns among water-rich localities and private
users. 184 Until water supply conditions in a watercourse's basin approach the point where demand is equal to supply and thus where
pressing public needs require a rebalancing of policy concerns, the
watershed test should continue to define the maximum area that can
benefit from a watercourse. Iss
Where, however, the diversion for public use is occurring within
the same watershed, then the permissibility of the diversion should
depend to an extent on the location of the benefitted land. If the diverted water is benefitting land that is not contiguous to the watercourse but once was part of the locality's tract of riparian land, then,
as discussed earlier, many policy arguments favor allowing the diversion as long as it meets the reasonable use requirement. At least
where the increase in use is reasonable, the diversion should not unfairly impair the interests of other riparians along the watercourse.
As with a private riparian proprietor, other riparians should have
foreseen reasonable growth of the riparian locality. Any other approach would restrict development to private users. To be an efficient
use, though, the value of the return flow must be considered part of
the property rights of the public user.Is6
In many public use diversion situations, the increase in use may
not seem reasonable to other riparians. Unlike situations involving an
individual riparian landowner, a riparian locality probably has devel184. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying texL The issue of severability and diversion are
closely related and much of the analysis in the section on severability can be applied to the diversion
question.
185. Furthermore, even when that point is reached, it probably should be the legislature, and
not the courts, which decides how to meet the needs of the water-poor region and which redefines
the balance between the competing policy concerns. Granted, the courts have some devices which
they could use in reordering policy concerns and achieving a new balance. Some interpretations of
the public trust doctrine, for example, would permit a court to incorporate the goal of environmental
preservation in a solution authorizing interbasin transfers. As interpreted by some courts, the public
trust doctrine imposes an obligation on parties making allocation decisions involving navigable waters to consider and protect the public interest in the environmenL See, e.g., National Audubon
Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413
(1983). For further discussion of the public trust doctrine, see Sax, supra note 164. As a general
matter, though, the courts would be less effective at developing a comprehensive solution for the
water supply problems of the water-poor region. Unlike the legislature, for example, the courts
could not impose adequate limitations on diversions, except as permitted by the particular controversy before them. The courts also would have difficulty fashioning a solution that contained the
political compromises needed to ensure that it would be acceptable to most, if not all, political
subdivisions and citizens within a state. See generally Butler, supra note 12, at 777-80.
186. See supra notes 149, 157, 158 and accompanying texL

166

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:95

oped significantly since it first acquired its riparian tract. Expecting
other riparians to anticipate the development that occurred may be
unreasonable. As a practical matter, then, permitting diversions in
the second situation may not benefit public users significantly. Depending on the size of the locality's riparian holdings and the number
of inhabitants, a court may choose to define reasonable growth at a
level far below the actual number of inhabitants on subdivided parts.
Whether the riparian land rationale and the severability principle
should be interpreted to prevent a diversion to land that is within the
watershed of the diverted watercourse but not part of the tract of land
encompassing the diversion site is a more difficult question. Assuming, once again, that the law is modified to account for return flow,
then permitting the diversion would not seem to raise serious efficiency problems. Because the benefitted land is within the watershed,
the unused water could return to the watercourse. Also, allowing the
diversion would encourage users to maximize the area of the watershed being benefitted by the watercourse. 187
The primary problems would appear to involve the important,
but competing, equities discussed earlier. On the one hand, permitting the diversion would seem to violate the riparian land restriction
and elevate the public user above other riparians that normally would
have priority of use. Riparians located above the benefitted land but
below the site of diversion would have less water available to them
than otherwise. On the other hand, prohibiting the diversion would
limit the options of water-poor localities and force them to buy water
on more unfavorable terms. By increasing the number of people benefitting on competitive terms, the diversion arguably would result in a
more equitable, as well as efficient, distribution of water resources. As
the number of satisfied parties rose, the number of parties characterizing the allocation system as fair also would increase. Furthermore, a
court could deal with the concern that the public user's status would
be elevated above other riparians by evaluating the reasonableness of
the diversion as suggested earlier. 188
187. But, to the extent that permitting diversions reduces the certainty of the rights of
nondiverting riparians, the diversions would be inefficient. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying
text.
188. See supra Part II.B. Furthermore, it could be argued that preferring a locality which is
diverting for public domestic use merely would be recognizing that local governments now conduct
most of the domestic uses traditionally preferred under the riparian doctrine.
Allowing courts to evaluate the lawfulness of public use diversions on a case-by-case basis
would cause some planning problems for localities. As the courts developed a rational diversion
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To achieve a proper balance between these concerns, the courts
need to recognize that public diversions fall within one of two categories. The first category includes those situations where the diverter
has attempted to acquire, by purchase or condemnation, sufficient riparian land or rights to justify the diversion. The second category
includes those situations where the diverter has not attempted to give
adequate value189 for the consumptive rights actually being exercised.
Although the diverter may own a tract of riparian land or may have
acquired the riparian rights for the tract of land encompassing the
diversion site, the land to which the use rights attach usually is small
in comparison to the area being served by the diversion.
Permitting those diversions falling in the first category does not
seem too troubling because of the value paid for the use rights.
Courts and legislatures have been willing to protect the interests of
bona fide purchasers for value in a variety of situations. 190 Allowing
the second type of diversion, however, raises the fairness concerns discussed earlier. These concerns seem serious enough, at first glance, to
justify a judicial ban on all diversions in the second category. Closer
scrutiny, however, reveals that the fairness concerns may relate more
to the value paid in relation to the quantity of water being diverted
than to the actual occurrence of the diversion.
If this is indeed the main point of contention with the second
type of public use diversion, then the courts could deal with the problem of the nonpaying diverter through careful application of the reastandard, though, more planning could occur. Also, a declaratory judgment procedure could help,
in appropriate circumstances, to alleviate the problem.
189. In most jurisdictions paying value requires parting with money, goods, or services that
represent a substantial portion of the purchased property's market worth. See, e.g., Worthy v. Caddell, 76 N.C. 82, 86 (1877). See generally 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 17.10 (A. Casner ed.
1952). Under this approach, then, giving a promise to pay would not constitute value even though it
would be sufficient to support a contract. Compare Bell v. Pierschbacher, 245 Iowa 436, 62 N.W.2d
784 (1954) (following this approach) with U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(d) (defining value as being given when
a party parts with "any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract").
190. See generally 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 17.10 (A. Casner ed. 1952). Bona fide
purchasers for value, for example, can prevail over a prior claimant when the purchasers take an
interest in realty not recorded by the claimant as required under the relevant state's recording statute. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW§ 291 (McKinney 1968); VA. CoDE§ 55-96 (Supp. 1983).
Additionally, they may prevail in many states when they purchase a voidable title, see Phelps v.
McQuade, 220 N.Y. 232, 115 N.E. 441 (1917), or purchase from a party clothed with indicia of
ownership by the prior owner, see O'Connor's Administratrix v. Clark, 170 Pa. 318, 32 A. 1029
(1895). See also U.C.C. § 2-403 (1972) (adopting, with some modifications, the voidable title exception, as well as a new exception known as the merchant entrustment exception). See generally Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework: Conveyancing Principles and Property Interests, 59 B.U.L. R.Bv. 811
(1979).
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sonable use requirement. That is, where the diverter is attempting to
justify the diversion on the basis of its own use rights, the courts could
apply the modified reasonable use requirement suggested earlier to define the diverter's rights. Under the modified requirement, a public
user generally could divert as much water as would be reasonable for
the tract of land encompassing the diversion site. 191 When doubt exists about the reasonableness of a diversion, the party proposing it
should bear the risk of nonpersuasion. A party pursuing a new use
like a diversion should not be able to upset established uses and rights
without clearly demonstrating the reasonableness of the new use. If
the public user fails to meet this burden, then it can try to acquire the
rights of the parties who would be injured by the diversion. 192
This suggested approach to public use diversions makes several
key assumptions. First, the proposal assumes that the law will recognize the value of return flow as a property interest and thus reduce the
inefficiencies that otherwise could result from a diversion. Second,
the proposal assumes that the courts will recognize the need to adopt
safeguards to minimize conflicts with other aspects of the riparian
doctrine and to protect the reliance interests of neighboring riparians.193 Although the arguments favoring modernization of the riparian doctrine are compelling, judicial modifications should, to the
191. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. In determining whether a use is reasonable, a
court should consider the status of the user, the status of the benefitted land as upper or lower
riparian land, the size of the diversion-site tract, the distance between the diversion-site tract and the
benefitted tract, and other factors traditionally considered.
192. See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text. The uncertainty of the reasonable use
standard thus could operate as an equitable safety valve for the benefit of users opposing the
diversion.
193. The need to adopt safeguards to protect the policies of the riparian land requirement
becomes more apparent when the severability and diversion concepts are involved in the same situation. Suppose, for example, that a private riparian transfers use rights to a locality located downstream to the private riparian and that the locality plans to divert water from the transferor's upper
tract to the locality's lower tract for public use. The proposed diversion raises several interesting
questions concerning the priority and reasonableness of the public use. If the diversion is allowed,
priority of use still should be defined by the benefitted land's position in the watershed. The public
user generally should not be able to acquire a higher priority because of the upper riparian status of
its transferor.
Perhaps the more interesting question raised by the proposed diversion concerns whether the
reasonableness of the public use should be measured by the upper or lower tract of land. The fairest
approach would appear to be to focus on the expectations of the complaining riparian. If that riparian is located below the upper and lower tracts of riparian land, then he would have expected to
receive the watercourse's flow after reasonable use by the owners of both tracts. The diverter thus
should be able to take the reasonable share for both tracts without undermining these expectations.
If the complaining riparian is between the two tracts, however, he would have expected to
receive the stream flow after reasonable use by the upper tract only. He would not have measured
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extent possible, protect legitimate expectations. Possible safeguards
include continuing to focus on position in the watershed to define general priorities of use and measuring the reasonableness of a diverter's
use in terms of the diversion site and not the benefitted tract. Third,
the proposal assumes that the courts will be willing to change some of
the outdated assumptions used in determining the reasonableness of a
use. The courts, for example, would need to change their assumption
that riparians are individuals who expect their lands to remain relatively undeveloped.
With these modifications, the suggested approach should permit
public use diversions only when serious impairment to existing interests would not occur. By carefully using the reasonable use requirement to measure the rights of diverters, the courts should be able to
distinguish between the two types of public use diverters. Those public users who have purchased sufficient use rights to justify the diversions generally should be permitted to conduct the diversions.I 94
Artificial interpretations of the riparian land and reasonable use restrictions should not prevent or limit their public consumptive uses.
Nor should such interpretations result in narrow rulings on the sufficiency of a public user's rights. Where, however, the diverter has not
paid value for all the use rights that it is exercising, the diverter
should not be able to claim the right to continue the diversion on the
strength of its riparian rights. Although this approach often may
force the nonpaying public user to go to the marketplace to satisfy its
public's consumptive needs, 195 the approach seems to be the fairest
his rights in terms of the lower tract. In this situation then, it would only seem fair to permit a
diversion of a reasonable share for the upper tract. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
194. Furthermore, efficiency and equity concerns support adopting legal rules enabling a pub-lic user to predict with some degree of certainty whether a diversion plan involving acquisition of use
rights would be upheld. At the present time the lawfulness of such plans is unclear in many traditional riparian jurisdictions. See, e.g., supra notes 169-70 (describing uncertainty surrounding public
use diversion plans in Virginia).
195. A locality may have to purchase a significant amount of riparian rights to enable it to
divert, depending on the status of the transferor. If, for example, the transferor is a private agrarian,
then under the suggested approach the reasonableness of transferee's diversion initially would be
defined by the transferor's rights and by what a reasonable development of his land would permit.
So where the agrarian owns a small farm, his rights generally would not permit a large-scale diversion.
Adopting a legal rule that permitted intrabasin diversions where the diverter acquired sufficient
use rights to justify the diversion admittedly would impose hardships on localities financially unable
to purchase the necessary rights. The legislatures in some riparian states presently are considering
ways to alleviate the financial burdens associated with water and other public works projects. In
Virginia, for example, the General Assembly called for a reexamination of the financial relationship
between state and local governments. H.J. Res. 12, 1983 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., 1983 VA. ACTS
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way for the courts to balance the competing public and private interests under the riparian doctrine. Also, at least under this approach, a
locality would know that it could conduct a diversion if it purchased
sufficient use rights. Whether the nonpaying diverter could justify its
diversions on other grounds, by, for example, attacking the rights of
the complaining riparian, will be discussed in the remaining section of

Part III.
In conclusion, the various approaches used to explain the nodiversion rule offer a range of alternatives for dealing with the public's
consumptive needs. The second approach, which focuses on the status of a user, seems the least acceptable of the three, given the development patterns near watercourses and the importance of the relevant
public policy concerns. Although less objectionable, the per se rationale also has some troubling consequences. Because all diversions to
nonriparian land would be per se unreasonable, a court could not examine the actual effects of such a diversion on the reasonable use
rights of neighboring riparians. The per se approach thus limits the
extent to which courts could permit diversions by upholding marketplace transfers of use rights or by creating exceptions to the no-diversion rule.
If properly interpreted, the riparian land approach could give the
courts the greatest flexibility in dealing with diversions. A proper interpretation would involve recognizing that the riparian land restriction defines which parties have riparian rights to exercise or transfer,
as well as modifying the riparian land and the reasonable use standards as suggested. Whether this interpretation would lead to greater
recognition of public consumptive interests then would depend on a
jurisdiction's approach to the severability principle. If a jurisdiction
interprets the severability principle broadly and follows a modified
1247; H.J. Res. 105, 1982 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., 1982 VA. Acrs 1646. In 1984 it received a
detailed report studying the matter and recommending, among other things, that a more equitable
and stable funding program be established. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW CoMM'N,
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL AssEMBLY OF VIRGINIA ON STATE MANDATES
ON LocAL GOVERNMENTS AND LocAL FINANCIAL REsOURCES, H. Doc. No. 15 (1984). In that
same year the Virginia General Assembly also received a report from the State Water Study Commission recommending the establishment of a Water and Sewer Assistance Authority to help local
governments finance needed water supply and wastewater treatment projects. See STATE WATER
STUDY CoMM'N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL AssEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, H.
Doc. No. 32, at 4-6, app. D (1984). Intended to alleviate the "critical need" for funding of such
projects, the Authority would be empowered to receive public and private funds to be used for
borrowing in the bond market and making loans and grants to local governments for construction of
appropriate infrastructure projects. /d. at app. D, §§ 62.1-198, -203 to -218.
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view of the riparian land restriction, a nonriparian locality in an adequately sized watershed should be able to buy up enough riparian
rights to entitle it to divert for use by its inhabitants. But, even if a
jurisdiction follows a narrow approach to severability, diversions by
public users still may be possible. Unlike the other two approaches to
the no-diversion rule, the riparian land approach permits the development of exceptions to the no-diversion rule. Part III.B. discusses
those exceptions.
B.

Permitting Public Consumptive Uses Through Exceptions to the
No-Diversion Rule

Even under a traditional interpretation of the riparian doctrine,
some exceptions to the no-diversion rule exist. Two related exceptions could, under certain circumstances, enable localities to divert
significant quantities of water. The first exception, known as the surplus water doctrine, focuses on whether a diversion involves excess or
surplus water. 196 A riparian generally is entitled to receive only the
flow of a watercourse after reasonable use by upstream riparians. 197
Thus, if a locality is diverting water in excess of the natural flow of a
watercourse, the locality could argue that the water being diverted is
surplus water and that its conduct therefore is not interfering with the
rights of riparians along the watercourse.
196. The courts have had great difficulty defining surplus water. For instance, although they
generally agree that flood waters would be surplus water, they have disagreed about whether flood
waters would lose that status if the flooding was an annual occurrence. Compare Motl v. Boyd, 116
Tex. 82, 286 S.W. 458, 463 (1926) (surplus exists when water is above line of highest ordinary flow
''uninfluenced by recent rainfall or surface runoff") with Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co.,
200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607, 610 (1926) (annual flooding constitutes "usual and ordinary" flow of the
river). For a discussion of the courts' approach to defining flood waters and to diversions of such
waters see Teass, Water and Water Courses-Riparian Rights-Diversion of Stonn or Flood Waters
for Use on Nonriparian Land, 18 VA. L. REv. 223 (1932).
197. This definition of a riparian's rights is known as the "reasonable use theory." Another
approach also developed under early common law and still is used in some riparian jurisdictions
today. Referred to as the English or "natural flow theory," it provides that a riparian only has the
right to receive the natural flow of a stream, undiminished, except nominally, by other riparians'
uses. Under this approach a use that was reasonable under the first theory would not be permitted if
it substantially diminished the flow. Although most riparian jurisdictions have adopted the reasonable use theory, a few still appear to follow the natural flow theory. See supra note 13. See generally
Introductory Note on the Nature of Riparian Rights and Legal Theories for Detennination of the
Rights in REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 41, at 209-13 (1977). Some courts have given
inconsistent signals and have failed to distinguish clearly between the two. Compare, e.g., Town of
Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508, 514 (1921) (using natural flow language) with
Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 130 S.E. 408, 410 (1925) (using reasonable use
language).
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The second exception arises because riparian jurisdictions generally require a riparian to establish injury before he can obtain relief for
an unlawful use. 198 The extent to which this exception overlaps with
198. See, e.g., Elliot v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 191, 197 (1852). See generally
1A G. THOMPSON, supra note 74, § 272 (1980). One of the underlying reasons for the injury requirement is the principle de minimis non curat lex-that is, that the law does not concern itself with
trivial matters. Where a use does not have an adverse effect on others, it should not be enjoined.
Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87, 88 (1913). Courts have had
difficulty defining injury. They generally require some perceptible damage to the rights of another
riparian. C<Jmpare People v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N.W. 211, 213 (1902) (injury exists if use
destroys, renders useless, or materially diminishes flow) with Lawrie v. Silsby, 76 Vt. 240, 56 A.
1106, 1109 (1904) (injury must be palpable or perceptible).
Under the early approach to the injury requirement, courts required the plaintiff to show injury
to some present use, which meant that if plaintiff riparian was not making any use of the watercourse
he could not establish injury to his rights. See 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 499, at 1651 & n.2.
Yet, if a court denied recovery on this ground, it was jeopardizing plaintifi's future exercise of his
riparian rights. By the time plaintiff actually used the watercourse, he may have lost the ability to
sue, either because his waiting would be interpreted as acquiescence or because defendant acquired
the right to divert by prescription. Because of this dilemma, many jurisdictions adopted the position
that sufficient injury existed and relief therefore was justified where defendant could acquire a prescriptive right by continuing his use. See, e.g., Parker v. Griswold, 17 Conn. 288, 303 (1845); Town
of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508, 514 (1921); see also 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note
13, § 499, at 1651-52. Although some cases indicate that courts following this approach presume
injury to a lower riparian whenever an unlawful diversion to nonriparian land occurs, see, e.g., Town
of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E .2d 700, 704 (1942), others appear to recognize that such
a diversion may not necessarily cause injury to riparian rights (e.g., where surplus water is diverted),
see, e.g., Harris v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 153 N.C. 542, 69 S.E. 623, 624 (1910); Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508, 515 (1921).
Many riparian jurisdictions allow a riparian to protect his future as well as his present needs. In
Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 130 S.E. 408 (1925), for example, several riparian
owners sought to enjoin a nonriparian from diverting water from a spring to a nonriparian resort
hotel. Defendant claimed it was entitled to divert the water because it had been assigned the rights
of a riparian proprietor of the spring. The court granted plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction, reasoning that defendant's diversion for nonriparian use would injure plaintiffs' land in times of
drought. Hoover, 130 S.B. at 410. The court reached this conclusion in spite of evidence showing
that the stream only had been dry twice in thirty years, noting that future reasonable uses may be
considered but must be based on more than mere speculation. /d. Where, for instance, lower riparians argued that manufacturing was a possible future use, but failed to show such use was reasonable
in light of the character of the land, the power of the watercourse, or even future construction plans,
the court limited its inquiry to domestic uses. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Graham Land & Improvement Co., 10 Va. L. Reg. 983, 989 (Cir. Ct. 1904). See generally 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13,
§468.
Whether a lower riparian establishes injury to present uses, however, may affect the type of
relief to which he is entitled. If the plaintiff fails to establish actual injury, then the most he could
recover at law is nominal damages. Diversion alone, without evidence of actual damages, will not
warrant substantial recovery at law. Elliot v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 191, 197
(1852); see also Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 467, 130 S.E. 408, 410 (1925) (suggesting that not even nominal damages may be recovered). Equity, however, may grant an injunction even though a lower riparian has not sustained any actual injury. Where an unlawful diversion
is an infringement of his property rights, equity generally will allow the lower riparian to vindicate
his rights and prevent their loss by adverse use. See Purcellville, 19 S.E.2d at 704. As long as
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the surplus water doctrine depends on how the courts define injury.
Where actual injury or harm is required, the injury exception would
be more expansive than the surplus water doctrine. The injury exception, for instance, could be used to protect a party who was diverting
part of another riparian's reasonable share, or nonsurplus water. If
that other riparian was not conducting any uses and otherwise not
exercising his- rights, he eould not establish actual h&~. But where
the courts define injury broadly to include any potential or threatened
harm, then the conflict could be resolved similarly under either theory. Because the water being diverted in the example represents a
portion of another riparian's reasonable share, it could not qualify for
protection as surplus water. Nor could the diversion fall within the
injury exception, for at least one riparian should be able to establish
potential harm to the future exercise of his reasonable use rights.
Courts in riparian jurisdictions have differed in their approaches
to the surplus water and injury exceptions. Some have accepted both
doctrines as welcome limitations to the no-diversion rule. 199 Others
have been hesitant to accept or reject the exceptions.200 One factor
plaintiff's legal right is "clear, and its violation palpable" and as long as plaintiff' has not slept on his
rights, "equity ordinarily will interfere, although the right has not been established at law." Carpenter v. Gold, 88 Va. 551, 14 S.E. 329, 330 {1892); accord REsTATEMF.NT {SECOND) OP TORTS§ 850A
comment m (1977).
Where damages are sought, the measure of damages usually is the difference between the market value of the entire tract before and after the injury, and not the amount of loss to the injured
right. See Rider v. York Haven Water & Power Co., 251 Pa. 18, 95 A. 803, 804 (1915); Norfolk &
W. Ry. Co. v. Allen & Sons, 122 Va. 603, 95 S.E. 406, 409 (1918). Sometimes, however, courts allow
evidence of the reduced value of the damaged portion. See, e.g., Baltimore & P. R.R. Co. v. Fifth
Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 335 (1883); Southern Ry. Co. v. Watts, 134 Va. 503, 114 S.E. 736
(1922). The courts generally do not award punitive damages, in the absence of malice, wantonness,
or fraud. See Rider v. York Haven Water & Power Co., 95 A. at 804. For a discussion of the
remedies available to riparians see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS§ 850A comment m (1977).
199. See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273, 276 (1927) (diversion allowed if
water supply abundant); Lawrie v. Silsby, 76 Vt. 240, 56 A. 1106, 1109 (1904) (diversion allowed if
no actual injury).
200. Virginia authorities, for instance, have given conflicting signals about their approach to
the surplus water doctrine. In Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921), the
Virginia Supreme Court suggests that under proper circumstances it would recognize the surplus
water argument as a valid justification for a diversion. The suggestion arose while the court was
discussing whether injury could be established in a situation where other riparians would not suffer
actual damages and would not have the prescriptive period running against them. Although the
court acknowledges that the case before it did not involve such a situation, the court states that
under those circumstances "the court below might properly have declined to decide the issue of right
raised between the parties to the suit and might have properly refused to award the injunction."
Zinn, 106 S.E. at 515.
More recent Virginia cases recognizing the common law right of a municipality to sell surplus
water appear to provide further support for the exception. In one decision, City of Martinsville v.
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apparently affecting how a court reacts to the exceptions is the rationale that it uses to explain the no-diversion rule.
Depending on the courts' interpretation, the second approach,
which declares public use diversions by localities to be unreasonable,
could seriously restrict the effectiveness of the two exceptions in permitting public consumptive uses. Because the second approach is not
fully developed, it could be interpreted as focusing on the status of the
diverter as a local government, the public nature of the use, the size of
the locality conducting the diversion, or any combination of the
above. If a court considers the status of the diverter as a local govemment201 or the public nature of the use to be the focus of the second
rationale, then the no-diversion rule would appear to reject both exBoard of Supervisors, 222 Va. 505, 281 S.E.2d 883 (1981), the state supreme court summarily states
that "[a] city has the power, without the aid of statute, to sell its surplus water rather than permitting it to be wasted," even to "customers beyond the corporate limits." Martinsville, 281 S.E.2d at
884-85. Although this statement suggests that the surplus water argument is valid, the court in
Martinsville did not actually address the question of whether the local government's surplus water
was obtained lawfully and indeed seems to assume that it was. An examination of Mount Jackson v.
Nelson, 151 Va. 396, 145 S.E. 355 (1928), cited by the Martinsville court in support of its summary
statement, Martinsville, 281 S.E.2d at 885, more clearly demonstrates this point. In Mount Jackson
v. Nelson, the court concludes that "a city in possession of surplus water, lawfully acquired," may
sell the surplus to persons beyond the corporate limits. Mount Jackson, 145 S.E. at 357 (emphasis
added). The court explains its conclusion by describing it as a matter of"[c]ommon sense." id., and
by noting that such action would be needed to avoid waste, id. In yet another decision, the court
provides additional justification for the common law right to sell surplus water, observing that
"[m]en of wisdom look towards future needs," that planning for those "future needs" sometimes can
result in surplus energy and that it would be "unreasonable" and uneconomical to "hold that the
surplus energy thereby created should be denied others in the community, separated only from the
city by an invisible geographical or political line." Light v. City of Danville, 168 Va. 181, 190 S.E.
276, 285 (1937). Thus, although the cases recognizing the common law right to sell surplus water
may not support the surplus water doctrine directly, the policies reflected in this common law right
appear to justify the doctrine.
Other Virginia authorities, however, indicate that diversion of surplus water is impermissible.
A state Attorney General opinion written more than fifty years after Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn,
for instance, summarily dismisses the argument as "questionable unless authorized by statute."
1971-1972 OP. OF THE ATT'Y GEN. OF VA. 80 (1972). Similar discrepancies appear in other Virginia authorities. Compare, e.g., 1967-1968 OP. OF THE ATT'Y GEN. OF VA. 297-98 (1967) (diversion of "excess water" is lawful as long as lower ripariaos are not adversely affected) with STATE
WATER STUDY COMM'N, INTERIM REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL AssEMBLY OF
VIRGINIA, S. Doc. No. 21, app. I (1979) (rejecting surplus water doctrine).
Legal authorities in other jurisdictions appear to be just as confused as Virginia about the doctrine. This confusion stems in part from the problems the courts have experienced in trying to define
surplus water. See supra note 196.
201. If the key factor is the status of the diverter as a local government, then a no-diversion
rule explained in those terms arguably may not cover diversions by private parties, perhaps not even
where those parties are supplying water to the locality's inhabitants. Furthermore, even if the courts
also ban diversions by private parties, the use of this factor as the rationale suggests that a court may
be adopting a per se rule for public diverters but not private diverters.
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ceptions. Any diversion conducted by a locality or for a public purpose would be unreasonable, even where the diversion involved
surplus water or did not cause injury. If, however, the size or density
of the municipal diverter is the crucial factor, then a no-diversion rule
explained in those terms conceivably could be interpreted as permitting diversions by sparsely populated localities where the diversions
involved surplus water or did not injure other riparians.
Using the per se rationale also limits the effectiveness of both
exceptions. Under the per se approach, a court automatically would
have to declare diversions to nonriparian land to be unreasonable and
therefore injurious to riparians below the diversion site, regardless of
whether injury actually occurred. Similar reasoning should prevent a
court from using the surplus water doctrine to protect diversions by
public users. Because the court would be forced to find all diversions
to nonriparian land to be unreasonable, it could not consider a diversion's actual impact on the flow rights of neighboring riparians. 202
These limitations would not exist if a court used the riparian land
rationale to explain the no-diversion rule and if it were willing to interpret the riparian land requirement as suggested. Using such an approach would p~rmit a court to evaluate the reasonableness of a
diversion according to the facts and circumstances of the particular
situation and to consider the actual consequences of the challenged
use. As long as a public use diversion involved a reasonable quantity
of water and did not interfere with the flow and reasonable use rights
of neighboring riparians, a court could permit the diversion even
though it was to nonriparian land. 203 But if the riparian land restriction were interpreted strictly, then this third explanation of the nodiversion rule would appear to prevent, or at least limit, application of
the exceptions like the other two approaches. 204
Regardless of the exact nature of the relationship between the
two exceptions and the various approaches to the no-diversion rule,
both exceptions can be justified by economic and equitable considera202. See supra note 198.
203. So if the diversion were based on a stream's natural flow before reasonable use by upper
riparians, a diverter would not rely on this argument to justify the diversion.
204. It could be argued that a strict interpretation of the riparian land restriction primarily
would limit use of the surplus water exception and would make the actual injury exception the key
exception. Such an interpretation would prohibit all diversions of surplus water to nonriparian land,
except where the diversion did not cause injury to other riparians. Under this interpretation, then,
the fact that surplus water was being diverted would be one factor to be considered in determining
whether other riparians were injured.
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tions. Allowing diversions within a watershed when surplus water is
used or when neighboring riparians would not be injured should promote more efficient uses of the watercourse. The diversions not only
would increase the area in the watershed being benefitted by the watercourse, but also would reduce the percentage of water in the watercourse not being used. Furthermore, because other riparians would
be receiving their reasonable share, they should not have reason to
complain about the harsh or unfair effects of the diversion on their
rights. 205
Neighboring 'riparians, however, may be justified in questioning
the fairness of permitting the diversions on a more general level.
Although their rights may not actually be injured by the diversions,
many of them would have acquired their riparian rights through legitimate marketplace transactions. In contrast, the locality seeking to
protect its diversion under the surplus water or injury exceptions
often has not attempted to purchase sufficient use rights to support
the diversion. Despite this more general "injustice," it seems preferable to favor the approach that promotes an efficient use of a watercourse, at least until other riparians establish injury.
Furthermore, even neighboring riparians may not find their last
argument so compelling once they realize that the surplus water and
injury exceptions do not provide permanent solutions to the water
supply problems of water-poor localities. By definition, diversions
based on those exceptions can continue without legal repercussions
only so long as surplus water exists or injury does not occur. Additionally, a locality conducting diversions under either exception probably could not seek judicial protection of its use against unlawful
conduct by others. Both theories permit diversions because neighboring riparians cannot sue, and not because the diverter has acquired a
legally protected riparian right.
A public user that desires a more permanent solution can pursue
several other exceptions to the no-diversion rule. It, for instance, can
attempt to acquire the necessary rights and interests entitling it to
divert by prescription.206 This exception, however, requires long, con205. To the extent, though, that lower riparians come to expect and rely on flooding that
occurs regularly, they may have reason to complain. See Thompson v. New Haven Water Co., 86
Conn. 597, 86 A. 585 (1913); Hyatt v. Albro, 121 Mich. 638, 80 N.W. 641 (1899).
206. See, e.g., Town of Gordonsville v. Zion, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921). An interesting
issue raised by the suggestion that riparian rights can be acquired by prescription concerns whether
the prescriptive right could include interbasin transfers and other uses not generally considered to be
within the rights of most riparians. To resolve this issue, the court must recognize that what ripari-
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tinuous, wrongful use and thus would not be as effective as the first
two exceptions. 207 It also would not permit much foresight and planning. To ensure greater planning, a locality instead can try to negotiate with riparians below a proposed diversion site to obtain a release
and prevent them from subsequently complaining about the diversions. Courts generally will uphold a contract that restricts or alters
riparian rights and even may allow specific perform-a nce if damages
would not adequately compensate the aggrieved party.208 If numerous riparians are involved, though, the release approach may not be
feasible. Those riparians who negotiated with the locality near the
end of the process probably would hold out for consideration greater
than the normal market value of their rights. 209
Where voluntary negotiations are not feasible, eminent domain
proceedings can prove effective, providing that the locality has sufficient eminent domain powers and financial resources to acquire the
necessary interests. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the
ans would be losing is their right to complain about the unlawful use. Although riparians may not
be permitted to conduct the uses themselves, they still could be injured by the prescriptive use.
Thus, the more accurate approach to defining the prescriptive right -would appear to be to describe
the prescriptive user as acquiring the right to continue a use that harms other riparians, and not as
acquiring the right to conduct the use from an unwilling riparian. But even then courts probably
would strictly interpret the scope of the prescriptive use right to limit it to the use actually acquired
by prescription. See Hamsberger, Prescriptive Water Rights in Wisconsin, 1961 WIS. L. REv. 47
(1961) (discussing the courts' approach to defining prescriptive rights in Wisconsin).
207. The length of the prescriptive period varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In Virginia,
for example, the period would be 20 years. Although VA. CoDE § 8.01-236 (1984) sets forth a ISyear period for recovery of land, the statutory period apparently only applies to adverse possession.
See Leake v. Richardson, 199 Va. 967, 103 S.E.2d 227 (1958). The common law period of20 years
thus still governs prescriptive use in Virginia. See Cornett v. Rhudy, 80 Va. 710 (1885).
Where a locality fails to acquire a use right by prescription, it still could acquire the right, after
the fact, by condemnation. Under appropriate circumstances courts have stayed proceedings
brought by an injured riparian against a locality to permit the locality to condemn the interests of the
injured party. See, e.g., Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921). For a
discussion of the eminent domain alternative see infra notes 210-12 and accompanying texl
208. See, e.g., Colmenero Canal Co. v. Babers, 80 Ariz. 339, 297 P.2d 927 (1956); Daniels v.
Bethlehem Mines Corp., 391 Pa. 195, 137 A.2d 304 (1958); Brisco Home Trustees v. Ohio River R.
Co., 78 W.Va. 502, 89 S.E. 727 (1916). See generally 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 470, at 158788. Although the release approach may have the same practical effect as a conveyance of riparian
rights, a release is not an "effective substitute for a true grant of a riparian righl, REsrATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 856 comment b (1977). As the REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS explains,
a release generally "operates only between the parties, and is viewed as a covenant not to sue, not a
property righl Id. But see Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples, 164 Mass. 319, 41 N.E. 441 (1895)
(agreement involving flowage may be binding in equity against subsequent grantee). Thus, in many
jurisdictions the remedies available for breach of a release should differ from those available for
infringement of a riparian right.
209. See R. POSNER, supra note 113, § 3.5, at 40.
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"necessary interests, theoretically would include the reasonable use
rights of all riparians located below the point of diversion who would
be affected by the diversion, as well as easements to lay conduit pipes
across riparian and nonriparian land located between the diversion
site and the destination area. If the watercourse is a major river, as
would probably be the case where a public water supply project is
involved, these acquisitions can be very costly. 21° Furthermore, even
if a locality has sufficient financial resources, its condemnation of appropriate interests may not be legally possible. A local government
can only exercise its eminent domain powers to acquire private interests when the condemnation is for a public use. When the private
interests are water rights, this principle has been interpreted to mean
that the condemnation cannot produce a significant private benefit.211
Thus, if only a few of a locality's inhabitants would benefit from the
condemned rights, or if the primary purpose of the condemnation is
to meet the business needs of a few private users, the condemnation
may not be possible.212
The limited effectiveness of the exceptions to the no-diversion
rule demonstrates the inadequacy of traditional riparian principles in
providing for the consumptive needs of the public. Expanding the
two principal common-law exceptions, the surplus water doctrine and
the injury exception, would provide relief for the public user, but
210. The city of Virginia Beach, Virginia, for example, has estimated that its plan to divert
water from Lake Gaston and transfer it almost ninety miles will cost $190 million for the initial
capital investment and $18 million annually for maintenance. For a discussion of the plan see supra
note 170. Thus, unless a jurisdiction is financially sound, the eminent domain alternative may be
impractical. But cf. supra note 195 (mentioning financial assistance bills for local governments).
The viability of the condemnation and purchase alternatives also depends on a jurisdiction's
approach to the severability principle. If riparian rights are severable, then a local government can
condemn just the appropriate riparian rights, which would be less costly than acquiring the riparian
land as well. Apparently aware of the difference in costs, many courts allow condemnation of the
riparian rights without condemnation of the respective riparian land or submerged bed. See, eg.,
Clear Creek Water Co. v. Gladeville Improvement Co., 107 Va. 278, 58 S.E. 586, 588 (1907); State v.
Superior Court, 48 Wash. 277, 93 P. 423, 425 (1908). See generally J. LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF EMINENT DoMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES§ 56 (1888) (recognizing that rights incident to
land may be separately condemned). However, where a statute specifies what may be condemned, a
lesser interest may not be taken. Charlottesville v. Maury, 96 Va. 383, 31 S.E. 520, 521 (1898). The
value of the condemned riparian rights usually is measured by diminution in value. See J. LEWIS,
supra, § 464.
211. See, e.g., Burger v. City of Beatrice, 181 Neb. 213, 147 N.W.2d 784 (1967). Thus, to be
permissible, the primary benefit of the condemnation should be to supply the domestic needs of the
locality's public. See generally Hamsberger, Eminent Domain in Water Law, 48 NEB. L. REv. 325,
366-69 (1969).
212. See, e.g., Burger v. City of Beatrice, 181 Neb. 213, 147 N.W.2d 784 (1967). For further
discussion of this issue see Hamsberger, supra note 211.
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probably would not be appropriate. Although the temporary nature
of the exceptions may impose an unfair burden on the locality conducting the diversion, greater unfairness would result if the two exceptions were broadened to permit a locality to conduct the diversion
on a regular basis when the locality did not own sufficient use rights
to justify the diversion. Unless a locality can point to an independent
basis for recognizing its public consumptiveus-e,2 I-3 the locality gener•
ally should have to acquire riparian rights in the same manner as a
private user, either through ownership of riparian land or acquisition
of severed rights. But, to permit the locality to acquire riparian rights
or land effectively, courts in riparian jurisdictions must be willing to
develop a broader and more realistic definition of riparian rights-one
that recognizes and permits public consumptive uses.
IV.

SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS: BALANCING PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE CONSUMPTIVE INTERESTS

As traditionally interpreted by the courts in many eastern states,
the riparian doctrine does not provide an adequate accommodation of
the public interest. Because that doctrine was developed in a waterrich, agrarian environment, many of its principles are designed to preserve domestic uses by private individuals. The narrow approach
taken by the judiciary in developing the riparian doctrine imposes serious limitations on the ability of local governments to meet public
consumptive needs. Perhaps the most significant limitation is the rule
that prohibits most diversions of water from a watercourse. Because
of the rule, localities often find operation of a public water supply
system to be a very costly and impracticable proposition.
Although other areas of property law also developed in the context of an agrarian economy, the courts have not been as hesitant in
those areas to change their perspective and accommodate the public
interest. Since the 1920's, for example, the courts have been sympathetic to attempts by local government to control private development
of land through zoning ordinances. 214 Like the attempts to recognize
213. See supra note 164.
214. The courts also have been sympathetic to legislative attempts to protect the public interest
in tidal lands. A recent opinion by the Virginia Supreme Court, for instance, interprets two statutes
protecting the public interest in certain lands lying on tidal waters more broadly than necessary. See
Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, 224 Va. 181, 294 S.E.2d 866 (1982). In Bradford v. Nature Con·
servancy, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that one act passed in 1780 reserved title in the state to
certain shoreland along the Atlantic Ocean for common use by the public, Bradford, 294 S.E.2d at
874, and that another statute enacted in 1888 prohibited alienation of marshland on the Eastern
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public consumptive rights in water resources, these ordinances
prompted constitutional challenges under the due process and takings
clauses. Yet, in resolving the challenges, the courts generally were
willing to uphold the ordinances as long as they were reasonable
methods of protecting the public interest in controlling private land
development.215
Perhaps the hesitancy of modem courts in recognizing public
consumptive rights can be attributed to the fact that persistent water
supply problems are a relatively recent occurrence in the eastern portion of the country. Given the prolonged absence of chronic water
supply problems, as well as the agrarian surroundings in which the
riparian doctrine developed, it is not surprising that the courts
adopted a narrow, private-user-oriented perspective in defining and
allocating consumptive rights. Although rapid growth in recent years
has altered water supply conditions in many areas of the eastern
United States, the principles of the riparian doctrine have become too
firmly entrenched for many courts to respond quickly to the changes,
or even recognize the need for reexamining some of those principles.
Whatever the reason for the judiciary's hesitation, it is time for
the legal system to respond to the changes in water supply conditions
that have begun to occur in many riparian jurisdictions. Unless the
legislatures of riparian states are willing to respond with comprehensive reforms, the courts must accept responsibility for that task and
develop a more acceptable accommodation of public and private
interests.
This Article has suggested modifications that the judiciary could
make to modernize the riparian doctrine and provide greater recognition of public consumptive interests. Effective implementation,
though, would require an active judiciary committed to the task of
updating the riparian doctrine and well-timed lawsuits permitting reinterpretation of appropriate riparian principles. Changes in the riparian doctrine that would need to be made include eliminating some of
the archaic assumptions upon which the riparian doctrine is based,
Shore, id. at 872. Instead of construing the acts as reserving title in the state, the court could have
concluded that the statutes merely give the public an easement or right to use the appropriate lands
for fishing, hunting, fowling, and other related activities. This interpretation would have given
greater effect to another Virginia statute that extends the boundary of land abutting bays, rivers,
creeks, and the sea to the low water mark, but that makes the extension subject to the 1780 commons
act. See VA. CoDE§ 62.1-2 (1982) (originally enacted as Act ofFebruary 16, 1819, 1818-1819 VA.
Acrs, ch. 28, § 1).
215. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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modifying the riparian land and reasonable use restrictions to ratify
reasonable expectations and promote current policy objectives, and
interpreting the severability principle broadly to permit freer transferability of consumptive rights.
Even if these changes were implemented, though, unrestrained
diversions for public use still would not be possible, because protection of present users' rights and reasonable expectations would require imposition of certain limitations. A court, for instance, should
prevent attempts by populated localities to acquire use rights from the
owner of a small riparian tract and then claim the right to conduct
large-scale diversions to meet their consumptive needs. The purchaser of use rights should not acquire greater rights than his transferor, not even where the purchaser is a local government. Because
limitations would need to be imposed on the use rights acquired by a
locality, the modified riparian doctrine still may not accommodate the
public interest to the satisfaction of some localities.
Although the localities' dissatisfaction may be somewhat justified, especially if the judiciary fails to broaden its perspective as much
as suggested, their discontent ignores an important facet of the modifications. The proposed modifications represent attempts to work
with the common-law allocation system to achieve an acceptable accommodation of private and public interests. They do not represent
attempts to alter the common-law system radically. The modified
principles do not give governmental entities free and un1irnited water
rights; nor do they guarantee that a locality's public consumptive
needs will be met. Localities desiring more radical changes should
urge development of a new allocation system or seek an independent
theory for recognizing public consumptive rights.

